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Abstract
The benefits of diversification decrease substantially during market downturns
due to asymmetric dependence between stock and market returns. Not all as-
sets are affected in the same way. This thesis provides a substantial evidence
of the cross-sectional variation in asymmetric dependence between equity re-
turns and market returns across the 38 largest financial markets and a variety
of asset classes.
I document that asymmetric dependence between stock returns and market
returns is significantly priced in international equity returns. Of all the com-
monly considered factors, asymmetric dependence is the only factor that is
priced in all 38 markets examined. Internationally, investors require additional
compensation to hold assets displaying asymmetric dependence. Notably, the
degree of asymmetric dependence increases faster in countries experiencing
stronger growth in their financial markets. This thesis supports recognition
of asymmetric dependence as a risk factor that has significant implications
for, inter alia, asset pricing, cost of capital, and performance evaluation.
Moreover, I build a general equilibrium model to identify important drivers
of the cross-sectional variation in asymmetric dependence. I show that stocks
with a high level of fundamental cash-flow risk exhibit a large amount of
time variation in conditional betas and a relatively higher degree of the cross-
sectional asymmetric dependence. The asymmetric effects of heterogeneous
cash-flow risk on the cross section of return dependence are driven by pref-
erence shocks correlated with the business cycle. The model predictions are
confirmed by US industry data.
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1Introduction
Asymmetric Dependence describes a characteristic of the joint distribution of re-
turns whereby the dependence between a stock and the market during market
downturns differs from that observed during market upturns (Patton, 2004) - see
Figure 1(a). Investors may well exhibit preferences for certain types of AD. For
example, consider two stocks A and B that have identical β and equal average
returns. Stock A exhibits a higher correlation in the lower tail of excess returns
whilst stock B is symmetric in return dependence. Under the assumptions of the
Sharpe-Lintner CAPM, investors will be indifferent to the choice between stocks
A and B as the expected returns on both stocks, as well as their βs, are equal.
However, investors may prefer stock B over A since stock A is more likely to suffer
abnormal losses during any market downturn.
Many authors find evidence for the existence of AD in US stock equities. See,
for example, Ang and Bekaert (2002); Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006b);
Campbell, Koedijk, and Kofman (2002); Chabi-Yo, Ruenzi, and Weigert (2017);
Hartmann, Straetmans, and De Vries (2004); Jiang, Wu, and Zhou (2017); Kelly
and Jiang (2014); Knight, Satchell, and Tran (1995); Oh and Patton (2017); Patton
(2004); Weigert (2015). In addition, several of these studies identify the existence
1
of AD between well-diversified stock indices, thereby providing credible evidence
that AD is not easily diversified.
If investors exhibit preferences with respect to AD then I expect AD to be
priced in financial markets if, in addition, it exists and is non-diversifiable. Dis-
appointment averse investors with state-dependent preferences, such as those de-
scribed by Skiadas (1997), will demand a return premium to compensate for lower-
tail asymmetric dependence exposure (Figure 1a). With a significant risk premium
for AD, the cost of capital will be substantially underestimated if AD is not incor-
porated properly.
Asymmetric dependence is heavily priced in the cross section of US listed eq-
uities (Alcock and Hatherley, 2016; Ang, Chen, and Xing, 2006a). The premium
associated with AD is consistent with disappointment-averse investors, such as
those described by Skiadas (1997), who expect an additional premium as com-
pensation for the asymmetric dependence risk. However, to date, little is known
about why AD exists, whether AD is a risk-based factor, and whether the pricing
of AD is US-centric or an international phenomenon. The focus of this thesis is to
provide answers to these questions.
Asymmetric dependence has important implications not only for asset pricing
but also for cost of capital estimation, capital allocation, performance manage-
ment and executive compensation. The phenomenon of asymmetric dependence,
its importance for international investors and its main determinants has not been
sufficiently explored. This thesis fills in this gap and provides evidence that asym-
metric dependence is priced internationally and across a range of different asset
classes.
This thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, I describe the empirical
measure of the cross-sectional asymmetric dependence and discuss the advantages
2
Types of Return Dependence
(a) Symmetric Dependence
(b) Lower-Tail Asymmetric Depen-
dence (LTAD)
(c) Upper-Tail Asymmetric Depen-
dence (UTAD)
Figure 1.1: Scatter plot of simulated bivariate data with different types of de-
pendence. The dependence between stock excess returns and market excess returns
may be described by a linear component (CAPM β) and a higher-order components,
capturing differences in dependence across the joint return distribution. A joint dis-
tribution that displays larger dependence in one tail compared to the opposite tail
is said to display asymmetric dependence. Panels (1.1(a)) to (1.1(c)) display three
possible types of return dependence, symmetric dependence, lower-tail asymmetric
dependence and upper-tail asymmetric dependence.
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of the particular empirical measure of AD that is used in this thesis. Next, in
Chapter 3, I show that asymmetric dependence is priced internationally across all
the 38 largest financial markets. Moreover, in Chapter 4, I find that asymmetric
dependence exists also among US listed real-estate equities that are commonly
considered as defensive assets. All the previous chapters provide empirical evi-
dence of the cross-sectional asymmetric dependence between equity returns with-
out discussing where asymmetric dependence may come from. Chapter 5 provides
a theoretical framework that identifies the heterogeneous cash-flow risk of firms as
an important driver of the cross-sectional asymmetric dependence.
I measure the cross-sectional asymmetric dependence using the Alcock and
Hatherley (2016) JAdj statistic, which is, to the best of my knowledge, the only
metric that is able to measure asymmetric dependence orthogonally from linear
dependence. I use the JAdj statistic to identify the level of AD of individual equity
returns, because this metric provides a monotonic measure in AD that allows for
the pricing of AD independently of the price of β risk. The resulting price of
AD measured using the JAdj statistic then corresponds to the additional return
premium that investors request to bear the asymmetric dependence risk, over
and above any premia that may be attached to β or idiosyncratic risk. Many of
the existing studies explore dependence using a single measure, thereby capturing
both the symmetric, linear dependence and AD with the same metric. From an
asset pricing perspective and for the purposes of cost of capital estimation, it is
important to separate these factors to identify the price of AD orthogonally to the
price of linear, market (β) risk, which is achieved when the JAdj statistic is used.
In Chapter 3, I contribute to a greater understanding of AD by showing both
its existence and pricing is an international phenomenon. I find that the average
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level of lower-tail asymmetric dependence and upper-tail asymmetric dependence1
among most markets examined is stronger than that found in the US market.
The international evidence for AD premia is striking; I show that AD is signifi-
cantly priced in all stock markets examined. Among commonly considered factors,
I find that asymmetric dependence is the only factor that is consistently priced in-
sample across all markets considered. My findings are consistent with asymmetric
dependence being a risk-based factor (see Griffin (2002)) that affects excess equity
returns internationally. In addition, I find that the degree of AD strengthens in
countries experiencing faster growth in their financial markets. Similarly, the pro-
portion of firms exhibiting LTAD increases as financial markets grow in size and
importance. This has important implications for financial market stability, be-
cause growth in national market capitalization relative to GDP may be associated
with negative effects for the real economy, ie potential abnormal losses experienced
during market downturns.
In Chapter 4, I explore the empirical evidence of the existence of AD across
US listed real-estate investment trusts (REITs). REITs are often assumed to be
defensive assets having a low correlation with market returns. However, this depen-
dence is not symmetric across the joint-return distribution. Disappointment-averse
investors with state-dependent preferences attach (dis-)utility to investments ex-
hibiting (lower-tail) upper-tail asymmetric dependence. I find strong empirical
evidence that investors price this asymmetric dependence in the cross section of
US REIT returns. In particular, I show that REIT stocks with lower-tail asym-
metric dependence attract a risk premium averaging 1.3 % p.a. and REIT stocks
exhibiting upper-tail asymmetric dependence are traded at discount averaging 5.8
1Lower- (upper-) tail asymmetric dependence describes a situation when a stock return cor-
relation with market returns is higher during market downturns (upturns) relative to upturns
(downturns), as illustrated in Figure 1.1.
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% p.a. I find no evidence that the equity β is positively priced in US REIT re-
turns. These findings imply that traditional estimators of REIT cost of capital
and performance measurement are likely to be substantially misrepresentative.
The identification of assets with a relatively low return dependence in bad
states (diversification) and a high dependence in good states (abnormal gains) is
very attractive for investors. Alcock and Hatherley (2016) show that a relatively
high (low) correlation of stock returns with market returns in bad times relative
to good times is associated with a significant return premium (discount). It still
remains unclear, however, why the cross-sectional variation in AD exists or which
stocks are more likely to exhibit a high degree of AD and perform relatively worse
during market downturns.
Moreover, despite a large body of empirical evidence identifying the cross-
sectional variation in asymmetric dependence between stock and market returns,1
little is known about the drivers of these cross-sectional differences. In Chap-
ter 5 of this thesis, I provide a theoretical explanation for the existence of the
cross-sectional asymmetric dependence. The benefits of diversification decrease
substantially during market downturns due to asymmetric dependence between
stock and market returns. Not all assets are affected in the same way. I build a
general equilibrium model to show that stocks with a high level of fundamental
cash-flow risk exhibit a large amount of time variation in conditional betas and
a relatively higher degree of asymmetric dependence. The asymmetric effects of
heterogeneous cash-flow risk on the cross section of return dependence are driven
by preference shocks correlated with the business cycle. The model predictions are
confirmed by data.
1See, for example, Alcock and Hatherley (2016); Ang and Bekaert (2002); Ang et al. (2006b);
Campbell et al. (2002); Chabi-Yo et al. (2017); Hartmann et al. (2004); Kelly and Jiang (2014);
Knight et al. (1995); Patton (2004); Weigert (2015).
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2Describing The Cross-sectional
Asymmetric Dependence
2.1 Measuring Asymmetric Dependence
Multiple measures exist that attempt to capture asymmetric dependence and/or
downside tail risk (the downside β (Ang et al., 2006a), Archimedean copula (Gen-
est et al., 2009), H-statistic (Ang and Chen, 2002), the J-statistic (Hong et al.,
2007) and the Alcock and Hatherley (2016) adjusted-J statistic). The Alcock and
Hatherley (2016) JAdj statistic is the only metric that is able to measure asym-
metric dependence orthogonally from linear dependence. I use the JAdj-statistic to
identify the level of AD of individual equity returns, because this metric provides
a monotonic measure in AD that allows for the pricing of AD independently of
the price of β risk.
The alternative metrics of asymmetric dependence typically use a single mea-
sure and thereby capture both the symmetric, linear dependence, and AD with the
same statistic. From an asset-pricing perspective and for the purposes of my study,
it is important to separate these factors to identify the price of AD orthogonally
7
2.1 Measuring Asymmetric Dependence
to the price of linear, market (β) risk.
I quantify the degree of asymmetric dependence between stock returns and
market returns using the Alcock and Hatherley (2016)’s Adjusted J-statistic (JAdj).
This measure of AD is orthogonal to the systematic and idiosyncratic risk.
Defining the JAdj Statistic
The Adjusted J-statistic (JAdj) adapts the J statistic proposed by Hong et al.
(2007) so that it is β and idiosyncratic risk invariant, thereby improving its utility
in empirical asset-pricing studies. The JAdj is defined by Alcock and Hatherley
(2016) as
AD = JAdj =
[
sgn
([
ρ˜+ − ρ˜−]1′)T (ρ˜+ − ρ˜−)′ Ωˆ−1(ρ˜+ − ρ˜−)] , (2.1)
where ρ˜+ = {ρ˜+(δ1), ρ˜+(δ2), ..., ρ˜+(δN)} and ρ˜− = {ρ˜−(δ1), ρ˜−(δ2), ..., ρ˜−(δN)},
1 is N × 1 vector of ones, Ωˆ is an estimate of the variance-covariance matrix,
(Hong et al., 2007). The conditional correlations are defined as follows, for δj ∈
{δ1, ..., δN},
ρ˜+(δj) = corr
(
R˜mt, R˜it|R˜mt > δj, R˜it > δj
)
(2.2)
ρ˜−(δj) = corr
(
R˜mt, R˜it|R˜mt < −δj, R˜it < −δj
)
. (2.3)
With symmetric dependence the value of JAdj will be close to zero. A significant
and non-zero value of JAdj provides evidence of an asymmetry between the lower
and upper-tail dependence.
I replicate the procedure proposed by Alcock and Hatherley (2016) to estimate
the Adjusted J-statistic (JAdj) for each equity in each country individually. First,
8
2.1 Measuring Asymmetric Dependence
for each set {Rit, Rmt}Tt=1, I get Rˆit = Rit−βRmt, where Rit and Rmt is the excess
return on asset i and market, and β = cov(Rit, Rmt)/σ
2
Rmt
. The first transformation
implies that each data set has a zero CAPM β, βRˆit,Rmt = 0. Second, I standardize
the data to get identical standard deviation of the CAPM regression residuals and
get RSmt and Rˆ
S
it. Third and the final transformation step sets the βˆ to 1 by letting
R˜mt = R
S
mt and R˜it = Rˆ
S
it +R
S
mt. After this transformation, all data sets have the
same β and standard deviation of model residuals, which compels the J-statistic
to be invariant to the linear dependence and the level of idiosyncratic risk.
I estimate the JAdj-statistic using daily excess returns following the definition
from equation (5.40) and using the following levels of exceedances
δ = {0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1} , (2.4)
consistent with Hong et al. (2007) and Alcock and Hatherley (2016).
Separating Lower-tail and Upper-tail Asymmetric Depen-
dence
Consistent with Alcock and Hatherley (2016), I separate the UTAD and LTAD
using indicator function Ic, which takes a value of 1 when condition c is satisfied
and zero otherwise. Any positive value (JAdj > 0) indicates upper-tail asymmet-
ric dependence (UTAD), while a negative value of (JAdj < 0) denotes lower-tail
asymmetric dependence (LTAD).
LTAD = JAdjIJAdj>0 (2.5)
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UTAD = JAdjIJAdj<0 (2.6)
I employ this measure for the following reasons. First, I seek to determine
the price and level of AD independently of systematic and idiosyncratic risk. The
JAdj is, by construction, orthogonal to the CAPM β and the idiosyncratic risk of
stock returns. The resulting price of AD measured using the JAdj statistic then
corresponds to the additional return premium that investors request to bear the
asymmetric dependence risk, over and above any premia that may be attached to
β or idiosyncratic risk.
The JAdj statistic differs from, for example, GARCH models that can only char-
acterize the correlation structure but cannot capture higher-order dependence, or
Copula functions can explain higher-order dependence but cannot achieve this in-
dependently of β and idiosyncratic risk. Weigert (2015) attempts to ameliorate the
impact of this issue by conditionally combining different copulae functions, which
leads to conditional β being characterized but his tail dependence measures remain
compounded by the effects of CAPM β and idiosyncratic risk. Similarly, Ang and
Chen (2002)’s downside and upside β cannot separate the effect of asymmetric
dependence from linear dependence or idiosyncratic risk on firm excess returns.
Second, I quantify the premia attached to different types of asymmetric depen-
dence. I distinguish between the situation when the return correlation is relatively
higher in the lower tail (lower-tail asymmetric dependence) or in the upper tail
(upper-tail asymmetric dependence), see Figure 1.1. These two return characteris-
tics have different implications for investors. Stock returns that exhibit lower-tail
asymmetric dependence (LTAD) are likely to be associated with a return premium
as investors may feel disappointed to hold assets that are highly correlated with the
10
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Aversion
market when the market is down. The upper-tail asymmetric dependent (UTAD)
stock returns will likely, on the other hand, be related with a return discount as
investors will feel rather elated to hold assets highly correlated with the market in
good times.
The JAdj statistic is a model-free nonparametric measure of dependence asym-
metries in the data. AD (measured by JAdj) differs from co-skewness, co-kurtosis
or upside and downside β measures. The JAdj statistic contains information about
all the higher-order co-moments, whereas co-skewness or co-kurtosis correspond to
the third and fourth co-moment only. The JAdj measure is different from condi-
tional βs because the JAdj is a function of the differences between the lower and
upper-tail correlations, where tail correlations are determined using multiple refer-
ence points. Upside and downside βs have only one reference point (typically zero
or the mean value), do not measure correlation asymmetries and are not orthog-
onal to the CAPM β. In order to illustrate the additional informational content
(or the importance) of AD, as measured by the JAdj, for investors, I include co-
skewness, co-kurtosis, downside and upside βs in my pricing regressions as control
variables. For further details about the JAdj statistic, please refer to Alcock and
Hatherley (2016).
2.2 The Price of Asymmetric Dependence and
Disappointment Aversion
It has long been recognized that investors care differently about downside losses
than they do about upside gains (Ang et al., 2006a). This concept has progressed
significantly from the classical notion of risk-aversion. Disappointment aversion is
distinct from risk-aversion in that disappointment (or elation) violates separability
11
2.2 The Price of Asymmetric Dependence and Disappointment
Aversion
axioms that impose independence across states. That is, outcomes in events that
did not occur affect attitudes towards outcomes that did (Grant, Kajii, and Polak,
2001). Several authors develop the theoretical underpinnings of these preferences,
including Gul (1991), Grant and Kajii (1998) and Skiadas (1997), all of whom
axiomatically model disappointment aversion.
Under the Skiadas model of disappointment aversion, an individual is endowed
with a family of conditional preference relations, one for each event. Grant et al.
(2001) elegantly describe this as follows:
Suppose acts f and g yield the exact same outcomes on event E, but
overall (unconditionally) g is preferred to f. Then, if the individual
dislikes disappointment, since all else is equal by construction, she will
be less unhappy in the event E if she chose f than if she chose g. That
is, conditional on E, she prefers f to g. Skiadas defines such an agent
as disappointment averse.
For example, consider two stocks X and Y that have equal CAPM βs and
expected returns. Let us further assume that Stock X displays a LTAD with
the market, whereas the returns on stock Y follows a multivariate Normal (MVN)
distribution with the market (i.e. symmetric dependence), as is described in Figure
1.1. Under the standard assumptions of the CAPM, a risk-averse investor will be
indifferent to investments in X or Y. However in the event of a major market
drawdown, such as during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, a disappointment-averse
investor may prefer stock Y over stock X since stock X is more likely to suffer losses
in a situation when investors’ wealth is already low. This disappointment translates
to investor dis-utility, and so disappointment-averse investors may demand a return
premium in order to compensate them for the dis-utility associated with LTAD.
Similarly, elation-seeking investors may accept a return discount in return for the
12
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greater utility derived from UTAD.
The depiction of disappointment-averse investors having a family of conditional
preference relations is the distinguishing feature of the Skiadas (1997) framework.
This insight recognises that an agent may, for example, experience significant
disappointment in the event of an extreme market drawdown and little or no
disappointment in the event of a slight market drawdown. In the following section,
I describe a metric of AD that is designed to capture a family of conditional
preferences, as described by Skiadas (1997). In contrast, Gul endows investors
with a single Savage preference relation and denotes disappointment relative to
the certainty equivalent of the investment return distribution. Ang et al.’s (2006a)
downside β is motivated by Gul’s (1991) description of disappointment aversion.
For completeness, I compare the primary results with those found using downside
β in Section 4.5.
Ang et al. (2006a) argue that the existence of a downside risk premium is
consistent with an economy of investors that are averse to disappointment in the
framework developed by Gul (1991). This framework deviates from the expected
utility paradigm upon which traditional asset pricing theory is built via the as-
sumption that the desirability of an act in a given state depends on not only the
objective payoff associated with the act, but also the state itself. This results in a
one parameter extension of the expected utility framework whereby outcomes that
lie above an endogenously defined reference point (elating outcomes) are down-
weighted relative to outcomes that lie below the reference point (disappointing
outcomes). The disappointment-averse utility function is therefore defined as:
φ(x, ν) =
 u(x) for x satisfying u(x) ≤ νu(x)+βν
1+β
for x satisfying u(x) > ν,
(2.7)
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where u is a generic utility function, β is the coefficient of disappointment aversion,
and ν is the certainty equivalent satisfying
∑
x φ(x, ν)p(x) = ν for probability
function p(x). This function inexplicably ties an agent’s risk aversion to their
aversion to disappointment and therefore cannot accommodate the separation of
dependence driven tail risk from systematic risk.1
An alternative framework is considered by Skiadas (1997) in which subjec-
tive consequences (disappointment, elation, regret, etc) are incorporated indirectly
through the properties of the decision maker’s preferences rather than through ex-
plicit inclusion among the formal primitives. For example, if an act y is considered
ex ante to yield better consequences than x overall, then the subjective feeling of
disappointment in having chosen y over x in the event that F occurs can lead to
the situation in which x is no less desirable than y during event F . In this case,
an aversion to disappointment implies that x is preferred over y in the event that
F occurs. This is formally written as:
(
x = y onF and y Ω x)⇒ x F y, x, y ∈ X, (2.8)
where Ω represents the set of all events, X is the set of acts, and  defines a
complete and transitive preference order. Disappointment is therefore defined by
the agent’s preference relation rather than if an outcome is worse than a certainty
equivalent.
Individuals with Skiadas (1997) preferences are therefore endowed with a fam-
1The set of preferences (u, β) satisfying (2.7), are risk averse if and only if β ≥ 0 and u is
concave (see Gul (1991), Theorem 3 for proof). Furthermore, (u1, β1) is more risk averse than
(u2, β2) if β1 ≥ β2 and Rau1(x) ≥ Rau2(x) for all x, where Rau(x) = −u′′(x)/u′(x), the coefficient
of absolute risk aversion (see Gul (1991), Theorem 5 for proof). It follows that if (u1, β1) is
more risk averse than (u2, β2), then β1 ≥ β2. Although Gul (1991) preferences improve upon
traditional utility preferences in the explanation of asset return dynamics, they fail to sufficiently
account for observed risk premium variability (Bekaert et al., 1997) and cannot accommodate
the existence of counter-cyclical risk aversion (Epstein and Zin, 2001; Routledge and Zin, 2010)
due to the constancy of the downside aversion parameter across states.
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ily of conditional preference relations, one for each event (Grant and Kajii, 1998).
Preferences are state-dependent, as in the Gul (1991) framework, and because
consequences are treated implicitly through the agents preference relations, pref-
erences can be regarded as “non-separable” in that the ranking of an act given an
event may depend on subjective consequences of these acts outside of the event.
Equation (2.8) has two important implications for my study. First, the out-
comes associated with x and y given F need not be bad outcomes. This implies
that the market may display feelings of disappointment even in the absence of
poor market conditions leading to the expectation of time varying tail risk pre-
mia. Second, the separation of systematic risk from excess tail risk follows directly
from (2.8) in that an act y may be preferred over x overall given the global risk
aversion properties of the individual, but may be more or less appealing during a
particular event as a result of the markets attitude towards disappointment and
elation. I therefore expect the market to assign a separate premium to both global
(systematic) risk aversion and aversion to AD.
Although disappointment aversion reflects a divergence from von Neumann
Morgenstern expected utility theory, the validity of a market price of risk contin-
ues to hold as a result of the relationship between disappointment aversion and
risk aversion. Gul (1991), for example, demonstrates that risk aversion implies dis-
appointment aversion. Conversely, Routledge and Zin (2010) argue that investor
preferences exhibit more risk aversion as the penalty for disappointing outcomes
increases, effectively as a result of an increase in the concavity of the utility func-
tion. This implies that an increase in downside risk is also likely to be captured
by an increase in systematic risk.
From a risk management perspective, this induces a substitution effect between
risk aversion and disappointment aversion in that the effect of risk aversion on a
15
2.2 The Price of Asymmetric Dependence and Disappointment
Aversion
utility maximizing hedge portfolio decreases as disappointment aversion increases,
and vice versa (Lien and Wang, 2002).
In an economy consisting of investors that are averse to disappointment in the
framework developed by Gul (1991), Ang et al. (2006a) show that investors require
higher compensation to invest in stocks that are sensitive to market downturns.
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3The Price of Asymmetric
Dependence: International
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This chapter contributes to a greater understanding of AD by showing both
its existence and pricing is an international phenomenon. I find that the average
level of lower-tail asymmetric dependence and upper-tail asymmetric dependence1
among most markets examined is stronger than that found in the US market. In
addition, the international evidence for AD premia is striking; I show that AD is
significantly priced in all stock markets examined. Among commonly considered
factors, I find that asymmetric dependence is the only factor that is consistently
priced in-sample across all markets considered. The coefficients attached to AD
have a “Bayesianized” p-value (Harvey, 2017) lower than 1% in all of the countries
analyzed with a t-statistics exceeding the Harvey, Liu, and Zhu (2014)’s value of
3.0. My findings are consistent with asymmetric dependence being a risk-based
factor (see Griffin (2002)) that affects excess equity returns internationally.
I measure AD orthogonally to systematic and idiosyncratic risk. Accordingly,
the AD premium is the reward investors expect for their acceptance of asymmetric
dependence risk. Such risk is independent of the premium investors demand when
they accept systematic and idiosyncratic risk (Alcock and Hatherley, 2016). My
study controls for coskewness and cokurtosis to show that the AD risk premium
is not confounded by any of these factors. I find that both lower- and upper-tail
firm-level asymmetric dependence are important for international investors, who
demand a premium for exposure to LTAD and accept a discount for the UTAD
benefits.
In addition, the return premium required to hold stocks with lower-tail asym-
metric dependence decreases, whereas the discount associated with upper-tail
asymmetric dependence increases as the proportion of firms with returns exhibit-
1Lower- (upper-) tail asymmetric dependence describes a situation when a stock return cor-
relation with market returns is higher during market downturns (upturns) relative to upturns
(downturns), as illustrated in Figure 1.1.
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ing lower-tail asymmetric dependence increases. In other words, a decrease in the
‘supply’ or the availability of AD makes it more valuable to investors, which is
consistent with the general demand and supply for AD risk. My findings pro-
vide further evidence consistent with AD being a relevant risk-based factor that is
associated with a non-negligible hedging cost.
I also contribute to a better understanding of the drivers of AD by empirically
exploring the role macro-factors play in cross-country heterogeneity in the aggre-
gated AD across countries. I explore whether economic risks (Ferson and Harvey,
1991), country-specific financial market risks (Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta, 1996),
the law code origin (Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998), or the
World Bank Doing Business indicators that differ across countries can explain the
country variations in AD by country.
I find that the degree of AD strengthens in countries experiencing faster growth
in their financial markets. Similarly, the proportion of firms exhibiting LTAD in-
creases as financial markets grow in size and importance. This has important
implications for financial market stability, because growth in national market cap-
italization relative to GDP may be associated with negative effects for the real
economy, ie potential abnormal losses experienced during market downturns.
These findings suggest that the financial markets considered in this study share
common factors that influence the firm-level asymmetric dependence, as well as
return sensitivity to AD. I find strong global and regional commonality effects in
both the level and price of asymmetric dependence. The aggregate firm-level AD
in different countries correlates with the global and regional aggregate AD levels.
Country-specific investor sensitivity to AD is positively associated with the global
and regional sensitivity to AD.
There is still disagreement in the existing literature about which factors explain
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the cross section of stock returns of international equities, despite the many studies
exploring international factor pricing (Amihud, Hameed, Kang, and Zhang, 2015;
Chan, Karolyi, and Stulz, 1992; Fama and French, 1998, 2012, 2017; Hou, Karolyi,
and Kho, 2011; Lee, 2011; Van Dijk, 2011; Watanabe, Xu, Yao, and Yu, 2013).
Furthermore, there is uncertainty as to whether only one set of risk factors impact
asset prices in all countries, or the drivers are country-specific. My contribution
to this debate provides evidence consistent with AD being a strong and consistent
risk factor, that is priced in all markets considered.
This research builds on the previous work of Alcock and Hatherley (2016),
who identify that US investors require additional compensation for assets with
returns exhibiting lower-tail asymmetric dependence, and who accept a discount
for holding stocks with upper-tail asymmetric dependence. Weigert (2015) shows
that international investors require additional compensation as a form of protec-
tion against the risk of a market crash. In this paper, I argue that the entire
continuum of asymmetric dependence between stock returns and market returns
is relevant for investors in international markets, and that their preferences are
not related to traditional consumption risk aversion. These results are consistent
with international financial markets endowed with disappointment-averse investors
(Skiadas, 1997).
This chapter is organised in the following sections. Section 3.1 describes my
methods and Section 5.4 reports the data sample. Section 3.3 discusses the main
results documenting the price of asymmetric dependence internationally, exploring
the cross-country differences in the observed levels and prices of AD and studying
the commonality effects of AD and AD pricing. Section 5.6 concludes.
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3.1 Empirical Design
Estimating Risk Premia
I follow Alcock and Hatherley (2016) and Ang et al. (2006a) to provide evidence
of the price of asymmetric dependence in each country individually. I examine
the relation between asymmetric dependence and excess returns using the Ang
et al. (2006a) cross-sectional regressions, while controlling for systematic risk, size,
book-to-market ratio, momentum, idiosyncratic risk, coskewness, cokurtosis and
illiquidity. I report the results for all the individual countries in the Appendix.
I consider and compare four main models with the following factors (regres-
sors): Model (0) as log(size), book-to-market ratio, momentum, idiosyncratic risk,
coskewness, cokurtosis, and illiquidity; Model (1) as: Model (0) and CAPM β,
Model (2) as Model (1) and AD, Model (3) as Model (1) and LTAD and UTAD,
and Model (4) as Model (0) and downside and upside β, and LTAD and UTAD.
At each month t, the average monthly excess return calculated using past twelve
months of daily data is regressed against a subset of the following regressors: the
JAdj, CAPM β, upside and downside β, idiosyncratic risk, size, book-to-market
ratio, Amihud (2002) illiquidity, coskewness, cokurtosis and the average of past
12 monthly excess returns estimated using daily returns from the past 12-month
period (except for the illiquidity factor). The Amihud (2002) illiquidity factor is
estimated using daily data from past 3 months. Regressors are winsorized at the
1% and 99% level each month to control for inefficient factor estimates. I use
data on daily basis to ensure sufficient number of observations for the asymmetric
dependence measure. The estimated values of the risk factors may be noisy relative
to estimates based on lower frequency data, the significance tests should, however,
have sufficient power since I use a relatively long data history (Lewellen and Nagel,
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2006).
For a given month t, I calculate the JAdj-statistic following Alcock and Hather-
ley (2016), using daily excess returns from the past 12 months with levels of ex-
ceedances: δ = {0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1}, which is also consistent with Hong, Tu, and
Zhou (2007) and Alcock and Hatherley (2016).
The control variables from my regressions are calculated as follows. In a given
month, t, the CAPM β, coskewness, cokurtosis are estimated using 12 months of
past excess daily returns. Firm size is the log value of market value calculated over
12 months of past daily observations. The book-to-market ratio is the average
BM from 12 months of past daily observations, where the book value of equity
is the last end-of-year value observation. The idiosyncratic risk is measured as
the standard deviation of CAPM residuals estimated using daily excess returns
in past 12 months. Monthly excess returns are calculated from the continuously
compounded excess daily returns. I use daily risk-free rate to obtain excess returns.
The downside and upside β are defined as
β− =
cov(Ri, Rm|Rm < 0)
var(Rm|Rm < 0) (3.1)
β+ =
cov(Ri, Rm|Rm > 0)
var(Rm|Rm > 0) , (3.2)
where Ri is the excess return on asset i and Rm is the market excess return. I use
the MSCI World Index as a market benchmark and the US one-month T-Bill rate
as a proxy for a risk free rate to calculate excess returns.
I estimate the risk premia for each factor using cross-sectional regressions es-
timated every month rolling forward using a 12 month window. I use overlap-
ping data in the monthly rolling-window estimations and therefore use the Newey
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and West (1987b) method to test for statistical significance and Newey and West
(1994b) for automatic lag selection. I use a short-rolling window to identify the
time variation in systematic risk (Bollerslev, Engle, and Wooldridge, 1988; Bos and
Newbold, 1984; Fabozzi and Francis, 1978; Ferson and Harvey, 1991, 1993; Ferson
and Korajczyk, 1995) and variations in asymmetric dependence risk (Alcock and
Hatherley, 2016).
Country Panel Regressions
I explore the country variation in AD level and AD pricing. I first control for
common factors affecting all countries. The commonality analysis is described in
Section 3.1. I regress the residuals from commonality regressions that quantify the
country-specific variation in AD and AD pricing, observed at the end of given year
t on a list of regressors from Table 3.6 in the Appendix. I use the residuals from
equations (3.3) and (3.4) instead of country levels and prices of AD to control for
regional and global common factors.
I use data from 2004 until 2015, because the Doing Business Indicators issued
by the World Bank are not available before 2004. If return data is not yet available
for a given stock exchange in 2004 in the WRDS Compustat Global dataset, I use
the maximum available data window fort this given financial market.
I analyze the country variation in AD using panel regressions with and without
fixed-year effects and cluster standard errors by countries. I apply first differencing
to all the variables from Table 3.6, except the dummy variables describing short
selling practices and law code. First differencing helps in reducing the impact of
collinearity (the Variance Inflation Factor reduced to less than 10 for all variables
in the model).
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Commonality Effects
I divide the countries into three regions consistent with Amihud et al. (2015).
My sample covers 6 countries from Americas (Argentina, Canada, Chile, Mexico,
Peru and US), 11 Asian-Pacific countries (Australia, China, Hong Kong, India,
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines and Singapore) and
20 European (or closely related to Europe) countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Romania, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and UK).
I analyze how country levels of AD and return sensitivity to AD are linked with
its global and regional values.1 I start by exploring the commonalities in the level
of AD and regress the mean country level of JAdj (across all firms from country c)
at month t (JAdjct ) on global and regional levels of AD at month t (J
Adj
gt and J
Adj
rt ),
while controlling for the monthly market excess returns (rmt), see regression model
in (3.3).2
JAdjct = α0c + α1cJ
Adj
gt + α2cJ
Adj
rt + α3crmt + ct. (3.3)
A commonality in the level of AD is indicated by a positive and significant
coefficient α1c and/or α2c. The global level of asymmetric dependence (J
Adj
gt ) is
the weighted average value of the JAdj across all the countries from my sample, and
the regional level of asymmetric dependence (JAdjrt ) is the weighted average value
of the JAdj across all the countries from a given region. ct represents regression
residuals. Weights assigned to each financial market are based on the number of
distinct firms listed on a given stock exchange.
Next, I analyze the commonalities in the variations of return premia attached
1The subscripts c, g and r represent the country, global and regional values of AD and
sensitivity to AD in all the regressions in this section.
2JAdjrt is orthogonalized to J
Adj
gt . I regress J
Adj
rt on J
Adj
gt and use the residual and intercept,
excluding the global effect on regional value, as the regional factor. I exclude country c when
calculating the global and regional values.
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to AD, see the model described from (3.4). I regress the mean return premium
attached to the JAdj in country c at month t (γct) on a global level of return
premium attached to the JAdj in month t (γgt), calculated as a weighted average of
return premium from month t across all countries from the sample, regional level
of return premium attached to the JAdj in month t (γrt), calculated as a weighted
average of return premium from month t across all countries from a given region
(Americas, Europe, or Asia-Pacific), the global level of AD (JAdjgt ) and regional
level of AD (JAdjrt ). The regional values of the level of AD (J
Adj
rt ) and sensitivity
to AD (γrt) are orthogonalized to its global counterparts (J
Adj
gt and γgt). ξct are
regression residuals.
γct = δ0c + δ1cγgt + δ2cγrt + δ3cJ
Adj
gt + δ4cJ
Adj
rt + ξct (3.4)
3.2 Data
I explore the price of asymmetric dependence (AD) on a sample of 38 stock ex-
changes. I select the largest stock exchange in each country except for China,
where I analyze both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange. I include both
stock exchanges from China (Shanghai and Shenzhen) and decide not to pool
them together due to differing listing requirements. I have data on 31,893 indi-
vidual firms from the 38 stock exchanges and 3,506,776 firm-month observations.
Table 3.1 describes the sample period, the number of distinct firms and firm-month
observations for all the financial markets considered.
For each country except the US, I retrieve daily stock price information from
WRDS Compustat Global Security Daily database (G SECD). I obtain a time
series of daily firm identifier (gvkey), date, close price (prccd), daily cash dividend
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Data Description
Table 3.1: This tables describes the data used from country i, including the sample
period, number of distinct firm and number of firm-month observations. I record
data from December 31, 1985 when the market proxy (MSCI World Index) becomes
available in the WRDS Database.
Country i Sample Period (dd/mm/yyyy) Distinct Firms Firm-Month Observations
Argentina 03/01/89 - 31/12/2015 89 10,333
Australia 02/01/87 - 31/12/2015 2,446 206,232
Austria 04/01/88 - 31/12/2015 147 13,884
Belgium 02/01/87 - 31/12/2015 211 24,392
Canada 31/12/85 - 31/12/2015 837 48,616
Chile 01/06/92 - 31/12/2015 223 18,050
China (Shanghai) 15/02/94 - 31/12/2015 934 124,378
China (Shenzhen) 15/02/94 - 31/12/2015 1,545 122,054
Denmark 02/01/87 - 31/12/2015 281 28,280
Egypt 06/01/97 - 31/12/2015 192 12,372
Finland 02/01/87 - 31/12/2015 177 23,391
France 02/01/87 - 31/12/2015 1,185 124,608
Germany 02/01/87 - 31/12/2015 900 87,963
Greece 01/06/92 - 31/12/2015 296 34,364
Hong Kong 02/01/87 - 31/12/2015 1,640 179,731
India 02/01/90 - 31/12/2015 2,065 88,646
Indonesia 30/05/90 - 31/12/2015 519 46,726
Ireland 31/05/95 - 31/12/2015 519 45,046
Italy 02/01/87 - 31/12/2015 457 52,001
Japan 02/01/87 - 31/12/2015 3,432 690,034
Korea 05/01/87 - 31/12/2015 1,855 231,945
Mexico 02/01/91 - 31/12/2015 155 14,406
Netherlands 02/01/87 - 31/12/2015 271 32,772
New Zealand 05/01/87 - 31/12/2015 171 16,429
Norway 02/01/87 - 31/12/2015 319 28,118
Pakistan 03/01/94 - 31/12/2015 418 33,645
Peru 16/08/94 - 31/12/2015 104 8,510
Philippines 03/01/89 - 31/12/2015 265 26,068
Poland 10/08/95 - 31/12/2015 636 43,786
Portugal 03/01/89 - 31/12/2015 94 9,334
Romania 19/05/98 - 31/12/2015 76 4,578
Singapore 02/01/87 - 31/12/2015 946 96,766
South Africa 01/06/92 - 31/12/2015 487 45,904
Spain 05/01/87 - 31/12/2015 492 46,815
Sweden 02/01/87 - 31/12/2015 628 57,325
Switzerland 05/01/87 - 31/12/2015 296 42,656
Turkey 13/02/90 - 31/12/2015 403 39,413
UK 02/01/87 - 31/12/2015 3,447 309,433
US 31/12/85 - 31/12/2015 2,880 437,772
Total 31,983 3,506,776
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amount (div), daily volume (cshtrd) and number of shares outstanding (cshoc). I
collect annual balance sheet information from WRDS Compustat Global Funda-
mentals Annual database. I collect firm identifier (gvkey), financial year (fyear),
common equity (ceq) for all listed equities. Data is collected in US dollars. I
select only common equity, where “TPCI - Issue Type Code” from the Compustat
Global Security Daily database is equal to 0 (Common, ordinary shares).
US data is collected from CRSP Security Daily database. I include only com-
mon shares (CRSP share code 10 or 11). I obtain CRSP return (ret), close price
(prc), number of shares outstanding (shrout), daily volume (vol) and use permno
as the main firm identifier. I use listings with the NYSE main stock exchange only
(where “hexcd=1”) to avoid potential biases due to cross listings or different list-
ing requirements. I collect end-of-year information about the firm common equity
values (ceq) from the Compustat Fundamentals Annual database.
For all countries, except the US, I calculate total return as the sum of the
capital gain and yield on dividends: Rit =
Pt−Pt−1+Dt
Pt−1
, where Pt and Pt−1 are
close prices from day t and the previous day t − 1 and Dt is the cash amount
of dividends paid out on day t. For US equities, I use the CRSP return, which
already incorporates both capital gains as well as dividend income.
I use the MSCI World Index as the market proxy and the US one-month T-
Bill rate collected from WRDS Fama French Factors dataset for the proxy of
risk free rate in all countries examined. This approach is consistent with existing
international asset-pricing studies (Amihud et al., 2015; Karolyi et al., 2012).
I follow Ince and Porter (2006) and set any daily return Rit of firm i on day t
to zero if rit exceeds 200% or if Rit > 100% and (1+Rit)×(1+Rit−1)−1 < 20%. I
use this procedure to screed for data errors indicating substantial returns that are
reversed within one month. Furthermore, I exclude all daily returns with negative
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BM to cover for potential data errors. I apply a liquidity rule and remove stock-
return time series with more than 50% of zero or missing daily returns. For each
month t, only stock return time series with data available in months t−12 to t+12
are included in the final data set. I only consider such stock exchanges that have
at least 50 listed firms and start analyzing the return time-series of such financial
exchanges only after the number of firms exceeds 50.
Descriptive Statistics
The country mean level of JAdj ranges from -0.617 (Turkey) to -3.395 (Hong Kong),
Figure 3.1. A negative mean JAdj observed across all countries suggests that there
are more firms exhibiting LTAD (JAdj < 0) than UTAD (JAdj > 0) in all of the
world largest stock exchanges, given that the magnitude of the firm-level LTAD
and UTAD is comparable in the stock markets considered, see Table 3.1 in the
Appendix. The relatively low absolute value of the mean JAdj in the Turkey can
be explained by a lower number of firms exhibiting LTAD returns relative to other
countries. The highest degree of both LTAD and UTAD is recorded in Peru, which
suggests that firms in Peru exhibit highly asymmetric tail correlations.
The values of mean βs range from low 0.191 (Shanghai) to high 1.050 (Turkey).
The relatively low observed values of the CAPM β may be attributed to the usage
of noisy daily data, which may result in a low correlation with the market proxy
(Vasicek, 1973) and/or the choice of the global market proxy (MSCI World index).
The main results remain qualitatively similar when local market proxies are used.
Table 3.7 describes summary statistics of the factor of the main interest, the firm-
level asymmetric dependence (JAdj), as well as of all the control variables used in
my pricing regressions: CAPM β, log-size, BM, past returns, idiosyncratic risk,
coskewness, cokurtosis and illiquidity.
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The Degree of Asymmetric Dependence: Country Comparison
(a) Asymmetric Dependence
(b) Lower-Tail Asymmetric Dependence (LTAD)
(c) Upper-Tail Asymmetric Dependence (UTAD)
Figure 3.1: This figure shows the country levels of asymmetric dependence (3.1(a)),
lower-tail asymmetric dependence (3.1(b)) and upper-tail asymmetric dependence
(3.1(c)), respectively. The country level of asymmetric dependence corresponds to
the equally-weighted average value of firm-specific asymmetric dependence (mea-
sured using JAdj) across all firms listed in a given financial market. The description
of data used is provided in Table 3.1.
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The JAdj is largely uncorrelated with other risk factors (Table 4.2 in the Ap-
pendix), except coskewness. The JAdj captures higher-order dependence structure
and therefore also contains information about the third co-moment. The JAdj is
constructed to describe and combine information from all the higher-order asym-
metries in return correlations, that may be attributed to any of the higher-order
co-moment, and shall not, therefore, be considered as just another (different) mea-
sure of the third co-moment. In order to justify the relevance of the JAdj for the
variations in the cross section of equity returns, I also include coskewness and
cokurtosis in the pricing regressions as control variables.
3.3 Results
The International Pricing of Asymmetric Dependence
The firm level asymmetric dependence (JAdj) is significantly priced in all in-sample
regressions, and all out-of-sample pricing regressions except Egypt and Mexico. I
use the Fama and MacBeth (1973) asset-pricing procedure to estimate the out-
of-sample regressions and the Ang and Chen (2002)’s method to conduct the in-
sample tests. In all of the countries in my study, the coefficient associated with
the degree of the firm-level asymmetric dependence is positive. This result is
ubiquitous and strongly consistent with the view that asymmetric dependence
between stock returns and market returns is a general risk-based factor, rather
than being an anomalous characteristic of the US market.
The value-weighted average t-statistic associated with the firm-level asymmet-
ric dependence is 5.876. See Model (2) from Table 3.2.1 In 34 out of 38 markets,
the t-statistic is greater than the Harvey, Liu, and Zhu (2014) hurdle rate of 3.0,
1I use the number of listed equities in each stock market as weights to calculate the average
regression coefficients and t-statistic from Table 3.2.
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Main Results: Summary
Table 3.2: This table shows the mean country-level cross-sectional regression co-
efficient and mean t-statistics (in parenthesis, in absolute values) estimated using
Fama and MacBeth (1973) reressions. The stock exchange size (the number of listed
companies from Table 3.1) is used as a weight to calculate the value-weighted average
coefficient and t-statistics. This table summarizes the risk premia measured using
the Ang et al. (2006a) asset-pricing procedure where equally-weighted cross-sectional
regressions are computed every month rolling forward. The detailed country-specific
results are available in the Appendix. The coefficients are calculated for each coun-
try individually as follows. At a given month, t, the average excess monthly return
calculated using the past twelve months of daily data is regressed against AD (JAdj),
LTAD (JAdj−), UTAD (JAdj+), β, size (“Log-size”), book-to-market ratio (“BM”),
the average past 12-monthly excess return (“Past Ret”), idiosyncratic risk (“Idio”),
coskewness (“Cosk”), cokurtosis (“Cokurt”) and illiquidity factor (“Illiq”). The
book-to-market ratio (“BM”) at time t for a given stock is computed using the last
available (most recent) book equity entry. The Amihud (2002) illiquidity factor
(“illiq”) at month t is estimated using daily data from t− 3 until t. Statistical sig-
nificance is determined using Newey and West (1987b) adjusted t-statistics, given
in parentheses, to control for overlapping data using the Newey and West (1994b)
automatic lag selection method to determine the lag length. All coefficients are re-
ported as effective annual rates. Risk premia are estimated using all data available,
a description of the data sample is provided in Table 3.1. MSCI World index and
the US 1-month T-Bill rate are used as a market and risk free rate proxy. All returns
are in US dollars.
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Intercept -0.041 [0.186] -0.133 [0.486] -0.160 [0.586] -0.120 [0.498]
β -0.050 [1.372] -0.071 [1.246] -0.074 [1.274]
Log-size 0.001 [0.075] 0.003 [0.238] 0.003 [0.287] 0.003 [0.314]
BM 0.015 [2.130] 0.016 [1.576] 0.016 [1.556] 0.015 [1.869]
Past Ret -1.147 [4.409] -1.084 [2.750] -1.076 [2.671] -1.084 [3.974]
Idio 5.002 [2.933] 4.999 [1.779] 5.038 [1.736] 4.023 [2.415]
Cosk -0.045 [0.629] 0.158 [1.773] 0.146 [1.638] 0.584 [4.053]
Cokurt -0.004 [0.164] 0.026 [0.691] 0.029 [0.785] 0.006 [0.211]
Illiq -0.654 [0.038] -0.590 [1.123] -0.637 [1.398] -0.616 [0.648]
β− 0.034 [2.255]
β+ -0.039 [2.494]
AD -0.014 [3.153]
LTAD -0.015 [2.965] -0.015 [4.485]
UTAD -0.012 [2.536] -0.013 [3.689]
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set to account for data mining issues and noise in variables. In all the countries
sampled, the coefficient associated with the JAdj is positive, see Figure 3.2. The
positive sign projects that the higher the degree of AD, the higher the expected ex-
cess return in one month. This further supports the Skiadas (1997) disappointment
theory, where investors expect additional compensation in return for asymmetric
dependence risk. Table 3.2 summarizes my main results, while country-specific
details are described in Appendix A.
My findings add further to our understanding of the risk-return drivers of inter-
national asset prices of listed equities. I find that the mean coefficient associated
with CAPM β is negative and insignificant. The coefficient attached to the CAPM
β is either insignificant or negative. My findings are consistent with a large number
of studies documenting a negative (or insignificant) price of CAPM β risk (Daniel
and Titman, 1997; Hou et al., 2011; Weigert, 2015; Zhang, 2006). I do not find
any out of sample evidence that systematic risk, as measured using the CAPM β
or upside and downside βs, is relevant for international investors, whereas AD is.
The existence of AD and AD pricing has important implications for risk-based
investment strategies that determine capital allocation, based on the bivariate dis-
tribution of firm returns and market returns. In the 38 largest financial markets,
asymmetric characteristics of return correlations are relevant for international in-
vestors with state-dependent preferences (see Skiadas (1997)), as they may value
potential gains and losses unevenly. Indeed, I suggest that the entire continuum
of asymmetric dependence is highly relevant for international investors.
My results of AD pricing are not confounded by the effect of systematic or
idiosyncratic risk. I use a measure of the firm-level AD (JAdj) that is orthogonal
to firm-level CAPM β and idiosyncratic risk. This is an important distinction
from other studies that use copulae techniques to measure tail dependence. For
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The Price of Asymmetric Dependence: Country Comparison
(a) Asymmetric Dependence
(b) Lower-Tail Asymmetric Dependence (LTAD)
(c) Upper-Tail Asymmetric Dependence (UTAD)
Figure 3.2: This figure shows the country price of asymmetric dependence (3.2(a)),
lower-tail asymmetric dependence (3.2(b)) and upper-tail asymmetric dependence
(3.2(c)), respectively. The significance of the price of asymmetric dependence (JAdj)
is measured using the in-sample Ang et al. (2006a) asset-pricing procedure where
equally-weighted cross-sectional regressions are computed every month rolling for-
ward. At a given month, t, the one-month excess monthly return from t is re-
gressed against JAdj (or JAdj− and JAdj+, respectively), β, size (“Log-size”), book-
to-market ratio (“BM”), the average past 12-monthly excess return (“Past Ret”),
idiosyncratic risk (“Idio”), coskewness (“Cosk”), cokurtosis (“Cokurt”) and illiq-
uidity factor (“Illiq”). The description of data used is provided in Table 3.1. The
dashed line represents the confidence interval associated with the t-statistic of 1.96
(5% confidence level) and the dotted line is associated with the confidence interval
related to a t-statistic of 3.0 (the Harvey et al. (2014) hurdle rate for t-statistic).
33
3.3 Results
example, see Low, Alcock, Faff, and Brailsford (2013); Oh and Patton (2017);
Patton (2012); Weigert (2015) or Genest, Gendron, and Bourdeau-Brien (2009).
International asset-pricing studies provide one of few tools to assess whether
a priced firm-level characteristics is a risk-based factor or a data-mining-related
anomaly (Griffin, 2002). Using different data samples from different financial mar-
kets to replicate the estimation of the AD risk premium 38 times, I find that AD
pricing is ubiquitous. Again, this is consistent with AD being a risk-based factor
relevant for investors internationally.
I estimate that the ‘typical’ return premium attached to AD1 expected by
investors ranges from a low 1% per annum (Turkey) to a high 7% per annum (Ire-
land), Figure 3.3. Investors most sensitive to AD are those in Ireland, Indonesia,
Argentina and Hong Kong, all of whom require a ‘typical’ return premium of more
than 5% per annum for holding a stock with an average degree of AD.
The pricing evidence of other commonly considered factors remains largely
consistent with existing literature. BM ratio is positively priced in 17 out of 38
markets. The positive coefficient associated with the BM ratio is consistent with
the Fama and French (1992, 1998, 2012, 2017) and Amihud et al. (2015)’s find-
ings. The Amihud (2002) illiquidity factor is significant only in the US and Sin-
gapore, which contrasts with Amihud, Hameed, Kang, and Zhang (2015) findings.
I exclude highly illiquid firm observations from the sample (see exclusion rules
described in Section 5.4), which may explain why the significance of the illiquidity
premia is lower in my results than in Amihud et al. (2015).
1The ‘typical’ price of AD is defined as the product of the mean JAdj and the estimated
regression coefficient associated with JAdj .
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The “Typical Price” of Asymmetric Dependence: Country
Comparison
(a) Asymmetric Dependence
(b) Lower-Tail Asymmetric Dependence (LTAD)
(c) Upper-Tail Asymmetric Dependence (UTAD)
Figure 3.3: This figure shows the typical price of asymmetric dependence (3.3(a)),
lower-tail asymmetric dependence (3.3(b)) and upper-tail asymmetric dependence
(3.3(c)), respectively. The typical price of AD is defined as the product of the mean
JAdj and the estimated regression coefficient associated with JAdj . The description
of data used is provided in Table 3.1.
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Lower-tail and Upper-tail Asymmetric Dependence
I explore the pricing of two notably distinct types of asymmetric dependence,
lower-tail asymmetric dependence (LTAD) and upper-tail asymmetric dependence
(UTAD). I quantify the price of the two types of AD, LTAD (JAdj−) and UTAD
(JAdj+), separately, by including them as risk factors in the out-of-sample pricing
regressions, Model (3) from Table 3.2. I find that at least one of the two factors,
LTAD or UTAD, is significant in all the countries, except for Mexico, Romania
and Turkey.1
Out of sample, in almost all the markets, LTAD (UTAD) is associated with pos-
itive (negative) and significant coefficients. This is consistent with my hypothesis
as the positive coefficient implies that the higher the degree of LTAD (measured
using JAdj−), the higher the excess return in next month, suggesting a return
premium required by investors to bear lower-tail asymmetric dependence
risk.2 The negative coefficient suggests that the higher the degree of UTAD (mea-
sured using JAdj+), the lower the excess return in the following month, which
indicates a return discount attached to upper-tail asymmetric dependence.
Significantly, I must be able to distinguish between these two types of AD, since
they have opposite implications for expected returns (premium or discount). This
is of critical importance for investor. I explain my empirical results in the con-
text of the Skiadas (1997) disappointment theory. Stock returns exhibiting LTAD
(UTAD) are associated with a return premium (discount) because investors with
state-dependent preferences may feel disappointed (elated) for having to hold an
LTAD (UTAD) asset relative to a symmetric asset. Having access to information
1For details on all country-level regressions, please refer to Tables from Appendix A.
2I note that JAdj− is always negative and when returns are regressed on JAdj−, the coefficient
associated with JAdj− is negative. I choose to report a positive regression coefficient to be
consistent with a common convention that positive coefficient suggests a return premium and a
negative regression coefficient indicates a return discount.
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about the current type and degree of AD is clearly important for the international
investor.
In terms of whether investors are concerned about upside and downside βs, I
add further clarification by adding the upside β (β+) and downside β (β−) into
the pricing regressions, see Model (4) from Table 3.2. I find that investors value
LTAD and UTAD, as measured by JAdj− and JAdj+, respectively, more than they
value upside and downside βs.
The ‘typical’ return premium (discount) associated with LTAD (UTAD), esti-
mated using the in-sample regressions, range from 1% to 16% (2% to 14%), Figure
3.3. The ‘typical’ price of LTAD (UTAD) corresponds to the size of the premium
(discount) required to hold a stock with an average degree of LTAD (UTAD). In
Ireland, I find that investors are most sensitive to both LTAD and UTAD, having
the highest price per unit of JAdj− and JAdj+ recorded, Figures 3.2b) and 3.2c).
The cross-sectional return sensitivity to one unit of LTAD (UTAD) ranges between
0.68% to 2.38% (-0.75% to 2.26%) across countries. The price of LTAD and UTAD
is consistent across the sample. The coefficient associated with LTAD is positive in
all countries examined. The sign of the coefficient attached to UTAD is negative
in all sample countries, except for Mexico and Austria.
I test for the equality of the risk premia attached to AD that is observed across
countries and find that in 61.35% of country pair combinations, I can can reject
the null hypothesis of equal AD premia (at 5% level). These results suggest that
investors in some countries care differently about the same unit level of AD, which
may be possibly linked to the cost and options for downside insurance product,
which may vary across countries.
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Drivers of Asymmetric Dependence
I study the sources of country variations in the degree of firm-level asymmetric
dependence and AD premia among countries. Our research is informed by existing
literature (Ferson and Harvey, 1991, 1994) that explores the effects of economic
risks on common factors.
I examine the relation between the observed degree and price of asymmetric
dependence and a number of country characteristics. In particular, I analyze
the role of economic risks, country-specific financial market risks, short selling
restrictions, the law code origin, conditions to do business and other country-
specific characteristics in explaining the variations in AD among countries (Beck
et al., 2003; Djankov et al., 2002, 2003, 2007, 2008; Erb et al., 1996).
I find that the change in the market capitalization to GDP, turnover, law origin
and the change in country conditions to start a business are useful in identifying
the differences in the changes in the degree of asymmetric dependence or return
sensitivity to AD among countries, Table 3.3.
Market Capitalization to GDP
I find that a change in the market capitalization to GDP ratio (∆ MCAP to GDP)
is related with a decrease in the change in the level of asymmetric dependence,
Table 3.3. This effect of ∆ MCAP to GDP on changes in the degree of AD may
come from an increase in the degree of LTAD, a decrease in the degree of UTAD,
or an increase in the proportion of firms with LTAD returns, because the aggregate
degree of AD is calculated as a weighted average of the firm-level LTAD and firm-
level UTAD.
I investigate the sources of the effect of ∆ MCAP to GDP on the degree of
asymmetric dependence and find that it comes primarily from changes in the
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Panel Regressions: Country-level Drivers
Table 3.3: This table reports panel regression estimation results. The first differ-
ence of country level of AD residuals (Model (1)), ∆ct from the model described
in equation (3.3)), the first difference of country return premium attached to AD
(Model (2)), ∆ξct from the model described in equation (3.4)), and the proportion
of LTAD firms (Model (3)) observed at the end of year t are regressed on a list of
country characteristics from Table 3.6 measured at the end of year t. All regressors
(except for Short Practiced, and Law Code dummies) are differenced. The sample
is limited to years 2004-2015, because World Bank Doing Business Indicators are
not available before 2004. Standard errors are clustered by country. *, **, and ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Table also reports
whether year effects are used in the regression (Yes/No), number of observations and
the adjusted R-squared coefficient. The regression results are robust to the choice
of the Law Code dummy variable base (English Law Code in this regression).
(1) (2) (3)
∆ Level of AD (∆ct) ∆ AD Premium (∆ξct) ∆ Prop. of LTAD
∆ Starting a Business (DTF) 0.0432 -0.000094 -0.00634***
(0.0460) (0.0002) (0.0022)
∆ Getting Credit (DTF) 0.0159 0.000145 0.00102
(0.0351) (0.0001) (0.0020)
∆ Protecting Investors (DTF) 0.0324 -0.0000608 0.00114
(0.0476) (0.0001) (0.0018)
∆ Enforcing Contracts (DTF) -0.0199 -0.000126 -0.00385
(0.0500) (0.0004) (0.0030)
∆ Resolving Insolvency (DTF) 0.0198 0.000354*** -0.00235
(0.0236) (0.0001) (0.0014)
∆ Paying Taxes (DTF) -0.0493 -0.000306 0.00133
(0.0420) (0.0002) (0.0031)
∆ Trading Across Borders (DTF) -0.0636** 0.000175 -0.000439
(0.0290) (0.0002) (0.0020)
Short Practiced 0.116 0.00015 -0.0158
(0.1230) (0.0007) (0.0094)
French Law 0.203 0.000647 0.00518
(0.1560) (0.0007) (0.0100)
German Law 0.0379 0.000211 0.0233*
(0.2060) (0.0011) (0.0132)
Scandinavian Law 0.143 0.00106 0.00955
(0.1110) (0.0006) (0.0073)
∆ Inflation -0.0429 0.000262 -0.00195
(0.1230) (0.0006) (0.0067)
∆ Turnover 0.00365 0.0000388 -0.000305
(0.0043) (0.0000) (0.0002)
∆ MCAP -0.00548*** -1.91e-05** 0.000167***
(0.0010) (0.0000) (0.0001)
∆ Log(Population) -9.858 0.0626 1.660**
(12.5) (0.1) (0.7)
∆ Log(GNI) 3.82 -0.0283 -0.491**
(4.3) (0.0) (0.2)
Constant 0.128 0.00287 0.0979***
(0.6850) (0.0026) (0.0296)
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 225 225 225
R-squared 0.818 0.151 0.889
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proportion of LTAD firms. Indeed, in countries with increasing values of MCAP
to GDP, the proportion of firms exhibiting LTAD increases relatively more.
My findings suggest that in countries where the relative importance of the
financial markets increases, i.e. in countries with increasing ∆ MCAP to GDP,
the overall effect of asymmetric dependence on asset prices and the real economy
becomes pronounced. This is because in these fast-growing financial markets, the
number of firms exhibiting LTAD increases and the effects of financial crises may
thus become more severe.
Moreover, I find that the proportion of firms with stock returns exhibiting
LTAD correlates with country-specific conditions to start a business. When con-
ditions to start a business improve at a faster rate, i.e. the change in the distance
to frontier (DTF)1 decreases, the change in the proportion of firms with LTAD
returns increases. I notice that the conditions required to start a business has
a similar effect on the proportion of LTAD firms as the relative importance of
financial markets in the economy, i.e. the ratio of MCAP to GDP. As a result,
these findings suggest that when more firms are created and financial markets grow
relative to GDP, the proportion of LTAD firms increases.
My findings signal an important message for regulators and policy makers.
I provide evidence that a fast growth of financial markets may not always be
associated with positive effects to the economy. In fact, I find that as the financial
market growth increases, the proportion of LTAD firms increases and investors
become more sensitive to asymmetric dependence. This adds further support for
the recognition of the firm level of asymmetric dependence as a relevant risk factor.
1The Doing Business Distance to Frontier score (DTF) shows the distance of an economy to
the “frontier”, which is derived from the most efficient practice or highest score achieved on each
indicator.
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Time Variations of Asymmetric Dependence
I explore co-movements of the time-series variations in the country aggregate levels
of AD and AD pricing in the global as well regional context. From 2000 to 2015,
the global1 level of asymmetric dependence was relatively volatile. The changes
in the overall global level of AD are mainly driven by changes in the proportion
of LTAD and UTAD firms in the markets, rather than changes in the degree of
AD. The levels of LTAD and UTAD remain relatively stable and fluctuate around
values -6 and 6, respectively.
The proportion of firms with returns exhibiting LTAD changes considerably,
ranging between 30% to 95%, as illustrated by the shaded area in Figure 3.4. With
a high proportion of LTAD firms, the global aggregated firm-level AD (which is a
weighted average of the firm-level LTAD and UTAD, is driven mainly by LTAD
(i.e. JAdj < 0), and therefore becomes more negative. This explains the significant
decline in the global level of AD during 2013 and 2014 when the proportion of
LTAD increased considerably.
The regional levels of AD, LTAD as well as UTAD are strongly correlated
across regions, Figure 3.5. Despite similarities in levels of AD across the three
regions, the degree of LTAD in Europe is relatively higher compared to the other
two regions in the period 2010 to 2014.
I observe a negative (positive) correlation of 52.66% (-15.20%) between the
return premium (discount) attached to LTAD (UTAD) and the proportion of firm
returns exhibiting LTAD. The relationship between the price of LTAD (UTAD)
and the proportion of firm returns exhibiting LTAD is statistically significant with
a t-statistics of 1.96 (8.31, respectively), measured by regressing the global price
1The term “global” refers to the value-weighted average across all countries considered. The
term “regional” refers to the value-weighted average across all countries from a given region
(Americas, Asian-Pacific or Europe). Stock exchange size (number of listed companies) is used
as weights.
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Figure 3.4: Time series of the “global” level of asymmetric dependence, lower-tail
asymmetric dependence and upper-tail asymmetric dependence. The “global” of
asymmetric dependence in month t is calculated as a weighted average of country
levels of asymmetric dependence from month t. Shaded areas represent the weighted
average of country proportion of LTAD firms (relative to UTAD firms). The “global”
level of AD refers to a value-weighted average of country-specific AD in time t, where
weights reflect the size of country’s stock exchange (measured using the number of
distinct firms listed in each stock exchange).
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Regional Levels of AD
(a) Asymmetric Dependence
(b) Lower-Tail Asymmetric Dependence
(LTAD)
(c) Upper-Tail Asymmetric Dependence
(UTAD)
Figure 3.5: Time series of the “regional” level of asymmetric dependence (Panel
(a)), lower-tail asymmetric dependence (Panel (b)) and upper-tail asymmetric de-
pendence (Panel (c)). The “regional” level of asymmetric dependence in month
t is calculated as a weighted average of country levels of asymmetric dependence
from month t for all countries within a region (Americas, Asia-Pacific and Europe).
Country weights used to calculate weighted averages reflect the size of country’s
stock exchange (measured using the number of distinct firms listed in each stock
exchange). Shaded areas represent NBER crisis periods.
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of LTAD (UTAD) on the value-weighted proportion of firms with LTAD returns
observed at month t.
These findings are consistent with a general demand and supply model, where
investors assign a higher price to a firm characteristic that is relatively more scarce
in the market. These findings imply that with a higher proportion of firms ex-
hibiting LTAD, the LTAD (UTAD) premium is relatively lower (higher). As a
result, the price of LTAD is negatively associated with UTAD having a correlation
coefficient of -41.72%.
Commonality Effects in the Level and Price of Asymmetric
Dependence
I study commonality patterns in the level of asymmetric dependence and its return
premium among the individual countries from the sample. In particular, I examine
how country levels of AD and return sensitivity to AD are linked with its global
and regional values. My research is informed by existing literature on commonality
effects among risk factors. Karolyi, Lee, and Van Dijk (2012) study commonality
in returns, liquidity, and turnover around the world and find that return com-
monality is greater during times of high market volatility, large market declines,
heightened presence of international and institutional investors, and with posi-
tive investor sentiment. Other authors focus on commonalities in liquidity premia
(Amihud, Hameed, Kang, and Zhang, 2015; Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam,
2000; Karolyi, Lee, and Van Dijk, 2012). I am the first to explore commonalities
in asymmetric dependence and AD pricing across countries.
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Price vs ‘Supply’ of AD
(a) Price of Lower-Tail Asymmetric Dependence
(b) Price of Upper-Tail Asymmetric Dependence
Figure 3.6: The “global” price of lower-tail asymmetric dependence (Figure 3.6(a))
and upper-tail asymmetric dependence (Figure 3.6(b)), calculated in month t as a
weighted average of country return premia (discount) attached to LTAD (UTAD)
as observed at month t. Shaded areas represent the weighted average of country
proportion of LTAD firms. Country weights used to calculate weighted averages
reflect the size of country’s stock exchange (measured using the number of distinct
firms listed in each stock exchange).
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Regional Prices of AD
(a) Asymmetric Dependence
(b) Lower-Tail Asymmetric Dependence
(LTAD)
(c) Upper-Tail Asymmetric Dependence
(UTAD)
Figure 3.7: Time series of the “regional” price of asymmetric dependence (Panel
(a)), lower-tail asymmetric dependence (Panel (b)) and upper-tail asymmetric de-
pendence (Panel (c)). The “regional” price of asymmetric dependence in month t
is calculated as a weighted average of country return premia (discount) attached
to AD or LTAD (UTAD) as observed at month t for all countries within a region
(Americas, Asia-Pacific and Europe). Country weights used to calculate weighted
averages reflect the size of country’s stock exchange (measured using the number of
distinct firms listed in each stock exchange). Shaded areas represent NBER crisis
periods.
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Commonalities in the Level and Price of Asymmetric Dependence
Table 3.5: This table reports the country-level Commonality regression statistics: the mean regression
coefficient, mean t-statistics (in parentheses), median coefficient and the number of positive coefficients
across all country regressions. In Panel A, the level of AD from country i is regressed on the global
level of asymmetric dependence (JAdjgt ), measured as the value-weighted average value of the J
Adj across
all the countries from the sample (except for country i), the regional level of asymmetric dependence
(JAdjrt ), measured as the value-weighted average value of the J
Adj across all the countries from a given
region (except for country i), and the market monthly excess return (Rmt). In Panel B, I regress the
mean return premium attached to the JAdj or country c in month t (γct) on the global level of return
premium attached to the JAdj in month t (γgt), calculated as the equally-weighted average of return
premia from month t across all countries from my sample (except for country i), the regional level of
return premium attached to the JAdj in month t (γrt), calculated as the equally-weighted average of
return premia from month t across all countries from a given region (except for country i), the global
level of asymmetric dependence (JAdjgt ) and the regional level of asymmetric dependence (J
Adj
rt ). MSCI
World index and the US 1-month T-Bill rate are used as a market and a risk free rate proxy. All returns
are in US dollars.
Panel A: Level of AD JAdjgt J
Adj
rt Rmt
(Global Level of AD) (Regional Level of AD) (Market Excess Return)
Mean Regression Coefficient 1.009 0.750 0.2175
Mean T-stat [27.819] [6.183] [0.132]
Median Regression Coefficient 1.033 0.711 0.0294
# of positive Regression Coefficients 100% 86% 54%
Panel B: Price of AD JAdjgt J
Adj
rt γgt γrt
(Global Level of AD) (Regional Level of AD) (Global Price of AD) (Regional Price of AD)
Mean Regression Coefficient -0.006 -0.004 0.601 0.946
Mean T-stat [0.373] [0.366] [3.596] [4.216]
Median Regression Coefficient -0.006 -0.003 0.749 0.805
# of positive Regression Coefficients 16% 24% 84% 95%
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3.4 Conclusion
I find that both the level of AD and return sensitivity to AD display strong
commonality patterns. The aggregated firm-level AD observed in different coun-
tries is strongly correlated with global as well as regional aggregated firm-level AD.
In all the 38 financial markets, the t-statistic associated with the coefficient of the
global AD exceeds the value of 20. The market excess return, on the other hand,
does not have any strong effect on the firm-level AD in countries examined.
Return sensitivity to AD in the individual countries depends on the global and
regional prices of AD, but not on global or regional aggregated firm-level AD. In
82% of countries from my sample (31 out of 38), the global price of AD positively
affects country prices of AD. In 35 out of 38 countries, the regional commonality
effect is relevant, that is, the coefficient δ2c is positive and significant. The t-
statistics associated with the coefficients δ1c and δ2c both exceed the Harvey et al.
(2014) hurdle rate of 3.0, see Panel B from Table 3.5.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter compares the cross section of stock returns across the worlds 38
largest stock exchanges with particular emphasis on the importance of asymmet-
ric dependence for international investors. I find that asymmetric dependence is
consistently priced in international equity returns. Indeed, asymmetric depen-
dence is the only factor that is priced in all the in-sample regressions and the vast
majority of the out-of-sample regressions.
My main results are consistent across all the countries examined. I find that
firms with returns exhibiting lower-tail (upper-tail) asymmetric dependence are
associated with a return premium (discount) in all the 38 markets. The evidence
of a significant price of asymmetric dependence is consistent with disappointment-
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averse investors that respond to a relative scarcity of the different types of asym-
metric dependence available in the market.
Changes in AD are related to the growth of financial markets relative to GDP
and the conditions necessary for the establishment of a business enterprise. I find
that the degree of asymmetric dependence rises in countries with increasing mar-
ket capitalization to GDP. This suggests that the growth in size and importance
of financial markets have negative effects that may influence the stability of these
markets, as well as the economy as a whole. Moreover, investors become more sen-
sitive to asymmetric dependence and require a higher additional return premium
to bear asymmetric dependence risk in countries with a high change in market
capitalization to GDP.
Both the level of AD and return sensitivity to AD display strong commonality
patterns. Country levels of AD are strongly correlated with global as well as
regional levels of AD. The return sensitivity to AD in the individual countries is
affected by global and regional prices of AD. These findings suggest that financial
markets considered in this study share common factors that affect the time-series
development of the firm-level AD and AD pricing.
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Country Characteristics
Table 3.6: A list of all country characteristics examined. The Doing Business
Distance to Frontier score (DTF) shows the distance of an economy to the “frontier”,
which is derived from the most efficient practice or highest score achieved on each
indicator. I use historical yearly DTF for each indicator available based on the
methodology used in March 2017.
Variable Name Description
Starting a Business DTF Methodology description: http://www.doingbusiness.org/Methodology/Starting-
a-Business. Starting a Business DTF is derived based on all procedures officially
required, or Commonly done in practice, for an entrepreneur to start up and
formally operate an industrial or commercial business, as well as the time and
cost to complete these procedures and the paid-in minimum capital requirement.
Getting Credit DTF Methodology description: http://www.doingbusiness.org/Methodology/Getting-
Credit: Getting Credit DTF measures the legal rights of borrowers and lenders
with respect to secured transactions through one set of indicators and the
reporting of credit information through another. The first set of indicators
measures whether certain features that facilitate lending exist within the appli-
cable collateral and bankruptcy laws. The second set measures the coverage,
scope and accessibility of credit information available through credit reporting
service providers such as credit bureaus or credit registries.
Protecting Minority Investors DTF Methodology is described in http://www.doingbusiness.org/Methodology/Protecting-
Minority-Investors: Protecting Minority Investors DTF measures the protection
of minority investors from conflicts of interest through one set of indicators and
shareholders rights in corporate governance through another. The data come
from a questionnaire administered to corporate and securities lawyers and are
based on securities regulations, company laws, civil procedure codes and court
rules of evidence.
Paying Taxes DTF Methodology description: http://www.doingbusiness.org/Methodology/Paying-
Taxes: Paying Taxes DTF records the taxes and mandatory contributions that
a medium-size company must pay in a given year as well as the administrative
burden of paying taxes and contributions and complying with post-filing proce-
dures. Taxes and contributions measured include the profit or corporate income
tax, social contributions and labor taxes paid by the employer, property taxes,
property transfer taxes, dividend tax, capital gains tax, financial transactions
tax, waste collection taxes, vehicle and road taxes, and any other small taxes
or fees. The ranking of economies on the ease of paying taxes is determined by
sorting their distance to frontier scores for paying taxes.
Trading Across Borders DTF Methodology description: http://www.doingbusiness.org/Methodology/Trading-
Across-Borders: Trading Across Borders DTF records the time and cost
associated with the logistical process of exporting and importing goods. Doing
Business measures the time and cost (excluding tariffs) associated with three
sets of procedures: documentary compliance, border compliance and domestic
transport within the overall process of exporting or importing a shipment of
goods.
Enforcing Contracts DTF Methodology description: http://www.doingbusiness.org/Methodology/Enforcing-
Contracts: Enforcing Contracts DTF measures the time and cost for resolving
a commercial dispute through a local first-instance court and the quality of
judicial processes index, evaluating whether each economy has adopted a series
of good practices that promote quality and efficiency in the court system. The
data are collected through study of the codes of civil procedure and other court
regulations as well as questionnaires completed by local litigation lawyers and
judges.
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*[h] Country Characteristics: Continued
Variable Name Description
Resolving Insolvency DTF Methodology description: http://www.doingbusiness.org/Methodology/Resolving-
Insolvency: Resolving Insolvency DTF is based on the time, cost and outcome
of insolvency proceedings involving domestic entities as well as the strength
of the legal framework applicable to judicial liquidation and reorganization
proceedings. The data for the resolving insolvency indicators are derived from
questionnaire responses by local insolvency practitioners and verified through a
study of laws and regulations as well as public information on insolvency systems.
Source: Doing Business Indicators, World Bank: http://www.doingbusiness.org
Short selling practiced A dummy variable equal to 1 if short selling is practiced and zero otherwise. For
countries that are not mentioned in Bris et al. (2007), data is filled in based on
publicly available information. Source: Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2007)
Law Code Dummy Variables Identifies the legal origin of the company law or commercial law of each country.
Each dummy variable is equal to 1 if the origin of the company law or commercial
law of the country is English, French, German or Scandinavian, respectively, and
zero otherwise. Source: Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer (2010)
Market capitalization to GDP (%) Market capitalization of listed domestic companies (% of GDP). Market capi-
talization (also known as market value) is the share price times the number of
shares outstanding (including their several classes) for listed domestic compa-
nies. Investment funds, unit trusts, and companies whose only business goal
is to hold shares of other listed companies are excluded. Data are end of year
values.
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage
change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and
services that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly. The
Laspeyres formula is generally used.
Turnover ratio (%) Stocks traded, turnover ratio of domestic shares (%). Turnover ratio is the value
of domestic shares traded divided by their market capitalization. The value is
annualized by multiplying the monthly average by 12.
log(GNI) (constant 2010 US$) GNI (formerly GNP) is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any
product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net
receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income)
from abroad. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars. In log values.
Risk premium on lending (%) Risk premium on lending is the interest rate charged by banks on loans to private
sector customers minus the risk free” treasury bill interest rate at which short-
term government securities are issued or traded in the market.
log(Population), total Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts
all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship. The values shown are
midyear estimates. Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank
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Factor values
Table 3.7: This table presents mean factor values and its standard deviations (in parenetheses) of all
listed firms from country i. At each month, t, I estimate for each firm from country i: JAdj , JAdj−,
JAdj+, β, size (“Log-size”), book-to-market ratio (“BM”), the average past 12-monthly excess return
(“Past Ret”), idiosyncratic risk (“Idio”), coskewness (“Cosk”) and cokurtosis (“Cokurt”) using the past
12 months of daily excess return data. The Amihud (2002) illiquidity factor (“illiq”) is estimated using
daily data from t − 3 until t. Factor values are estimated using all data available, a description of the
data used is provided in Table 3.1. MSCI World index and the US 1-month T-Bill rate are used as a
market and risk free rate proxy for all countries. All returns are in US dollars.
Country i JAdj JAdj− JAdj+ β Log-size BM Past ret Idio Cosk Cokurt Illiq
(AD) (LTAD) (UTAD)
Argentina -3.125 -6.410 6.014 0.674 18.956 1.637 0.007 0.028 -0.138 1.109 (0.0010)
(6.640) (3.745) (3.767) (0.484) (1.958) (2.686) (0.049) (0.012) (0.201) (0.997) (0.0030)
Australia -2.648 -6.578 6.025 0.592 17.729 0.864 0.012 0.050 -0.054 0.701 34.226
(7.061) (4.075) (3.735) (0.571) (2.095) (0.822) (0.064) (0.034) (0.147) (0.787) (135.449)
Austria -1.629 -6.215 5.988 0.568 19.604 1.662 0.003 0.024 -0.062 1.082 (0.0014)
(7.082) (3.875) (3.944) (0.514) (1.747) (3.078) (0.037) (0.015) (0.187) (1.352) (0.0052)
Belgium -1.912 -6.273 5.882 0.568 19.552 2.540 0.007 0.040 -0.048 1.062 (0.0100)
(7.048) (3.982) (3.918) (0.585) (1.805) (7.688) (0.046) (0.076) (0.168) (1.132) (0.0576)
Canada -2.753 -5.943 5.517 0.458 8.848 0.748 0.007 0.039 -0.073 0.728 (0.0033)
(6.228) (3.596) (3.322) (0.530) (8.504) (1.424) (0.047) (0.027) (0.167) (1.564) (0.0118)
Chile -2.053 -6.323 6.493 0.518 19.866 0.829 0.008 0.020 -0.099 1.463 (0.0407)
(7.371) (4.178) (4.311) (0.331) (1.722) (1.126) (0.034) (0.014) (0.204) (1.186) (0.2591)
Denmark -1.815 -5.961 6.073 0.546 18.915 5.825 0.002 0.029 -0.051 0.944 (0.0025)
(6.891) (3.634) (4.219) (0.451) (1.877) (4.481) (0.041) (0.019) (0.165) (1.018) (0.0117)
Egypt -1.165 -6.568 6.732 0.121 18.615 6.117 0.006 0.027 -0.037 0.205 (0.0008)
(7.552) (3.629) (4.013) (0.298) (1.642) (5.424) (0.045) (0.011) (0.153) (0.573) (0.0023)
Finland -1.639 -5.806 5.705 0.708 19.230 1.818 0.005 0.029 -0.049 1.160 (0.0010)
(6.556) (3.463) (3.614) (0.524) (1.778) (3.304) (0.038) (0.020) (0.160) (1.082) (0.0030)
France -2.509 -6.271 5.817 0.580 19.186 1.771 0.004 0.027 -0.057 1.016 (0.0054)
(6.726) (3.769) (3.643) (0.516) (2.148) (2.639) (0.038) (0.017) (0.159) (1.136) (0.0153)
Germany -2.618 -6.359 5.859 0.477 18.235 0.779 0.001 0.036 -0.038 0.635 (0.0056)
(6.750) (3.772) (3.600) (0.494) (1.835) (0.721) (0.047) (0.024) (0.145) (0.832) (0.0192)
Greece -1.774 -5.857 5.597 0.690 18.151 17.140 0.004 0.036 -0.039 0.963 (0.0214)
(6.470) (3.466) (3.361) (0.480) (1.822) (53.291) (0.049) (0.017) (0.141) (0.860) (0.0744)
Hong Kong -3.395 -6.501 5.601 0.415 18.908 12.074 0.012 0.038 -0.058 0.544 (0.0014)
(6.466) (3.878) (3.238) (0.447) (1.772) (11.983) (0.059) (0.021) (0.142) (0.666) (0.0035)
India -2.824 -5.785 5.371 0.411 16.037 1.833 0.008 0.037 -0.051 0.538 (0.5011)
(5.915) (3.326) (3.129) (0.387) (1.698) (2.894) (0.060) (0.014) (0.135) (0.580) (1.2385)
Indonesia -3.031 -6.649 6.125 0.478 27.646 0.754 0.020 0.041 -0.051 0.619 (0.0000)
(6.956) (3.934) (3.833) (0.526) (2.030) (2.522) (0.063) (0.025) (0.154) (0.748) (0.0000)
Ireland -2.259 -5.559 5.113 0.857 13.756 0.639 0.010 0.023 -0.097 1.809 (0.0001)
(5.887) (3.331) (2.931) (0.528) (1.802) (0.464) (0.032) (0.013) (0.235) (2.297) (0.0002)
Italy -2.596 -6.125 5.493 0.759 19.768 94.465 0.002 0.024 -0.060 1.291 (0.0007)
(6.341) (3.486) (3.247) (0.461) (1.828) (302.010) (0.037) (0.011) (0.157) (1.061) (0.0026)
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Factor values - Table 3.7 Continued
Country i JAdj JAdj− JAdj+ β Log-size BM Past ret Idio Cosk Cokurt Illiq
(AD) (LTAD) (UTAD)
Japan -2.062 -5.773 5.391 0.561 19.538 1.020 0.002 0.027 -0.030 0.662 (0.0001)
(6.222) (3.398) (3.175) (0.604) (1.654) (0.709) (0.034) (0.012) (0.150) (0.923) (0.0002)
Korea -2.501 -5.762 5.608 0.520 18.093 1.517 0.010 0.036 -0.066 0.767 (0.0006)
(6.095) (3.314) (3.160) (0.381) (1.545) (1.309) (0.052) (0.016) (0.144) (0.715) (0.0019)
Mexico -2.691 -6.274 6.615 0.884 20.585 11.988 0.005 0.027 -0.125 1.480 (0.0028)
(7.093) (3.881) (4.686) (0.535) (1.652) (10.050) (0.043) (0.018) (0.199) (1.098) (0.0089)
Netherlands -2.357 -6.061 5.808 0.700 19.835 0.842 0.004 0.025 -0.072 1.247 (0.0011)
(6.619) (3.671) (3.710) (0.514) (2.131) (0.728) (0.036) (0.016) (0.168) (1.339) (0.0038)
New Zealand -1.551 -6.207 6.030 0.399 18.345 1.277 0.008 0.028 -0.070 0.778 (0.0210)
(7.098) (3.940) (3.789) (0.337) (1.765) (1.010) (0.040) (0.021) (0.156) (0.797) (0.1187)
Norway -2.737 -6.174 5.742 0.891 19.126 0.943 0.006 0.033 -0.095 1.279 (0.0019)
(6.541) (3.695) (3.688) (0.551) (1.718) (1.189) (0.051) (0.019) (0.177) (1.066) (0.0078)
Pakistan -2.324 -5.925 5.689 0.047 17.045 1.416 0.014 0.033 -0.030 0.080 (1.7841)
(6.372) (3.451) (3.371) (0.328) (1.901) (2.340) (0.052) (0.019) (0.138) (0.504) (9.7799)
Peru -1.981 -7.563 7.805 0.352 18.984 2.368 -0.009 0.041 -0.087 0.855 (0.0025)
(9.295) (5.369) (6.076) (0.654) (1.791) (3.615) (0.143) (0.068) (0.164) (0.933) (0.0079)
Philippines -2.783 -6.748 6.230 0.282 18.356 1.365 0.018 0.038 -0.053 0.378 (0.0235)
(7.176) (4.054) (3.768) (0.447) (1.982) (1.732) (0.061) (0.021) (0.141) (0.616) (0.1174)
Poland -2.629 -6.031 5.535 0.875 17.648 3.335 0.006 0.035 -0.080 1.301 (0.0732)
(6.247) (3.407) (3.228) (0.510) (1.961) (3.186) (0.053) (0.020) (0.167) (1.004) (0.2826)
Romania -1.907 -6.546 7.085 0.598 18.532 5.774 0.007 0.031 -0.080 1.122 (0.0378)
(7.812) (3.648) (5.563) (0.429) (2.921) (5.737) (0.051) (0.017) (0.171) (1.050) (0.1337)
Shanghai -0.717 -5.616 5.477 0.191 19.836 0.829 0.008 0.030 -0.047 0.320 (0.0002)
(6.439) (3.226) (3.466) (0.304) (1.279) (2.521) (0.044) (0.012) (0.149) (0.604) (0.0010)
Shenzhen -0.969 -5.716 5.767 0.211 19.811 3.162 0.006 0.031 -0.055 0.351 (0.0004)
(6.619) (3.313) (3.610) (0.312) (0.953) (2.643) (0.043) (0.012) (0.148) (0.617) (0.0033)
Singapore -2.709 -6.576 6.111 0.501 18.422 3.214 0.011 0.041 -0.051 0.674 (0.0027)
(7.029) (4.007) (3.685) (0.488) (1.706) (6.019) (0.049) (0.032) (0.156) (0.772) (0.0063)
South Africa -2.097 -6.067 5.522 0.709 19.164 6.757 0.011 0.034 -0.069 1.064 (0.0599)
(6.567) (3.721) (3.320) (0.494) (2.085) (6.307) (0.045) (0.025) (0.158) (0.925) (0.2708)
Spain -1.963 -6.178 5.904 0.759 20.272 9.466 0.004 0.024 -0.054 1.305 (0.0002)
(6.998) (4.020) (3.893) (0.516) (1.914) (26.358) (0.039) (0.016) (0.164) (1.186) (0.0004)
Sweden -2.425 -6.038 5.674 0.864 18.685 0.855 0.004 0.034 -0.068 1.307 (0.0092)
(6.476) (3.592) (3.489) (0.517) (2.118) (0.713) (0.048) (0.024) (0.166) (1.067) (0.0497)
Switzerland -1.835 -5.869 5.823 0.528 20.060 1.103 0.004 0.026 -0.054 0.971 (0.0004)
(6.672) (3.571) (3.910) (0.467) (1.810) (1.030) (0.037) (0.027) (0.163) (0.997) (0.0015)
Turkey -0.617 -5.864 6.778 1.050 21.245 1.492 0.002 0.035 -0.086 1.517 (0.0001)
(7.478) (3.161) (5.211) (0.567) (5.606) (1.324) (0.052) (0.016) (0.185) (1.042) (0.0004)
UK -2.292 -6.872 6.220 0.547 18.954 0.907 0.007 0.027 -0.059 0.988 (0.0020)
(7.451) (4.167) (3.873) (0.471) (2.122) (0.840) (0.046) (0.020) (0.166) (1.053) (0.0084)
US -2.259 -5.559 5.113 0.857 13.756 0.639 0.010 0.023 -0.097 1.809 (0.0001)
(5.887) (3.331) (2.931) (0.528) (1.802) (0.464) (0.032) (0.013) (0.235) (2.297) (0.0002)
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4Asymmetric Dependence in Real
Estate Investment Trusts: An
Asset-Pricing Analysis
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4.1 Introduction
Many authors consider real estate investment trusts (REITs) to be defensive assets
having a low correlation with market returns, that is having a CAPM β less than
one (Chan, Hendershott, and Sanders, 1990; Glascock and Hughes, 1995; Glascock,
Michayluk, and Neuhauser, 2004; Howe and Shilling, 1990; Hung and Glascock,
2008). However, more recent research suggests that the dependence structure
between REITs and the market is more complex than previously thought (Chong
and Miffre, 2009; Clayton and MacKinnon, 2003). For example, Sun, Titman, and
Twite (2015) provide evidence that the REIT sensitivity to market returns was
particularly high during the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. This is consistent
with a broader pattern whereby REIT returns are more highly correlated in market
downturns than in upturns (Goldstein, 1999; Knight, Lizieri, and Satchell, 2005).
This asymmetric dependence (AD) between REIT returns and market returns
is well documented.1 Several authors find evidence of AD between returns of well-
diversified stock indices and infer that AD is not easily diversified away (Alcock
and Hatherley, 2009; Ang and Bekaert, 2002; Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta, 1994;
Hartmann, Straetmans, and De Vries, 2004; Hong, Tu, and Zhou, 2007; Longin and
Solnik, 2001; Low, Alcock, Faff, and Brailsford, 2013; Patton, 2004). The existence
and non-diversifiability of AD implies that CAPM β may not adequately describe
the sensitivity of REIT returns to market movements. If REIT investors exhibit
1See for example Bianchi and Guidolin (2014); Case, Yang, and Yildirim (2012b); Chatrath,
Liang, and McIntosh (2000); Goldstein (1999); Hoesli and Reka (2013); Huang and Wu (2015);
Knight, Lizieri, and Satchell (2005); Lizieri and Satchell (1997a,b); Lizieri, Satchell, and Zhang
(2007); Patel and Nimmanunta (2009); Rong and Tru¨ck (2010); Simon and Ng (2009); Zimmer
(2015). The existence of AD is not specific to REIT markets only. There also exists a substantial
literature on the existence of AD in the US stock market, see Ang and Bekaert (2002); Ang and
Chen (2002); Ang, Chen, and Xing (2006a); Bali, Demirtas, and Levy (2009); Bollerslev and
Todorov (2011); Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta (1994); Hartmann, Straetmans, and De Vries (2004);
Hatherley and Alcock (2007); Hong, Tu, and Zhou (2007); Longin and Solnik (2001); Low, Alcock,
Faff, and Brailsford (2013); Patton (2004); Post and Van Vliet (2006).
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preferences for AD, then AD should be priced in US REIT returns independently
of the price for CAPM β.
The primary objective of this paper is to determine the price of asymmetric
dependence in US REIT returns. This research contributes to the existing liter-
ature on REIT return premia by exploring the price that REIT investors attach
to lower-tail and upper-tail asymmetric dependence, independently of symmetric,
linear dependence (CAPM β). A significant premium for asymmetric dependence
is consistent with REIT investors being disappointment averse, rather than risk
averse. Given the previously weak empirical support for CAPM β premium (Pai
and Geltner, 2007), my thesis may provide useful isights on whether REIT in-
vestors are risk averse, disappointment averse, or both.
Asymmetric dependence is particularly important for US REIT investors for
a number of reasons. First, REITs are often highly leveraged, which increases
the level of AD in equity-holder returns (Alcock and Steiner, 2015). Second, to
the extent that AD attracts a return premium, REIT managers may have an
incentive to increase their firm’s exposure to AD in order to report this return
compensation as alpha (Alcock, Glascock, and Steiner, 2013; Diamond and Rajan,
2009; Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Spiegel, and Welch, 2007). Due to the diversified
ownership provisions of REIT legislation, investors have few tools to minimize such
rent-seeking behavior (Ghosh and Sirmans, 2003). The ultimate tool available to
investors is withdrawal of their capital, i.e. price protection. If REIT investors
are more likely to use this tool, then AD may be more of a concern for REIT
investments compared to other listed securities.
Finally, US REITs are required to distribute at least 90% of their taxable
income to investors in order to qualify for reduced corporate tax,1 as so are less able
126 US Code, Section 857 - Taxation of real estate investment trusts and their beneficiaries.
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to maintain a cash buffer to protect against unfavourable future market conditions
(Bradley, Capozza, and Seguin, 1998; Jensen, 1986). REITs are exogenously cash
constrained compared to other public firms. An, Hardin, and Wu (2012) highlight
that REITs are consequently more sensitive to liquidity crises: “Without access
to bank lines of credit, REITs are at a disadvantage when competing with other
firms in making acquisitions.”1 The effect of market downturns on REITs may be
thus more pronounced than the effect of market upturns (Bianchi and Guidolin,
2014; Chong and Miffre, 2009; Goldstein, 1999; Simon and Ng, 2009; Zhou and
Anderson, 2013). This increased downside sensitivity can further result in US
REIT returns exhibiting lower-tail asymmetric dependence.
It has so far proven difficult to identify the price of AD independently of the
price for CAPM β because most of the metrics employed to identify AD do not
satisfy strict monotonicity and orthogonality conditions. I use an adjusted version
of the J-statistic (Alcock and Hatherley, 2016) that is monotonic, orthogonal to
CAPM β, and is size and scale invariant. Consequently, it is ideally suited for ex-
ploring AD in an asset-pricing framework. Furthermore, the adjusted J-statistic
can distinguish between two different types of AD: lower-tail asymmetric depen-
dence (LTAD), where the correlation between stock and market returns is higher
in the lower tail than in the upper tail of the joint-return distribution, and upper-
tail asymmetric dependence (UTAD), where the correlation is higher in the upper
tail than in the lower tail. The secondary objective of this paper is to determine
the price sensitivity of US REITs to LTAD and UTAD, respectively.
Ultimately, investor preferences will determine whether or not AD is priced
in the US REIT market. Disappointment-averse investors with state-dependent
1During the 2008-2009 financial crisis, the REIT market experienced a dramatic decline in
market value. The FTSE NAREIT U.S. Real Estate Index fell from its index value of 213.68 in
January 2007 to 63.41 in March 2009 (Case, Hardin, and Wu, 2012a).
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preferences, such as those described by Skiadas (1997), may demand a return
premium to compensate for LTAD exposure. Elation-seeking investors with state-
dependent preferences may accept a return discount for holding a UTAD asset.
The JAdj statistic captures return characteristics consistent with the Skiadas (1997)
framework of investor preferences.
I find strong empirical evidence that investors in US REITs demand a signif-
icant price for AD exposure. US REITs with LTAD attract a risk premium and
US REITs exhibiting UTAD trade at a discount independently of the price of the
CAPM β. The typical premium for LTAD in US REITs is 1.3% per annum and
the typical discount for UTAD in US REITs is 5.8% per annum. My findings are
robust to controlling for a large number of commonly used REIT characteristics.
The level of AD can predict US REIT returns up to three months ahead. Inter-
estingly, I find no evidence that the CAPM β is priced in the cross section of US
REIT returns. This finding is consistent with Pai and Geltner (2007), who claim
that factors important for investors in US REITs are largely different from those
relevant for investors in US equities. This is true for most of the standard risk
factors. Nevertheless, I find that AD is relevant for investors in US REITs as well
as US listed equities. Moreover, AD is the only covariate considered that has a
t-value higher than the Harvey, Liu, and Zhu (2014) critical value of 3.0.
The third contribution of this paper is to analyze the temporal trends of the
level and price of AD in US REIT returns. The level of both LTAD and UTAD
steadily increased until the 2007-2008 financial crisis. The level of LTAD and
UTAD has been decreasing since the global financial crisis. The price of both
LTAD and UTAD peaked during the crisis but remains a significant factor.
My findings have important implications not only for asset pricing, but also for
REIT cost of capital, internal capital allocation, strategic asset allocation, financial
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risk management, portfolio management and performance assessment. Based on
these results, REIT investors do not value the CAPM β but place a considerable
premium (discount) on REITs exhibiting LTAD (UTAD). REIT capital allocation
and financing decisions are unique and differ substantially from industrial equi-
ties. This may explain why investors in REITs value firm-specific information
differently.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the data and em-
pirical design used to empirically examine my hypotheses. Section 4.3 presents
the main empirical results and identifies the temporal trends in AD pricing. I
particularly explore the role of AD during the 2007-2008 financial crisis in Section
4.4 and verify the robustness of my results in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Data and Empirical Design
I use continuously compounded daily total returns of all NYSE-listed REITs de-
scribed by CRSP database.1 Data starts in January 1992 with the introduction of
the umbrella partnership REIT (UPREIT) regulation and ends in December 2013.
I restrict the data sample to common shares of listed US REITs (share code 18)
with exchange code equal to 1 (NYSE only). I apply a liquidity rule to remove
REIT time series with more than 50% of zero or missing daily returns. The final
sample consists of 373 distinct REITs with 792,510 firm-return observations.
I collect daily data on permno, price, holding period return and number of
shares outstanding. I collect book value data using the CRSP/Compustat Merged
database for the unique permno identifiers. I retrieve the Total Common/Ordinary
1I limit the sample to NYSE only due to differing listing requirements of the remaining stock
exchanges in the US. NYSE provides a market for well-established companies, which are expected
to have a more stable stock price development. NYSE offers the highest level of disclosure of
information of all the stock exchanges in the US, and contains relatively large companies with a
more stable performance and operating history.
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Equity data. I proxy the risk free rate by the 1 month T-bill rate collected from
the Kenneth R. French Data Library. The market return proxy is the CRSP Value
Weighted return of all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks also collected from the
Kenneth R. French Data Library. The excess daily returns are computed as the
difference between the daily holding return and the daily risk free rate.
I estimate the risk premia using both in-sample and out-of-sample estimation
methods. I employ the Ang et al. (2006a) contemporaneous regression method to
generate in-sample estimates of the risk premia for each factor. I run the in-sample
cross-sectional regressions each month rolling forward using a 12 month window.
The short rolling window allows us to account for time variations in risk premia
or the individual risk factors. For each month t, I calculate the relevant variables
for all stocks with data in months t − 12 to t. I estimate the JAdj-statistic using
daily excess returns following the definition from equation (5.40) and using the
following levels of exceedances δ = {0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1}, consistent with Hong
et al. (2007).
I use continuous compounding to convert daily excess returns into monthly ex-
cess returns. I calculate market capitalization as the absolute value of the product
of the close share price and total shares outstanding. Firm size is then the average
log value of firm’s market capitalization over the 12 months. Book-to-market ratio
is the average ratio of the book value of equity to the market capitalization over
the 12 months. Firm coskewness and cokurtosis are estimated using daily observa-
tions from the 12 months of data. The idiosyncratic risk is proxied by the standard
deviation of CAPM residuals estimated on daily data from the 12 months.
I employ the Fama and MacBeth (1973) intertemporal regression method to
generate out-of-sample estimates of the risk premia for each factor. For each month
t, I calculate the relevant predictors on data from t−12 to t. Mean monthly excess
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returns from t + 1 are regressed on information from the preceding 12 months,
consistent with Fama and MacBeth (1973).
Finally, I explore the predictive ability of the JAdj (out-of-sample) using future
three-month (six-month) mean monthly-excess returns. All relevant variables are
calculated on data from t−12 to t and mean excess returns are calculated on data
from t to t+ 3 (t+ 6).
In all the regressions, I apply the Newey and West (1987b) procedure to test
for statistical significance with overlapping windows and use the Newey and West
(1994b) automatic lag selection.
4.3 Asymmetric Dependence Risk Premium
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the cross-sectional regressions are
presented in Table 4.1. The mean JAdj is negative (-1.575). This finding is con-
sistent with Huang and Wu (2015), who find that LTAD is more prevalent in US
REITs. Knight et al. (2005) provide similar conclusions in the UK REIT market.
My sample is comprised of 66% of LTAD US REITs with a mean value of JAdj−
of -5.331 and 34% US REITs that exhibit UTAD with a mean JAdj+ of 5.140.
In my sample, the equally-weighted average monthly excess return on US RE-
ITs is 1.0% and the equally-weighted average CAPM β is 0.643. The equally-
weighted average β, β− and β+ have similar values (0.643, 0.674 and 0.632, re-
spectively). This suggests a lack of asymmetry in the linear dependence of US
REIT returns with those of the market. Taking together, these statistics sug-
gest that there is a significant AD despite no evidence of asymmetry in the linear
dependence.
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Factor Correlation and Double Sorted Portfolios
The correlation between the individual risk factors is presented in Table 4.2. There
is a relatively high degree of correlation between β and cokurtosis (65%), size and
cokurtosis (55%) and β and size (49%). I test for potential multicollinearity using
the variance inflation factor index (VIF) (Belsley, 1991) and find no evidence
of a strong or moderate multicollinearity (VIF < 5 for all the variables). The
correlations between the JAdj and other covariates are unremarkable with a possible
exception of coskewness. In order to better understand the correlation structures,
I double sort the sample into JAdj and coskewness, as well as JAdj and β deciles.
The results from the double-sorting procedure are described in Table 4.3, where
Panel A depicts mean excess returns sorted into β and JAdj and Panel B presents
mean excess returns sorted in coskewness and JAdj. When considering the dou-
ble sorts in coskewness and JAdj deciles, mean excess returns are monotonically
decreasing in JAdj deciles and relatively constant across the coskewness deciles.
After controlling for JAdj, coskewness does not appear to have any significant ef-
fect on excess returns. The difference in excess returns between the lowest and the
highest JAdj decile is positive for most of the coskewness deciles. The mean excess
returns are monotonically decreasing in JAdj deciles. That is, a higher value of AD
is associated with a lower excess return.
When considering mean excess returns sorted in β and JAdj deciles, there ap-
pears to be little evidence of a correlation between β and excess returns. The
relation between the JAdj is more straightforward as for almost every β decile,
the difference in excess returns between the lowest and the highest JAdj decile is
positive for most of the β deciles.
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The Price of Asymmetric Dependence
I now turn my attention to the in-sample estimates of the risk premia from the
contemporaneous Ang et al. (2006a) regressions. After controlling for β, size, book-
to-market ratio, past returns, idiosyncratic risk, coskewness and cokurtosis, the
JAdj is negatively correlated with contemporaneous excess returns, see Table 4.4.
That is, AD in REIT returns are associated with a significant price. This is
consistent with REIT investors demanding a risk premium for LTAD and REIT
investors willing to accept a discount for UTAD. This price of AD is independent
of any premium attached to β. The JAdj is strongly significant having the highest
t-statistic of all risk factors. The JAdj is the only risk factor considered with a
t-statistic that exceeds the Harvey, Liu, and Zhu (2014) level of 3.0.1
The typical risk premium for AD in US REITs, where I define a typical price
(premium or discount) to be the factor price sensitivity multiplied by the average
factor value, −0.004× (−1.575), is 0.6% per annum. Huang and Wu (2015) show
that by accounting for AD in US REITs, an investor can outperform the market
and generate higher excess returns that the market. My findings go one step
further and show that this is also reflected in the price of individual US REITs.
The significant factors from the Ang et al. (2006a) contemporaneous regression
are JAdj, firm size, past excess return and cokurtosis. Interestingly, neither the
CAPM β nor idiosyncratic risk are significant in the cross section of US REIT
returns. This is despite of high levels of idiosyncratic risk that real-estate funds
managers often need to to manage.
At least 75% of all assets in REITs must be invested in real estate, cash or US
Treasury,2 which may lower the ability to diversify risk. Nevertheless, I find that
1This t-statistic level of 3.0 is set by Harvey et al. (2014) to account for data mining, corre-
lation among the tests and missing data issues.
2US Code 26, Section 856.
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idiosyncratic risk is insignificant implying that US REIT investors do not value
idiosyncratic risk (Campbell et al., 2001; Fu, 2009; Merton, 1987).
I estimate the out-of-sample sensitivity of future one-month excess returns
to the AD measure (JAdj) using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) intertemporal
regression method. I find that the JAdj is also significant in the out-of-sample
regression and the coefficient associated with JAdj is (−0.005) and the typical
price attached to average level of JAdj is (−0.005) × (−1.575), that is 0.8% per
annum. The coefficient of the JAdj a from the out-of-sample regression is the only
risk factor with a t-statistic that exceeds the Harvey, Liu, and Zhu (2014) critical
value of 3.0.
The CAPM β is not significant in the in-sample regression but is significant
in the out-of-sample specification, although it has a negative coefficient. Indeed,
the CAPM β coefficient is negative in all my regressions, whether it is significant
or not. The out-of-sample regression procedure yields qualitatively similar results
to the in-sample regression, which suggests that my results are robust to different
regression specifications.
I also explore the power of JAdj to predict future excess returns over longer
investment horizons, Table 4.4, columns 3 and 4. I find that the JAdj can predict
excess returns up to three months ahead.
Lower-Tail Asymmetric Dependence vs Upper-Tail Asym-
metric Dependence
I quantify the price associated with LTAD and UTAD separately and re-run the
regressions using the JAdj− and JAdj+ measure of LTAD and UTAD. After con-
trolling for other factors, my measure for LTAD (JAdj-) and UTAD (JAdj+) are
both contemporaneously and intertemporally correlated with excess returns, see
Table 4.5, columns 1 and 2. The JAdj- (JAdj+) is positively (negatively) corre-
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lated with US REIT excess returns. This implies that a higher degree of LTAD
(UTAD) leads to higher (lower) excess returns. The typical premium for LTAD in
US REITs is 1.3% and the typical discount for UTAD in US REITs is 5.8%. The
premium for LTAD and discount associated with UTAD compares favorably with
the typical premium for AD of 0.6% and is substantial compared to the commonly
assumed market price of risk of 6.0% (Fernandez, Linares, and Ferna´ndez Ac´ın,
2014).
My findings are consistent with investors with state-dependent preferences,
where outcomes in events that did not occur also affect attitudes towards outcome
that occurred. This is different from risk-aversion, which is independent across
states. In paticular, the significant premium (discount) for LTAD (UTAD) is
consistent with disappointment-averse (elation-seeking) REIT investors possessing
a family of conditional preferences as described by Skiadas (1997). Ang et al.
(2006a) propose an alternative measure of disappointment, downside β, which is
consistent with investors endowed with Gul (1991) preferences.
The main difference between the Skiadas (1997) and Gul (1991) preferences is
entrenched in the identification of the conditional preference relations. Gul (1991)
endows investors with a single Savage preference relation and denotes disappoint-
ment relative to the certainty equivalent of the investment return distribution.
Skiadas (1997) recognises that an agent may, for example, experience significant
disappointment in the event of an extreme market drawdown and little or no dis-
appointment in the event of a slight market drawdown. Skiadas (1997) therefore
assumes a family of conditional preference relations while Gul (1991) works with
a single preference relation.
The conditional CAPM βs are consistent with investors endowed with Gul
(1991) preferences, in which the conditional measure of linear dependence is mea-
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sured using a certainty equivalent, e.g. conditioning on market excess return being
lower (market downturn) or greater (market upturn) than zero. The JAdj, on the
other hand, assumes that investors have Skiadas (1997) preferences, because the
JAdj is measured using conditional exceedance correlations with a family of ex-
ceedances.
The conditional βs are insignificant, and the JAdj− and JAdj+ are both sig-
nificant in the in-sample Ang et al. (2006a) regressions, Table 10. Out of sample,
the JAdj+ is significant in predicting excess returns up to three months ahead.
My results suggest that US REIT investors are endowed with a family of state-
dependent preferences, as described by Skiadas (1997). I provide further discussion
and comparison of the two competing measures of asymmetric dependence in the
robustness Section 4.5.
I illustrate relative risk premia of US industrial equities and US REITs in
Table 4.6. The CAPM β is not priced in US REITs, but is significant in US
equities. This implies that the standard mean-variance preference framework is
not well-represented by US REIT investors. The finding of insignificant CAPM β
is consistent with Pai and Geltner (2007), who claim that factors important for
investors in US REITs are largely different from those relevant for investors in
US equities. Investors in REITs are more concerned with asymmetric dependence
rather than linear dependence. This finding is consistent with investors using
pricing mechanisms to protect against risk.
AD measured by the JAdj is relatively more important for REIT investors
than industrial equity investors since AD is the only factor significant in all the
pricing regressions for REITs (except size and momentum). This has important
implications for cost of capital of US REITs. The price of AD is likely to represent
a greater proportion of US REIT cost of capital relatively to the cost of capital of
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US industrial equities.
Based on my results, REIT investors do not value the symmetric dependence
(CAPM β) but place a considerable premium (discount) on REITs exhibiting
LTAD (UTAD). For a US REIT exhibiting lower-tail asymmetric dependence in
returns, neglecting the information about the level of asymmetric dependence may
lead to serious underestimation of firm cost of capital. Without the AD informa-
tion, REIT managers may accept projects that will ultimately lead to a destruction
of shareholders’ wealth. My findings have important implications not only for cost
of capital but also for internal capital allocation, strategic asset allocation, financial
risk management, portfolio management and performance assessment.
I further test the predictive ability of JAdj− and JAdj+ using three-month
and six-month future returns. The JAdj+ can predict excess returns up to three
months ahead. The JAdj− is significant only in the in-sample regressions, whereas
the JAdj+ is significant in all of the regressions except the six-month predictive
regression, see Table 4.5.
The traditional tests of stock return predictability may reject null hypothesis
too frequently if the predictor variable is persistent (Campbell and Yogo, 2006). In
all my regressions, I account for the artificial persistence created by the presence
of overlapping data by incorporating the Newey and West (1987b) procedure to
calculate t-statistics with the Newey and West (1994b) automatic lag selection
method to determine the lag length.
In addition, I also examine potential persistence in the JAdj by estimating the
coefficients of the autoregressive (AR) process of JAdj for each US REIT in my
sample. I use non-overlapping estimates of JAdj calculated using daily data from
12-month rolling window periods, Figure 4.1. There is no significant AR coefficient,
hence I accept that the JAdj is not persistent. Therefore, my results are robust to
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The autocorrelation function (ACF): JAdj
Figure 4.1: The autocorrelation function is computed using a JAdj computed on
12-month non-overlapping periods using daily excess returns. One lag represents
a 12-month period. I restrict my attention to REIT stocks listed on the NYSE
between January 1992 and December 2013.
any persistence concerns.
LTAD and UTAD Migration Probability
I now explore the empirical probability that a US REIT with past LTAD continues
to exhibit LTAD. This is not the same as persistence. Here I are only concerned
with migrations between the LTAD and UTAD firm-return observations. This
information is important from the investor perspective as LTAD is related with
a return premium and UTAD attracts a return discount. The information about
whether REIT is LTAD or UTAD in a given time period thus completely changes
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the outlook on return prediction. I estimate the migration probabilities between
LTAD and UTAD as follows. First, I use non-overlapping 12-month periods of
daily data to estimate JAdj− and JAdj+. In the next step, I calculate migration
probabilities for each US REIT from the sample individually. Table 4.7 presents
mean migration probabilities between LTAD (JAdj−) and UTAD (JAdj+) firm
characteristics.
I find that if a US REIT exhibits LTAD, it has a 70.95% probability of being
LTAD twelve months in the future. US REITs exhibiting UTAD are approximately
equally likely to be UTAD in twelve months (with 49.87% probability). This
implies that the LTAD characteristic is more stable than the UTAD characteristic.
Temporal Trends in AD Pricing
The Skiadas (1997) framework of disappointment-averse investor preferences is
state-dependent, which implies that investor sensitivity to AD may change over
time. If investor perception of investment outcome changes over time, it may lead
to time-series variations in AD.
The level of lower-tail and upper-tail asymmetric dependence of US REITs
both rise to a peak and then start to decline suggesting a change in the temporal
trend in the level of AD, see Figure 4.2. The risk premium associated with LTAD is
relatively stable with a slight decrease in the last years of the sample. The discount
attached to UTAD is steadily decreasing since 2000. The market risk premium has
increased since 2009 but still remains insignificant in explaining excess returns.
The temporal development of AD risk variations suggests an existence of a
structural break around the 2007-2008 financial crisis. The vertical line in Fig-
ures 4.2 and 4.3 corresponds to the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.
The changes in AD level and price before and after the crisis are further analyzed
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Crisis
Time Variations: Mean Factor Loadings
Figure 4.2: This figure depicts the mean factor loading for β, JAdj− and JAdj+ at a
given month, t, between January 2000 and December 2013 using the past 12 months
of daily excess returns. I proxy the market portfolio with the NYSE, AMEX and
NASDAQ stocks and the risk free rate with the 1 month T-bill rate. The estimate
is calculated using all historical data up to and including time t. The vertical line
corresponds to the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.
in Section 4.4.
4.4 US REITs Asymmetric Dependence and the
2007-2008 Financial Crisis
The US REIT market was severely hit by the 2007-2008 financial crisis with a 60%
decrease in The National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT)
All Equity Index over the period from September 2008 until February 2009 (Sun
et al., 2015). This fall in REIT market value is substantial compared to the
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decrease in the National Council of Real Estate investment Fiduciaries (NCREIF)
Property index of 15% over the same time period.
A number of authors study the performance of REITs during the 2007-2008
financial crisis. Zhou and Anderson (2012) provide evidence that extreme risks are
higher in REIT markets relative to stocks, which is even more pronounced after
the crisis. An, Wu, and Wu (2015) suggest that the the increased crash risk of
REITs after the crisis is due to the changing ownership structure of REITs. They
find that with a higher institutional ownership (from 34% in 1994 to 75% in 2011),
crash risk for REIT stocks becomes significantly higher relatively to non-REIT
stocks. Besides the increased exposure of REIT investors to risk, the diversification
benefits of REITs have changed considerably over time and practically vanished
in the crisis (Huang and Zhong, 2013; Knight et al., 2005).
Existing literature provides several explanations for this change in REIT-return
behavior. Das, Freybote, and Marcato (2015) argue that there was a structural
change in the investor decision-making process around the crisis. Before the cri-
sis, institutional investors in REITs created their investment decisions based on
sentiment in the private market. During and after the crisis, investors switched
their capital from illiquid private markets to more liquid REIT markets (Das et al.,
2015). Zhou and Anderson (2013) claim that during the crisis, investors switched
from passive externally-managed entities into active self-managed ones and became
more responsive to market conditions. The investor herding behavior is stronger
in declining markets and during turbulent conditions (Zhou and Anderson, 2013)
and the market value of liquidity increased significantly during the crisis (Hill,
Kelly, and Hardin III, 2012).
As a consequence of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the US Government in-
troduced new rules to issue elective stock dividends to help satisfy the dividend
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requirement of REITs. Devos, Ong, Spieler, and Tsang (2013) study the impact
of these rules on REIT dividend policy and find that only 17 REITs used these
rules and there was no difference in cash flows between REITs that issued these
selective dividends compared to the REITs that did not. According to Case et al.
(2012a), it is rather the level of leverage that influences the decisions to pay stock
dividends instead of cash flow levels among US REITs. Moreover, (Sun et al.,
2015) find that REITs with higher debt to asset ratios and shorter maturity fell
more during the 2007-2008 financial crisis.
Because of the evidence of a widespread impact of the 2007-2008 financial crisis
on US REITs, I examine whether the level of AD and the investor sensitivity to AD
changed after the crisis. I choose the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September
2008 as my structural break point between the two sub-samples. I summarize
the mean levels and standard deviations of CAPM β, JAdj, JAdj− and JAdj+
in the “pre-crisis” (before September 2008) and “post-crisis” (after September
2008) periods in Table 4.8. The mean CAPM β in the pre-crisis period was 0.433
while the post-crisis mean CAPM β is 1.228. This finding suggests that after the
2007-2008 financial crisis, US REITs became less defensive instruments and the
diversification benefits have decreased, which is consistent with empirical findings
of Huang and Zhong (2013) and Knight et al. (2005). This difference in mean β
before and after the crisis is significantly different with p-value lower than 0.01%,
tested using the two-sample T-test for difference in means with unequal standard
deviations, see Table 4.8.
The level of asymmetric dependence (both LTAD and UTAD) has decreased
after the crisis. The mean value of JAdj was -1.935 before the crisis and -0.536
after the crisis, which suggests that the asymmetries in exceedance correlations
decreased. The mean JAdj is significantly different before and after the crisis. The
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mean factor sensitivity towards JAdj and JAdj− is also significantly lower. However,
the sensitivity to JAdj+ remains unchanged after the crisis. The results from the
tests of significant differences in means for factor levels and factor sensitivities of
CAPM β, JAdj, JAdj− and JAdj+ are summarized in Table 4.8.
The level of AD as well as AD sensitivity have decreased after the crisis. This
change in the REIT risk-return characteristics is consistent with findings of other
authors (Huang and Zhong, 2013; Knight et al., 2005). Nevertheless, the JAdj still
remains one of the few significant risk factors explaining the cross section of US
REIT returns.
4.5 Robustness Checks
To ensure the robustness of the evidence of AD in US REIT returns, I employ var-
ious checks using alternative downside measures and alternative regression speci-
fications.
Alternative downside measures
Ang et al. (2006a) build upon the Gul (1991) preference theory to rationalize
investor incentives for downside β (β−) and upside β (β+). In the Gul (1991)
framework, state-dependent investors may feel disappointed if an investment out-
come is worse than the certainty equivalent of the investment return distribution.
There is only one reference point (the certainty equivalent) that differentiates be-
tween bad outcomes and good outcomes, which is consistent with the definition of
the downside and upside β.
I define the downside and upside β as β− = cov(Ri, Rm|Rm < 0)/var(Rm|RM <
0) and β+ = cov(Ri, Rm|Rm > 0)/var(Rm|RM > 0), respectively. The downside
and upside βs are similar in mean (0.677 vs 0.627) and standard deviation (0.570
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vs 0.571), Table 4.1. There is no evidence that for a difference in linear dependence
of US REIT returns in the market downturns than upturns.
I compare the two downside risk measures, JAdj and β−, in several ways. First,
I double sort US REIT monthly excess returns into β− deciles and then into JAdj
deciles in Table 4.9, Panel A. The mean monthly excess returns in β− deciles are
relatively constant. There is therefore no evidence that β− capture any valuable
information or is valued by investors. The difference in excess returns between
the lowest and the highest JAdj decile is positive in most of the β− deciles, which
suggests that JAdj is a relevant risk factor independent from β−. The correlation
between the JAdj and the downside β is less than 5%, which implies that the value
of JAdj provides a different information than downside β.
I replicate the same procedure for β+ in Table 4.9, Panel B. Mean excess returns
are not monotonic in β+ and the difference in mean excess returns between the
lowest and the highest JAdj decile is again positive in most of the β+ deciles. The
JAdj is superior to the downside and upside β in explaining the cross-sectional
return variations.
Further, I include β− and β+ into the value-weighted in-sample cross-sectional
regressions and report my results in Table 4.10. Regression I from Table 4.10
contains the conditional β measures and control variables whereas Regressions II
and III from Table 4.10 use the conditional βs, control variables as well as the JAdj
or JAdj− and JAdj+, respectively, as variables explaining US REIT excess returns.
Both β− and β+ are insignificant in all the regressions. On the other hand, JAdj is
significant with a t-statistic that exceeds the Harvey et al. (2014) t-statistic level
of 3.0 in Regression II from Table 4.10.
My results suggest that the marginal price-setting investor is not endowed with
a set of Gul (1991) preferences (β− and β+ are insignificant). However, I find a
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strong evidence consistent with the marginal price-setting investor endowed with
a family of conditional preferences as described by Skiadas (1997).
Alternative regression specifications
I provide several additional tests to verify the robustness of the results. In Ta-
ble 4.11, I estimate equally-weighted in-sample cross-sectional regressions and con-
clude that the JAdj is significant in the equally-weighted regressions.
Next, I explore the effect of US REIT stock return volatility on my results.
I exclude the top quintile, decile and vigintile of the most volatile stock returns,
re-estimate the out-of-sample cross-sectional regressions and summarize results in
Table 4.12. The main results are qualitatively robust to the exclusion of the most
volatile US REIT stocks.
In the last test, I change the specification of the rolling window period and use
six months to five years of data with daily, weekly and fortnightly frequency to
validate results. The CAPM β remains insignificant across all my regressions from
Tables 4.13 and 4.14.
My results remain qualitatively unchanged when using alternative data speci-
fication. The coefficient associated with the JAdj is significant and negative in all
the regressions from Tables 4.13 and 4.14.
4.6 Conclusion
REITs are generally considered to have a low correlation with the market, which
provides desirable diversification qualities. I provide new evidence that shows
that these diversification benefits are diminished for most of US REITs because
of existence of the lower-tail asymmetric dependence. I also quantify investor
sensitivity to this asymmetric dependence in the US REITs market. I find a strong
empirical evidence that AD in US REIT returns are related with a significant price.
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This is consistent with the theory of disappointment aversion described by Skiadas
(1997).
My main results suggest that the marginal price-setting disappointment-averse
investor demands a premium to hold a REIT exhibiting LTAD averaging at 1.3%
per annum. The typical return discount associated with UTAD is 5.8% per annum,
which suggests that US REIT investors are willing to accept a substantially lower
return in favor for holding a UTAD asset. The price of AD (both LTAD and
UTAD) is independent from the CAPM β. Interestingly, I find that neither the
CAPM β nor idiosyncratic risk are priced in US REIT returns.
Asymmetric dependence is a significant factor explaining US REIT returns in
the in-sample, out-of-sample and predictive regressions with future returns of up
to three months ahead. The JAdj is the only significant covariate considered with a
t-statistic higher that the Harvey et al. (2014) critical value of 3.0. The statistical
significance is strong and the results are robust to various changes in regression
specifications, which implies that investors value AD in the cross section of US
REIT returns.
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Descriptive statistics (1992-2013)
Table 4.1: This table summarizes the mean, standard deviation, minimum, 25th
percentile, median, 75th percentile and maximum for all variables in the data set.
All variables are estimated at each month, t, using the next 12 months of daily excess
return data. Returns (“Ret”) are estimated as the average of the next 12 monthly
excess return. We restrict my attention to REIT stocks listed on the NYSE between
January 1992 and December 2013. I provide summary statistics for β, JAdj , JAdj−
and JAdj+ in two sub-samples, before September 2008 covering the “pre-crisis”
period and after September 2008 denoting the “post-crisis” period.
Mean Std Min 25th 50th 75th Max
Ret 0.010 0.030 -0.200 -0.002 0.010 0.022 0.341
Log-size 12.859 1.769 7.230 11.857 13.068 14.097 17.650
BM 0.631 1.249 -26.553 0.419 0.622 0.857 16.983
β 0.643 0.603 -2.378 0.206 0.444 1.015 7.385
β− 0.674 0.617 -6.677 0.268 0.596 1.014 5.251
β+ 0.632 0.734 -3.143 0.159 0.462 1.078 12.352
Idio 0.019 0.017 0.006 0.011 0.014 0.021 0.390
Cosk -0.081 0.199 -1.416 -0.180 -0.063 0.045 0.779
Cokurt 1.755 1.533 -2.664 0.627 1.409 2.558 9.916
JAdj -1.575 5.897 -25.254 -5.600 -2.839 3.307 26.220
JAdj− -5.331 3.135 -25.254 -6.932 -4.745 -3.036 -0.084
JAdj+ 5.140 3.011 0.066 2.961 4.543 6.687 26.220
β
Before 09/2008 0.433 0.428 -2.378 0.162 0.308 0.618 3.258
After 09/2008 1.228 0.639 -0.767 0.835 1.165 1.537 7.385
JAdj
Before 09/2008 -1.935 5.982 -25.254 -5.918 -3.257 3.010 26.220
After 09/2008 -0.536 5.533 -22.770 -4.423 -1.275 3.766 23.788
JAdj−
Before 09/2008 -5.445 3.110 -25.254 -7.065 -4.874 -3.162 -0.172
After 09/2008 -4.926 3.192 -22.770 -6.424 -4.173 -2.632 -0.084
JAdj+
Before 09/2008 5.494 3.128 0.113 3.226 4.889 7.148 26.220
After 09/2008 4.458 2.641 0.066 2.553 3.975 5.781 23.788
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Factor Correlation
Table 4.2: This table presents the correlation between each factor. We restrict my
attention to REIT stocks listed on the NYSE between January 1992 and December
2013. At each month, t, I estimate β, β−, β+, idiosyncratic risk (“Idio”), coskewness
(“Cosk”), cokurtosis (“Cokurt”) and JAdj estimated using the next 12 months of
daily excess return data, and size (“Log-size”), book-to-market ratio (“BM”) and
the average past 12-monthly excess return (“Past Ret”) computed as at time t.
Returns (“Ret”) are estimated as the average of the next 12 monthly excess return.
I proxy the market portfolio with the CRSP Value Weighted return of all NYSE,
AMEX and NASDAQ stocks and the risk free rate with the 1 month T-bill rate. All
factors are Winsorized at the 1% and 99% level at each month.
β Log-size BM Past Ret Idio Cosk Cokurt JAdj Ret
β 1 0.486 0.012 -0.003 0.219 0.033 0.651 0.215 0.087
Log-size 1 -0.079 0.081 -0.397 -0.016 0.549 0.240 -0.025
BM 1 -0.099 0.138 -0.006 -0.038 -0.064 0.090
Past ret 1 -0.306 -0.133 0.124 0.029 0.050
Idio 1 0.106 -0.114 -0.062 -0.084
Cosk 1 -0.330 0.432 0.032
Cokurt 1 0.141 0.056
JAdj 1 -0.017
Ret 1
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The Time Series Average Returns for Double Sorted Portfolios
Table 4.3: For a given month, I first sort stocks into β deciles, and then into JAdj
deciles within each characteristic decile in Panel A. In Panel B (C), I first sort stocks
into coskewness (size) deciles and then into JAdj deciles within each characteristic
decile. Dependence ranges from low (group 1) to high (group 10) which implies that
JAdj1 consists of the stocks with high downside risk and J
Adj
10 consists of stocks with
high upside potential. I record and report the equal weighted average 12 monthly
excess return for all stocks within each group, expressed as an effective annual rate
of return. I restrict my attention to REIT stocks listed on the NYSE between
January 1992 and December 2013. I proxy the market portfolio with the CRSP
Value Weighted return of all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks and the risk free
rate with the 1 month T-bill rate. I provide the spread (“Diff”) for each row and
column, given by the return associated with the high risk group, less the return
associated with the low risk group. I also include the average return (“Avg”) for
each row and column.
Panel A: β/JAdj Sorted Portfolios
β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 β6 β7 β8 β9 β10 Diff Avg
JAdj1 0.120 0.148 0.148 0.118 0.153 0.120 0.136 0.144 0.165 0.174 0.055 0.147
JAdj2 0.127 0.102 0.106 0.102 0.095 0.158 0.179 0.134 0.089 0.225 0.098 0.137
JAdj3 0.062 0.129 0.100 0.097 0.160 0.135 0.131 0.154 0.062 0.214 0.153 0.128
JAdj4 0.114 0.115 0.131 0.127 0.154 0.136 0.129 0.143 0.185 0.107 -0.006 0.137
JAdj5 0.081 0.083 0.151 0.104 0.109 0.186 0.138 0.098 0.120 0.104 0.022 0.122
JAdj6 0.006 0.110 0.111 0.128 0.139 0.168 0.153 0.122 0.137 0.053 0.046 0.120
JAdj7 0.041 0.125 0.168 0.124 0.144 0.156 0.157 0.166 0.132 0.046 0.004 0.133
JAdj8 0.073 0.129 0.144 0.146 0.153 0.142 0.188 0.142 0.115 -0.010 -0.083 0.127
JAdj9 0.077 0.100 0.149 0.139 0.172 0.120 0.157 0.164 0.113 -0.015 -0.092 0.121
JAdj10 0.129 0.112 0.079 0.158 0.113 0.130 0.158 0.151 0.015 -0.083 -0.213 0.094
Diff -0.010 0.037 0.069 -0.040 0.039 -0.009 -0.021 -0.007 0.151 0.258
Avg 0.088 0.116 0.128 0.125 0.139 0.145 0.153 0.142 0.111 0.077
Panel B: Cosk/JAdj Sorted Portfolios
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 Diff Avg
JAdj1 0.158 0.190 0.067 0.113 0.157 0.171 0.131 0.187 0.173 0.158 0.001 0.147
JAdj2 0.173 0.119 0.096 0.155 0.094 0.133 0.133 0.138 0.195 0.211 -0.038 0.137
JAdj3 0.126 0.116 0.147 0.154 0.137 0.098 0.100 0.114 0.102 0.180 -0.054 0.128
JAdj4 0.110 0.169 0.170 0.106 0.113 0.116 0.130 0.100 0.168 0.187 -0.078 0.137
JAdj5 0.103 0.122 0.110 0.114 0.146 0.120 0.111 0.135 0.127 0.107 -0.004 0.122
JAdj6 0.099 0.111 0.103 0.099 0.135 0.115 0.163 0.112 0.142 0.122 -0.023 0.120
JAdj7 0.131 0.093 0.112 0.146 0.129 0.144 0.129 0.154 0.154 0.117 0.015 0.133
JAdj8 0.123 0.103 0.070 0.138 0.105 0.177 0.131 0.131 0.144 0.119 0.003 0.127
JAdj9 0.060 0.143 0.123 0.090 0.176 0.155 0.098 0.137 0.090 0.113 -0.053 0.121
JAdj10 0.098 0.152 0.173 0.059 0.167 0.107 0.053 0.041 0.069 0.109 -0.010 0.094
Diff 0.060 0.038 -0.106 0.054 -0.010 0.064 0.078 0.146 0.103 0.049
Avg 0.131 0.135 0.115 0.119 0.133 0.133 0.116 0.122 0.125 0.127
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Cross-sectional Regressions: JAdj (1992-2013)
Table 4.4: I measure the in-sample risk premia using the Ang, Chen, and Xing
(2006a). I also estimate the Fama and MacBeth (1973) intertemporal regression
method to generate out-of-sample estimates of the risk premia and 3-month and
6-month predictive regressions estimated every month rolling forward. In the Ang
et al. (2006a) regressions, at a given month, t, the average of the next 12 excess
monthly returns is regressed against β, β−, β+, idiosyncratic risk (“Idio”), coskew-
ness (“Cosk”), cokurtosis (“Cokurt”) and JAdj estimated using the next 12 months
of daily excess return data, and size (“Log-size”), book-to-market ratio (“BM”) and
the average past 12-monthly excess return (“Past Ret”), computed as at time t. In
the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions, I use the next one-month monthly ex-
cess return as dependent variable, whereas in the predictive regressions I use mean
monthly excess return from the next three months, six months, nine months, twelve
months and fifteen months. I proxy the market portfolio with the CRSP Value
Weighted return of all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks and the risk free rate
with the 1 month T-bill rate. All regressors are Winsorized at the 1% and 99%
level at each month. I restrict my attention to REIT stocks listed on the NYSE
between January 1992 and December 2013. Statistical significance is determined
using Newey and West (1987b) adjusted t-statistics, given in parentheses, to con-
trol for overlapping data using the Newey and West (1994b) automatic lag selection
method to determine the lag length. All coefficients are reported as effective annual
rates
In-sample Out-of-sample Predictive regressions
Regressions Regressions 3m 6m
Int 0.283 0.173 0.208 0.199
[3.311] [1.887] [2.971] [2.663]
β -0.025 -0.127 -0.086 -0.062
[0.619] [2.035] [1.960] [1.253]
Size -0.016 -0.011 -0.013 -0.013
[2.578] [1.583] [2.669] [2.320]
BM 0.005 0.025 0.021 0.020
[0.304] [1.280] [1.497] [1.240]
Past Ret 0.971 1.214 1.836 1.932
[2.459] [2.187] [4.247] [3.268]
Idio -1.511 -0.493 -0.111 0.372
[1.125] [0.380] [0.095] [0.342]
Cosk 0.085 0.167 0.051 0.067
[1.581] [1.689] [0.890] [1.095]
Cokurt 0.040 0.073 0.053 0.047
[2.140] [2.579] [2.929] [1.867]
JAdj -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 -0.001
[3.642] [3.287] [2.455] [1.023]
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Cross-sectional Regressions: JAdj− and JAdj+ (1992-2013)
Table 4.5: I measure the in-sample risk premia using the Ang, Chen, and Xing
(2006a). I also estimate the Fama and MacBeth (1973) intertemporal regression
method to generate out-of-sample estimates of the risk premia and 3-month and
6-month predictive regressions estimated every month rolling forward. In the Ang
et al. (2006a) regressions, at a given month, t, the average of the next 12 excess
monthly returns is regressed against β, β−, β+, idiosyncratic risk (“Idio”), coskew-
ness (“Cosk”), cokurtosis (“Cokurt”), JAdj− and JAdj+ estimated using the next 12
months of daily excess return data, size (“Log-size”), book-to-market ratio (“BM”)
and the average past 12-monthly excess return (“Past Ret”), computed as at time
t. In the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions, I use the next one-month monthly
excess return as dependent variable, whereas in the predictive regressions I use mean
monthly excess return from the next three months, six months, nine months, twelve
months and fifteen months. I proxy the market portfolio with the CRSP Value
Weighted return of all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks and the risk free rate
with the 1 month T-bill rate. All regressors are Winsorized at the 1% and 99%
level at each month. I restrict my attention to REIT stocks listed on the NYSE
between January 1992 and December 2013. Statistical significance is determined
using Newey and West (1987b) adjusted t-statistics, given in parentheses, to con-
trol for overlapping data using the Newey and West (1994b) automatic lag selection
method to determine the lag length. All coefficients are reported as effective annual
rates
In-sample Out-of-sample Predictive regressions
Regressions Regressions 3m 6m
Int 0.293 0.196 0.228 0.211
[3.205] [2.010] [2.809] [2.633]
β -0.021 -0.120 -0.081 -0.060
[0.526] [1.940] [1.630] [1.206]
Size -0.016 -0.012 -0.014 -0.014
[2.543] [1.691] [2.515] [2.372]
BM 0.004 0.023 0.020 0.020
[0.245] [1.146] [1.246] [1.279]
Past Ret 0.942 1.188 1.820 1.904
[2.369] [2.120] [3.674] [3.210]
Idio -1.223 -0.559 -0.074 0.429
[0.912] [0.430] [0.059] [0.391]
Cosk 0.095 0.159 0.058 0.076
[1.670] [1.625] [0.909] [1.255]
Cokurt 0.039 0.072 0.051 0.046
[1.961] [2.555] [2.491] [1.841]
JAdj− -0.003 -0.003 -0.0003 -0.00001
[2.238] [1.541] [0.145] [0.008]
JAdj+ -0.011 -0.017 -0.014 -0.007
[2.551] [2.429] [2.228] [1.214]
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In-sample Regressions: US REITs vs US equities (1992-2013)
Table 4.6: I compare the in-sample risk premia of US REITs estimated using
the equally-weighted Ang et al. (2006a) asset pricing regressions with the Alcock
and Hatherley (2016) risk premia of US equities estimated using the same Ang
et al. (2006a) procedure. The results of the risk premia of US equities refer to
Table 3 from Alcock and Hatherley (2016). I restrict my attention to REIT stocks
listed on the NYSE between January 1992 and December 2013 and NYSE stocks
listed between January 1992 and June 2013 (US industrial equities). Statistical
significance is determined using Newey and West (1987b) adjusted t-statistics, given
in parentheses, to control for overlapping data using the Newey and West (1994b)
automatic lag selection method to determine the lag length. The equally-weighted
mean and equally-weighted standard deviation (in parentheses) for each variable is
provided at the last column. All coefficients are reported as effective annual rates.
US REITs US equities
I III IV mean I III IV mean
(std) (std)
Int 0.296 0.277 0.293 0.391 0.379 0.388
[3.259] [3.182] [3.205] [4.702] [4.685] [4.688]
β -0.025 -0.027 -0.021 0.640 0.106 0.101 0.104 0.900
[0.613] [0.662] [0.526] (0.570) [3.068] [3.003] [3.019] (0.499)
Log-size -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 12.859 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 13.981
[2.570] [2.501] [2.543] (1.752) [4.345] [4.346] [4.354] (0.441)
BM 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.659 -0.025 -0.025 -0.026 0.605
[0.454] [0.366] [0.245] (0.552) [2.050] [2.074] [2.079] (1.688)
Past ret 0.994 1.000 0.942 0.010 -0.071 -0.043 -0.043 0.008
[2.456] [2.478] [2.369] (0.026) [0.346] [0.210] [0.212] (0.030)
Idio -1.086 -1.206 -1.223 0.019 -4.572 -4.629 -4.655 0.021
[0.814] [0.897] [0.912] (0.014) [3.835] [3.895] [3.907] (0.011)
Cosk 0.025 0.093 0.095 -0.080 -0.158 -0.049 -0.047 -0.113
[0.490] [1.632] [1.670] (0.191) [3.497] [1.332] [1.292] (0.221)
Cokurt 0.037 0.040 0.039 1.746 -0.003 0.002 0.001 2.057
[1.888] [2.027] [1.961] (1.482) [0.401] [0.240] [0.065] (1.443)
JAdj -0.004 -1.576 -0.005 -2.574
[3.675] (5.771) [5.011] (5.838)
JAdj− -0.003 -5.294 -0.004 -5.659
[2.238] (3.003) [4.280] (3.257)
JAdj+ -0.011 5.074 -0.009 5.225
[2.551] (2.793) [4.667] (2.926)
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JAdj− and JAdj+ Average Migration probabilities (1992-2013)
Table 4.7: JAdj is estimated using a 12-month rolling window of daily returns. I
calculate probability of migrations between JAdj− and JAdj+ using non-overlapping
data to account for autocorrelation issues. I restrict my attention to REIT stocks
listed on the NYSE between January 1992 and December 2013.
JAdj− JAdj+
JAdj− 70.953% 29.047%
JAdj+ 50.135% 49.865%
Structural break test
Table 4.8: I test for a statistical difference in means of β, JAdj , JAdj− and JAdj+
in the periods before and after the global financial crisis of 2007/2009. I choose
September 2008 to define the “pre-crisis” and “after crisis” period. The statistical
significance of the difference in means is tested using the two-sample T-test with
unequal standard deviations. I restrict my attention to REIT stocks listed on the
NYSE between January 1992 and December 2013.
Factor level β JAdj JAdj− JAdj+
P-value < 0.01% < 0.01% < 0.01% < 0.01%
T-stat -100.989 -17.661 -9.077 16.545
Diff in means -0.769 -1.412 -0.526 0.978
Mean before 09/2008 0.437 -1.939 -5.410 5.408
Mean after 09/2008 1.206 -0.527 -4.884 4.430
Std before 09/2008 0.418 5.847 2.986 2.863
Std after 09/2008 0.562 5.430 3.032 2.531
Factor sensitivity β JAdj JAdj− JAdj+
P-value < 0.01% < 0.01% < 0.01% 19.550%
T-stat -6.646 -5.444 -4.703 -1.304
Diff in means -0.223 -0.004 -0.011 -0.002
Mean before 09/2008 -0.082 -0.005 -0.013 -0.003
Mean after 09/2008 0.141 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
Std before 09/2008 0.234 0.007 0.026 0.010
Std after 09/2008 0.231 0.004 0.011 0.013
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4.6 Conclusion
Time Variations: In-sample Mean Factor Sensitivity
Figure 4.3: This figure depicts the factor sensitivity per unit of standard deviation
of given risk factor using the in-sample asset pricing procedure where cross-sectional
regressions are computed every month rolling forward. At a given month t, the
average of the next 12 excess monthly returns is regressed against β, idiosyncratic
risk, JAdj , coskewness and cokurtosis estimated using the next 12 months of daily
excess return data, and size (Log-size), book-to-market ratio (BM) and the average
past 12-monthly excess return (Past Ret), computed as at time t. I proxy the market
portfolio with the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks and the risk free rate with
the 1 month T-bill rate. All regressors are Winsorised at the 1% and 99% level at
each month. I restrict my attention to REIT stocks listed on the NYSE between
January 1992 and December 2013. The Premium for β, Coskewness and Cokurtosis
between January 2000 and December 2013 is given by the time series mean factor
sensitivity using all historical sensitivity estimates up to and including time t. The
vertical line corresponds to the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.
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4.6 Conclusion
The Time Series Average Returns for Double Sorted Portfolios
Table 4.9: For a given month, I first sort stocks into β− deciles, and then into JAdj
deciles within each characteristic decile in Panel A. In Panel B, I first sort stocks into
β+ deciles and then into JAdj deciles within each characteristic decile. Dependence
ranges from low (group 1) to high (group 10) which implies that JAdj1 consists of
the stocks with high downside risk and JAdj10 consists of stocks with high upside
potential. I record and report the equal weighted average 12 monthly excess return
for all stocks within each group, expressed as an effective annual rate of return. I
restrict my attention to REIT stocks listed on the NYSE between January 1992 and
December 2013. I proxy the market portfolio with the CRSP Value Weighted return
of all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks and the risk free rate with the 1 month
T-bill rate. I provide the spread (“Diff”) for each row and column, given by the
return associated with the high risk group, less the return associated with the low
risk group. I also include the average return (“Avg”) for each row and column.
Panel A: β−/JAdj Sorted Portfolios
β−1 β
−
2 β
−
3 β
−
4 β
−
5 β
−
6 β
−
7 β
−
8 β
−
9 β
−
10 Diff Avg
JAdj1 0.111 0.160 0.143 0.116 0.125 0.104 0.123 0.127 0.155 0.246 0.135 0.147
JAdj2 0.136 0.142 0.098 0.139 0.100 0.131 0.079 0.125 0.178 0.182 0.047 0.137
JAdj3 0.064 0.106 0.151 0.117 0.128 0.110 0.164 0.097 0.106 0.209 0.145 0.128
JAdj4 0.089 0.134 0.127 0.107 0.145 0.146 0.139 0.163 0.173 0.128 0.039 0.137
JAdj5 0.054 0.139 0.136 0.132 0.144 0.132 0.107 0.118 0.123 0.118 0.064 0.122
JAdj6 0.065 0.104 0.125 0.139 0.138 0.112 0.147 0.143 0.122 0.078 0.012 0.120
JAdj7 0.078 0.109 0.144 0.149 0.154 0.123 0.161 0.157 0.097 0.100 0.022 0.133
JAdj8 0.089 0.165 0.134 0.137 0.149 0.148 0.139 0.153 0.112 0.005 -0.085 0.127
JAdj9 0.073 0.135 0.154 0.128 0.149 0.101 0.147 0.165 0.086 0.028 -0.045 0.121
JAdj10 0.090 0.133 0.104 0.139 0.099 0.119 0.100 0.098 0.049 -0.060 -0.150 0.094
Diff 0.021 0.027 0.039 -0.023 0.026 -0.015 0.023 0.029 0.106 0.305
Avg 0.087 0.133 0.133 0.131 0.134 0.123 0.131 0.135 0.122 0.118
Panel B: β+/JAdj Sorted Portfolios
β+1 β
+
2 β
+
3 β
+
4 β
+
5 β
+
6 β
+
7 β
+
8 β
+
9 β
+
10 Diff Avg
JAdj1 0.155 0.119 0.086 0.096 0.168 0.106 0.205 0.178 0.177 0.160 0.006 0.147
JAdj2 0.110 0.111 0.112 0.132 0.147 0.151 0.135 0.120 0.143 0.186 0.075 0.137
JAdj3 0.070 0.123 0.118 0.140 0.170 0.113 0.137 0.116 0.088 0.143 0.074 0.128
JAdj4 0.084 0.114 0.118 0.147 0.123 0.162 0.178 0.153 0.135 0.093 0.009 0.137
JAdj5 0.055 0.096 0.106 0.102 0.129 0.166 0.146 0.140 0.106 0.115 0.060 0.122
JAdj6 0.040 0.093 0.114 0.116 0.105 0.149 0.182 0.142 0.134 0.079 0.038 0.120
JAdj7 0.093 0.116 0.115 0.143 0.122 0.127 0.178 0.137 0.104 0.105 0.011 0.133
JAdj8 0.066 0.154 0.162 0.120 0.140 0.159 0.144 0.155 0.110 0.024 -0.042 0.127
JAdj9 0.089 0.173 0.150 0.126 0.144 0.124 0.116 0.155 0.101 0.055 -0.034 0.121
JAdj10 0.148 0.062 0.102 0.176 0.117 0.086 0.134 0.110 0.095 -0.047 -0.195 0.094
Diff 0.007 0.058 -0.016 -0.080 0.051 0.020 0.070 0.068 0.082 0.208
Avg 0.098 0.115 0.116 0.130 0.135 0.136 0.154 0.140 0.115 0.077
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4.6 Conclusion
Alternative downside risk measure: β− (1992-2013)
Table 4.10: I measure the in-sample risk premia using the Ang, Chen, and Xing
(2006a) where cross-sectional regressions are computed every month rolling for-
ward. At a given month, t, the average of the next 12 excess monthly returns
is regressed against β, β−, β+, idiosyncratic risk (“Idio”), coskewness (“Cosk”),
cokurtosis (“Cokurt”) and JAdj estimated using the next 12 months of daily excess
return data, JAdj−, JAdj+, size (“Log-size”), book-to-market ratio (“BM”) and the
average past 12-monthly excess return (“Past Ret”), computed as at time t. I proxy
the market portfolio with the CRSP Value Weighted return of all NYSE, AMEX and
NASDAQ stocks and the risk free rate with the 1 month T-bill rate. All regressors
are Winsorized at the 1% and 99% level at each month. I restrict my attention to
REIT stocks listed on the NYSE between January 1992 and December 2013. Statis-
tical significance is determined using Newey and West (1987a) adjusted t-statistics,
given in parentheses, to control for overlapping data using the Newey and West
(1994a) automatic lag selection method to determine the lag length. The mean and
standard deviation (in parentheses) for each variable is provided at the last column.
All coefficients are reported as effective annual rates.
I II III
Int 0.299 0.280 3.411
[3.451] [3.411] [0.294]
β− 0.0327 0.045 1.140
[0.851] [1.140] [0.047]
β+ -0.0358 -0.047 -1.484
[1.169] [1.484] [0.047]
Log-size -0.017 -0.016 -2.674
[2.742] [2.674] [0.016]
BM 0.008 0.007 0.420
[0.461] [0.420] [0.005]
Past ret 1.092 1.093 2.673
[2.661] [2.673] [1.051]
Idio -1.716 -1.872 -1.390
[1.299] [1.390] [1.892]
Cosk 0.156 0.267 2.147
[1.478] [2.147] [0.271]
Cokurt 0.037 0.043 2.281
[2.078] [2.281] [0.044]
JAdj -0.004
[3.756]
JAdj− -0.003
[2.183]
JAdj+ -0.013
[2.729]
88
4.6 Conclusion
Equally-weighted In-sample Regressions (1992-2013)
Table 4.11: I measure the in-sample risk premia using the Ang, Chen, and Xing
(2006a) where cross-sectional regressions are computed every month rolling for-
ward. At a given month, t, the average of the next 12 excess monthly returns
is regressed against β, β−, β+, idiosyncratic risk (“Idio”), coskewness (“Cosk”),
cokurtosis (“Cokurt”) and JAdj estimated using the next 12 months of daily excess
return data, and size (“Log-size”), book-to-market ratio (“BM”) and the average
past 12-monthly excess return (“Past Ret”), computed as at time t. I proxy the
market portfolio with the CRSP Value Weighted return of all NYSE, AMEX and
NASDAQ stocks and the risk free rate with the 1 month T-bill rate. All regressors
are Winsorized at the 1% and 99% level at each month. I restrict my attention to
REIT stocks listed on the NYSE between January 1992 and December 2013. Statis-
tical significance is determined using Newey and West (1987a) adjusted t-statistics,
given in parentheses, to control for overlapping data using the Newey and West
(1994a) automatic lag selection method to determine the lag length. The mean and
standard deviation (in parentheses) for each variable is provided at the last column.
All coefficients are reported as effective annual rates.
I II III IV V mean
(std)
Int 0.296 0.105 0.277 0.293 0.293
[3.259] [3.784] [3.182] [3.205] [3.353]
β -0.025 -0.027 -0.021 0.640
[0.613] [0.662] [0.526] (0.570)
β− 0.007 0.050 0.677
[0.213] [1.256] (0.571)
β+ -0.009 -0.048 0.627
[0.396] [1.519] (0.671)
Log-size -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 12.859
[2.570] [2.501] [2.543] [2.643] (1.752)
BM 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.659
[0.454] [0.366] [0.245] [0.382] (0.552)
Past ret 0.994 1.000 0.942 1.061 0.010
[2.456] [2.478] [2.369] [2.584] (0.026)
Idio -1.086 -1.206 -1.223 -1.739 0.019
[0.814] [0.897] [0.912] [1.276] (0.014)
Cosk 0.025 0.093 0.095 0.281 -0.080
[0.490] [1.632] [1.670] [2.258] (0.191)
Cokurt 0.037 0.040 0.039 0.044 1.746
[1.888] [2.027] [1.961] [2.269] (1.482)
JAdj -0.004 -1.576
[3.675] (5.771)
JAdj− -0.003 -0.003 -5.294
[2.238] [2.353] (3.003)
JAdj+ -0.0114 -0.013 5.074
[2.551] [2.715] (2.793)
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5.1 Introduction
I show that heterogeneous cash-flow risk explains the cross section of the firm-
level asymmetric dependence. The fundamental cash-flow risk is measured using
the covariance between firm cash-flow growth and aggregate consumption growth
(Menzly et al., 2004). I build an equilibrium model of the economy where investors
experience preference shocks correlated with the business cycle and trade multiple
risky assets, and whose future cash flows are affected by heterogeneous cash-flow
risks of firms. The existence of preference shocks is consistent with investors being
more sensitive to changes in utility levels during bad times. Asymmetric depen-
dence between stock returns and market returns emerges when the effect of investor
preference shocks interacts with the firm-level cash-flow risk. The proposed model
generates moments that are able to match important characteristics of asset prices.
The existence of preference shocks is crucial in understanding the behavior of
equity premia. Consider, for example, the impact of a serious economic downturn
in the economy; firms pay low dividends, investors experience low consumption
levels, and also realize a high preference shock. The effect of the preference shock
makes investors value even more each additional unit of consumption, because their
marginal utility depends positively on preference shocks. As a result, the existence
of preference shocks increases the discount rate that investors use to price risky
assets, which further increases anticipated excess returns for a given level of risk
aversion.
In the proposed model, preference shocks lead to time-varying and state-dependent
asset prices. Investors are particularly sensitive to consuming less during bad
times and any shock to individual consumption is thus more painful during eco-
nomic downturns. The cash-flow dynamics of the risky assets in the economy are
affected by heterogeneous cash-flow risks. Risky assets differ in their cash-flow
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growth reactions to economic shocks. Firms from various industries may experi-
ence differing demand reactions from consumers following a negative shock to the
economy, which generates heterogeneous cash-flow risks of firms.
The sign and the magnitude of the cash-flow risk determine whether a risky
asset is a good or a bad hedge against negative consumption shocks (Menzly et al.,
2004). If the covariance is negative, asset cash flows grow faster in the presence
of any decrease in aggregate consumption growth. Consequently, these assets will
serve as natural hedges against negative consumption shocks and may also perform
relatively better than other assets during bad times.
To understand the intuition of the model, consider first a bear market scenario.
During market downturns, negative shocks to aggregate consumption decrease the
current personal consumption of individual agents. This automatically leads to
a drop in investor utility and an increase in risk aversion. Investors shift their
attention to safe assets and prefer to sell risky assets. This change in demand for
risky assets is not proportional, however. Agents prefer to sell assets with the worst
performance first. High cash-flow risk stocks that exhibit a high covariance of cash-
flow growth with consumption growth are likely to perform relatively worse. As
a result, the dependence of high cash-flow risk stocks on market returns is higher
relative to low cash-flow risk stocks. In addition, agents experience a positive
preference shock in depressed economic conditions and the total effect of negative
consumption shocks on asset prices is thus magnified.
Conversely, during market upturns the individual consumption and utility of
agents increase. Investors increase their demand for risky assets, particularly for
high-cash flow risk assets that experience a relatively high increase in cash-flow
growth. Nevertheless, the total effect of the increased demand for high cash-flow
risk stocks is lower due to the presence of a negative preference shock experienced
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during market upturn periods. Consequently, the effect of heterogeneous cash-flow
risk of firms on the conditional return dependence is stronger during bad times
relative to good times. This mechanism generates asymmetric dependence between
stock and market returns in the economy.
In this paper, I show within a general equilibrium model that conditional de-
pendence measures (conditional β) and the degree of asymmetric dependence are
associated with the firm level of fundamental cash-flow risk. Assets with a high
cash-flow covariance risk do not only have higher unconditional consumption βs.
I demonstrate that high cash-flow risk stocks also exhibit higher degrees of asym-
metric dependence and time variation in conditional dependence measures. The
proposed model suggests that stocks with a high fundamental cash-flow risk are
likely to perform relatively poorly during market downturns.
Asymmetric dependence of asset returns is generated by the interaction be-
tween heterogeneous cash-flow risks of firms and preference shocks experienced by
investors. Both of these two components of the model are relevant to capture the
cross section of asset prices and their conditional moments. Without the preference
shocks, the model is unable to generate a sufficient amount of time variation that
is observed in financial markets. Without heterogeneous cash-flow risks, all assets
would behave and perform in the same manner. This paper contributes to the
existing literature by noting the importance of preference shocks for equilibrium
asset pricing and providing a theoretical link between the firm level of cash-flow
risk and conditional asymmetric dependence measures.
I test the model implications using a variety of empirical proxies of aggregate
consumption shocks. I find that heterogeneous cash-flow risk affects the asset’s
conditional dependence structure. I also show that US industries with high cash-
flow risk have a higher degree of asymmetric dependence. These empirical results
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confirm the model predictions suggesting that assets with a high covariance of
cash-flow and consumption growth will perform relatively poorly during market
downturns. I conclude that firms with a high cash-flow risk experience abnormal
losses in market downturns that are driven by the asymmetric dependence of stock
returns.
This paper extends our understanding of the cross-sectional drivers of asym-
metric return dependence. This work is closely related to Santos and Veronesi
(2004), who examine the effects of cash-flow risk on conditional betas using a
habit formation model introduced by Campbell and Cochrane (1999). Although
closely related, this paper differs from Santos and Veronesi (2004) in a number
of ways, firstly through the use of preference shocks to explain time variation of
asset prices rather than external habits. In particular, I explain how the existence
of preference shocks generates the state dependence of asset prices. Secondly, this
paper shows in a closed form how fundamental cash-flow risks drive asymmetric re-
turn dependence. Third, it confirms the model predictions using various empirical
tests and measures of firm cash-flow risks using US industry data.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 5.2 presents the
theoretical model, Section 5.3 describes the predictions of the model. Section 5.4
describes the data used. Section 5.5 tests the theoretical implications and Section
5.6 concludes.
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5.2 The Model
Aggregate Economy
The aggregate consumption dynamics follow a geometric process with a time-
varying consumption volatility. Specifically,
dCt
Ct
= µCdt+ σC(Yt)dZ
1
t , (5.1)
where µC is the expected value of consumption growth, σC(Yt) is the volatility
of aggregate consumption, and dZ1t is a (1 × 1) Brownian motion. The volatil-
ity of consumption growth (σC(Yt)) depends on the state variable Yt. I follow
Santos and Veronesi (2017) and assume that the consumption growth volatility is
countercyclical and positively related to the recession indicator Yt.
σC(Yt) = σmax(1− λ/Yt) (5.2)
The state variable Yt represents a recession indicator. This means that the
value of Yt is high during recessions and low during market booms. The dynamics
of the state variable Yt are mean-reverting and correlated with innovations in the
aggregate consumption growth.
dYt = k(Y¯ − Yt)dt− vYt
[
dCt
Ct
− µCdt
]
, (5.3)
where k is the speed of mean reversion, Y¯ is the long run mean of Yt and the
parameter v describes the effects of unexpected consumption shocks on the state
variable Yt. The parameter v is positive, v > 0, which implies that with a negative
aggregate shock to economy, the value of Yt increases, and vice versa.
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Utility with Preference Shocks
Agents derive utility from individual consumption (Cit) and the level of preference
shock described by gt. That is, for agent i ∈ {1, ...,M}, the utility function is
given by
U(Cit , gt, t) = Et
[∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(τ−t)ui(Ciτ , gτ )dτ
]
, (5.4)
where ρ > 0 is the subjective discount rate and Cit is the agent i’s consumption
rate at time t. The agent i’s individual instantaneous utility function is defined as
ui
(
Cit , gt
)
= gt log
(
Cit
)
. (5.5)
The preference shock gt is driven by the current value of the state variable Yt
gt = a
(
Yt − Y¯
)
+ 1, (5.6)
where Y¯ is the long-term mean of Yt and a > 0 represents agent sensitivity to
preference shocks. The presence of preference shocks suggests that agents’ sensi-
tivity to utility shocks depends on market conditions. Moreover, I assume that
a > 0, which implies that agents are particularly sensitive to any shock to their
personal consumption during times of economic downturn.1 This is because the
agent marginal utility will be high when gt is high, which occurs when Yt is high
and exceeds its long-term level Y¯ . If, on the other hand, the current value of
the state variable Yt is lower than its long-term level Y¯ , agents are relatively less
concerned with shocks to personal consumption levels and their marginal utility
level is relatively low.
The existing literature has explored the effects of preference shocks on asset
prices using the framework of the Epstein and Zin (1991) non-separable pref-
1The value of the sensitivity parameter a is further restricted so that a
(
Yt − Y¯
)
+ 1 > 0 is
always satisfied.
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erences. Normandin and St-Amour (1998) show that preference shocks statis-
tically influence the equity premia and conclude that preference shocks can be
interpreted as proxies for omitted variables characterizing the state dependence
of investor preferences. Basu and Bundick (2017) suggest that unlike standard
general-equilibrium models, models with preference shocks can easily generate
comovement explaining declines in output, consumption, investment, and hours
worked, experiences during contraction periods.
The Social Planner’s Optimization Problem
Markets are complete and the social planner solves the problem
U(Ct, gt, t) = max
Cit
∫
I
ψiU(Cit , Yt, t)di (5.7)
subject to
∫
I
Citdi = Ct, where
∫
I
ψidi = 1.
Proposition 1. The marginal utility of the representative agent is given by
Mt = e
−ρtC−1t gt = e
−ρtC−1t (a
(
Yt − Y¯
)
+ 1). (5.8)
The marginal utility of the representative agent is high during recession periods
when gt is high. The pricing functions follow from the marginal rate of substitution.
Mτ
Mt
=
uC(Cτ , Yτ )
uC(Ct, Yt)
= e−ρ(τ−t)
C−1τ
C−1t
(a
(
Yτ − Y¯
)
+ 1)
(a
(
Yt − Y¯
)
+ 1)
. (5.9)
Proposition 2. The price of the claim on the aggregate consumption is given in
equilibrium by
(5.10 )
Pt(Ct, Yt) = Et
[∫ ∞
t
Mτ
Mt
Cτdτ
]
= Ctg
−1
t
[
a(Yt − Y¯ )
ρ+ k
+
1
ρ
]
.
The price of the claim on aggregate consumption can be considered as the
price of market portfolio. When a = 0, the equilibrium price of the claim on
aggregate consumption transforms to Pt =
Ct
ρ
. With the existence of preference
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shocks, i.e. when a > 0, the price of the aggregate market portfolio is affected
by current market conditions. The price of market portfolio will be high during
market upturns when the recession indicator Yt is low and vice versa. This holds
because ∂Pt
∂Yt
= Ct
(1−1/ρ)
g2t
< 0.
Proposition 3. The equilibrium risk-free rate (rt) is given by
rt(Yt) = ρ+ µC︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1)
+ ak
Yt
gt
(1− Y¯ /Yt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2)
−
(
1 + av
Yt
gt
)
σ2C(Yt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3)
. (5.11)
and the market price of risk (σM) is in equilibrium equal to
σM(Yt) =
(
1 + av
Yt
gt
)
σC(Yt). (5.12)
The equilibrium risk-free rate can be decomposed into three elements, (1,2,3)
from equation (5.50). Without preference shocks, i.e. when a = 0, the risk-free
rate is constant and fully determined by the discount rate ρ and the consumption
growth rate µC . In the presence of preference shocks, when a > 0, the risk-free
rate becomes stochastic and dependent on the market conditions represented by
the recession indicator Yt.
The effect of the market state is described and quantified by terms (2) and (3)
from equation (5.50). (2) comes from the mean-reversion dynamics of the state
variable Yt and implies that interest rates will be low during recession periods
(when Yt > Y¯ ) and high in expansions (when Yt < Y¯ ). (3) is a result of the
interaction of the consumption dynamics with the state variable dynamics. Con-
sequently, the equilibrium risk-free rate is low in periods with a high consumption
volatility, which occurs during market downturns.
Proposition 4. The equilibrium volatility of the market portfolio (σP (Yt)) is given
by
σR(Yt) =
(
1 +
aYt
gt
kv
(ρa(Yt − Y¯ ) + ρ+ k)
)
σC(Yt). (5.13)
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The presence of preference shocks (a > 0) creates time-varying volatility of
market returns. The magnitude of the time variation is largely affected by the
current market conditions (Yt), and further depends on the sensitivity parameter
(a), the speed of mean reversion of the economic state (k) and the discount rate
(ρ).
Proposition 5. The market risk premium at time t, rmt , is given by
(5.14 )
rmt (Yt) = Et(dRP − rtdt)
= σM(Yt)σR(Yt)dt
=
(
1 + av
Yt
gt
)(
1 +
aYt
gt
kv
(ρa(Yt − Y¯ ) + ρ+ k)
)
σ2C(Yt),
where dRP is the total return on the market portfolio, dRP = (dPt +Dtdt)Pt.
The market risk premium is time-varying due to the interaction between the
dynamics of the state variable Yt and the aggregate consumption Ct. The market
risk premium is positively related to the recession indicator and the sensitivity
parameter a.
The Cross Section of Assets
There are N risky assets and one risk-free asset in the economy, each risky asset j
pays dividends Djt at time t that exist in a form of a perishable consumption good.
The dividend payments form agents’ aggregate output. Instead of modelling the
dividend rate processes, I focus on the share of output that each risky security
produces (sjt) (Menzly et al., 2004; Santos and Veronesi, 2017).
sjt =
Djt
Ct
, for j = 1, ..., N. (5.15)
I also consider other sources of non-dividend income, for example from labor de-
scribed by s0t : s
0
t = 1−
∑N
j=1 s
j
t . The dividend share process of asset j is stationary
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and mean-reverting.
dsjt = φ
j(s¯j − sjt)dt+ sjtσj(st)dZnt , (5.16)
where σj(st) = (σ(s
1), ..., σ(sN)) is a vector of volatilities,
σj(st) = vj −
N∑
k=1
sk(t)vk, (5.17)
φj is the speed of mean reversion of the share process j, vi denotes a vector of
constants, vi = (v
1
i , ..., v
n
i ) and Z
n
t is a (n × 1) vector of Brownian motions with
n ≤ N + 1. I follow Menzly et al. (2004) and normalize the constants vi to satisfy∑N
k=1 s¯kvk = 0, which does not change the share process but simplifies the model
derivations. I further assume that the total income equals agents’ consumption,∑N
k=0 s
k
t = 1, and no individual asset can dominate the consumption, which implies
that conditions
∑
j=1 s¯
j < 1 and φj >
∑N
j=1 s¯
jφj must be met.
Heterogeneous Cash-Flow Risk
Risky assets exhibit heterogeneous cash-flow risk, where cash-flow risk is the co-
variance between the growth of the share of dividend output each asset produced
(sjt) and the growth of aggregate consumption (Ct). This definition follows Menzly
et al. (2004). The cash-flow risk of asset j is given by
covt
(
dsjt
sjt
,
dCt
Ct
)
= θjCF −
N∑
l=1
θlCF s
l
t. (5.18)
The constants from the vector v = (v1, ..., vN) from equation (5.17) are nor-
malized so that Et
(
covt
(
dsjt
sjt
, dCt
Ct
))
= Et(σ
j(st)σC(Yt)) = θ
j
CF .
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Price Dynamics
The price of the risky asset j is the present value of the expected future dividend
income.
P jt = Et
[∫ ∞
t
Mτ
Mt
Djτdτ
]
(5.19)
Using the marginal rate of substitution from (5.9), the price of the risky asset j
can be arranged into
(5.20)
P jt =
∫ ∞
t
Et
(
e−ρ(τ−t)
C−1τ
C−1t
gτ
gt
Djτ
)
dτ
= Ctg
−1
t
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(τ−t) Et
(
gτs
j
τ
)
dτ
= Ctg
−1
t
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(τ−t) Et
(
qjτ
)
dτ,
where qjτ = gτs
j
τ . I identify the main risk drivers from the cash-flow dynamics by
applying the Itoˆ’s lemma to qjt
(5.21)
dqjt = q
j
t
akYtgt
(
Y¯ − Yt
Yt
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1)
+φj
s¯j − sjt
sjt︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2)
−avσC(Yt)σj(st)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3)
 dt
+ qjt
[
σj(st)− avYt
gt
σC(Yt)
]
dZNt .
The drift term from the cash-flow dynamics described in equation (5.21) can
be decomposed into three risk drivers. The first risk driver (1) describes the effect
of economic conditions on asset prices. The risk driver (1) affects prices through
the mean reversion of the state variable Yt. If the current value of the recession
indicator Yt is below its long-term average Y¯ , the change in q
j
t increases. The risk
driver (2) is generated by the mean reversion of the consumption share dynamics
that affect asset prices and expected returns. If the consumption share of the risky
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asset j is lower than its long-term average, the dividend share sjt is expected to
rise, which increases the change in the expected cash-flow dynamics (↑ dqjt ).
Lastly and most importantly, the heterogeneous cash-flow risk affects cash-
flow dynamics and therefore also prices through term (3). The risk driver (3)
demonstrates how the covariance between consumption growth and consumption
share of the risky assets affects asset prices. Although all aspects of the proposed
model are considered, this risk driver is given the most attention in this paper.
In order to derive the price of the risky asset j, one must first derive the value
of
∫∞
t
e−ρ(τ−t) Et (qjτ ). I follow the method used by Menzly et al. (2004) to find
the solution to the stochastic SDE that drives qjt to derive the price of the risky
assets in the economy (see the proof of Proposition 6 in the Appendix).
Proposition 6. The price of the risky asset j is given in equilibrium by
P jt (Yt, s
j
t) = Ctg
−1
t (ζ
j
0 + ζ
j
1s
j
t + ζ
j
2s
j
tYt + ζ
j
3Yt), (5.22)
where
(5.23 )
ζj0 =
aφj s¯jY¯ k
α0
[
1
φj
− 1
k
+
1
φj(φj + ρ)
− 1
k(k + ρ)
]
+
φj s¯j
ρ
[
−α0
α1
+
α1
α0α2
− α1
φj(φj + ρ)α0
1
ρ2
+
α1
α2α0(−(ρ+ α2)) +
1
ρ2
]
ζj1 =
α1
α0
(
1
ρ+ φj
− 1
ρ
(
α1
α0
− 1
))
− 1
α2
α1
α0
+
2
ρ
(5.24)
ζj2 =
1
ρ+ φj
− 1
ρ
(
α1
α0
− 1
)
(5.25)
ζj3 =
aφj s¯jY¯ k
α0
(
1
ρ+ φj
− 1
ρ+ k
)
(5.26)
and
α0 = ak − k + aφj + avθjCF (5.27)
α1 = φ
j − akY¯ + aλvθjCF + aφj s¯jY¯ (5.28)
α2 = a(k + φ
j + vθjCF ). (5.29)
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It follows from Proposition 6 that the price of the risky asset j depends on the
current market conditions (Yt) as well as the current share of consumption of the
dividend process (sjt).
Proposition 7. I apply Itoˆ’s lemma to the equilibrium price of the risky asset
j from equation (5.67) and derive the equilibrium volatility of the risky asset j
(σjR(Yt)).
σjR(Yt, s
j
t) = σC(Yt)−
(
γj1(θ
j
CF )−
aYt
gt
)
vσC(Yt) + γ
j
2(θ
j
CF )σ
j(st)s
j
t , (5.30)
where
γj1(θ
j
CF ) =
ζj1 + ζ
j
2Yt
ζj0 + ζ
j
1s
j
t + ζ
j
2s
j
tYt + ζ
j
3Yt
(5.31)
and
γj2(θ
j
CF ) =
ζj3 + ζ
j
2s
j
t
ζj0 + ζ
j
1s
j
t + ζ
j
2s
j
tYt + ζ
j
3Yt
. (5.32)
The return volatility of the risky asset j is driven by three components: 1)
shocks to the aggregate consumption, 2) shocks to the state variable Yt and 3)
shocks to the dynamics consumption share sjt . The sensitivity of return volatil-
ity to shocks to the state variable and the consumption share is described with
constant parameters γj1(θ
j
CF ) and γ
j
2(θ
j
CF ), respectively, and both depend on the
heterogeneous cash-flow risk of asset j.
Proposition 8. The equilibrium expected excess return of the risky asset j at time
t, rjt , is given by
rjt (Yt, s
j
t) = Et(dR
j
P − rtdt)
= σM(Yt)σ
j
R(Yt)dt
= σC(Yt)
(
1 + av
Yt
gt
)(
σC(Yt)−
(
γj1(θ
j
CF )−
a
gt
)
vσC(Yt)Yt
+ γj2(θ
j
CF )σ
j(st)s
j
t
)
,
(5.33 )
where dRjP is the total return on the risky asset j at time t, dR
j
P = (dP
j
t +D
j
tdt)P
j
t .
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Conditional Dependence of Expected Returns
The conditional measure of firm’s risk (CAPM βj) is associated with shocks to the
cash-flow process and the discount-rate process driven by the state-variable Yt.
The effect of heterogeneous cash-flow risk (θjCF ) on the firm’s risk thus depends on
the current market conditions (Yt) and the current value of the firm consumption
share (sjt).
Proposition 9. The conditional beta of asset j is time-varying and depends on
the market conditions described by the state variable Yt and the current value of
the dividend share sjt .
(5.34 )
βj(Yt, s
j
t) =
covt(r
j
t , r
m
t )
vart(rmt )
=
σjR(Yt, s
j
t)σR(Yt)
′
σR(Yt)σR(Yt)′
=
σC(Yt)−
(
γj1(θ
j
CF )− agt
)
vσC(Yt)Yt + γ
j
2(θ
j
CF )σ
j(st)s
j
t(
1 + aYt
gt
kv
(ρa(Yt−Y¯ )+ρ+k)
)
σC(Yt)
The covariance between returns on asset j and the market is affected by het-
erogeneous cash-flow risk through parameters γj1(θ
j
CF ) and γ
j
2(θ
j
CF ). The effect of
the heterogeneous cash-flow risk on the conditional dependence is further studied
in Section 5.3.
I explore whether the effect of heterogeneous cash-flow risk on conditional re-
turn dependence comes from the discount-rate or the cash-flow channel. I de-
compose the equilibrium conditional β (βj(Yt, s
j
t)) into its cash-flow (β
j
CF ) and
discount-rate component (βjDISC): β
j = βjCF + β
j
DISC , which allows me to study
both of them separately.
Proposition 10. The equilibrium cash-flow and discount-rate betas for asset j are
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given by
(5.35 )
βjCF (Yt, s
j
t) =
∂P jt
∂sjt
sjt
P jt
σj(st)
1 + ∂Pt
∂Yt
Yt
Pt
=
γj2(θ
j
CF )s
j
tσ
j(st)
σC(Yt) + akv
σC(Yt)Yt
gt(ρa(Yt−Y¯ )+ρ+k)
and
(5.36 )
βjDISC(Yt, s
j
t) =
1 +
∂P jt
∂Yt
Yt
P jt
σC(Yt)
1 + ∂Pt
∂Yt
Yt
Pt
=
σC(Yt)−
(
γj1(θ
j
CF )− agt
)
vσC(Yt)Yt
σC + akv
σC(Yt)Yt
gt(ρa(Yt−Y¯ )+ρ+k)
.
I calibrate the model in Section 5.3 and study the effects of the heterogeneous
cash-flow risk (θjCF ) on the conditional dependence measures. I am particularly in-
terested in assessing the asymmetries in the conditional dependence during market
downturns relative to market upturns. The degree of asymmetric return depen-
dence is captured by the slope of the conditional β as a function of the state
variable Yt. The higher the slope of β, the higher the degree of asymmetric depen-
dence, because the difference between conditional dependence in bad states versus
good states will increase.
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Table 5.1: Panel A reports the calibration parameters. Panel B displays a set
of moments for the aggregate stock market observed between 1952 and 2015: the
risk premium (rm), risk-free rate, consumption to price ratio (PC) and sharpe ratio
(SR). It compares the observed values with the same moments in simulated data
obtained from a 10,000-year simulation of the model. Two models are compared:
Model (1) represents the unrestricted version of the model with preference shocks
as described in from Section 5.2. Model (2) refers to the model without preference
shocks, that is when a = 0.
Panel A a ρ k Y¯ λ v¯ µC σmax θ
j
CF
0.0385 0.0416 0.1567 34 20 1.1194 0.0218 0.064 (-0.02; 0.02)
Panel B rm rm (Std) rf rf (Std) PC PC (Std) SR
Data (1952-2015) 0.0786 0.1660 0.0186 0.0251 35.8878 16.5892 0.3612
Model (1): with pref. shocks 0.0734 0.1843 0.0110 0.0368 29.7596 5.5446 0.2354
Model (2): without pref. shocks 0.0003 0.0117 0.0631 0.0005 24.0385 0.0000 0.0117
5.3 Model Predictions
The Aggregate Economy
The model proposed in Section 5.2 is calibrated to fit the aggregate US data
between 1952 and 2015. In particular, I choose calibration parameters to fit the
main moments of asset prices including the risk-free rate, market risk premium,
price-to-consumption ratio and sharpe ratio observed in the US between 1952 and
2015. The parameters describing the recession indicator dynamics are from Santos
and Veronesi (2017). Using parameters from Panel A in Table 5.1, I simulate
10,000 years of quarterly data and report the aggregate moments in Panel B. I
consider two distinct models: with preference shocks (Model (1)) and without
preference shocks (Model (2)). Model (2) assumes that the parameter a is equal
to zero, which shuts down the preference shocks effect.
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Aggregate Market: The Effect of Preference Shocks
(a) Risk-free rate (b) Market risk premium
(c) Return volatility (d) Sharpe ratio
Figure 5.1: This figure illustrates the effects of the preference shocks on the equilib-
rium risk-free rate (a), market-wide risk premium (b), return volatility (c), and the
sharpe ratio of the market portfolio (d) as a function of the recession indicator Yt.
The shaded area represents the probability density of the state variable Yt. Model
(1) with preference shocks is represented by blue line and Model (2) is depicted using
a black dotted line.
Model (1) fits well the US aggregate asset pricing moments while Model (2)
cannot sufficiently explain the observed time variation of asset prices. In particular,
Model (1) generates a significantly larger and realistic market risk premium, return
volatility and Sharpe ratio relative to Model (2). In Model (2), the risk-free rate is
too large and almost deterministic, the generated risk premium is close to zero and
the Sharpe ratio is too low relative to the observed values. The only variation that
we can observe in moments from Model (2) comes from the stochastic component
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of the consumption growth volatility. This variation is, however, too low to explain
highly volatile asset prices. These findings suggest that the presence of preference
shocks is important to generate a sufficient time variation of asset prices.
Aggregate Market: Simulations of the State Variable Yt
(a) Risk-free rate (b) Market risk premium
(c) Return volatility (d) Sharpe ratio
Figure 5.2: This figure shows the effect of preference shocks (with a = 0.0385, blue
area) on the distribution of the simulated equilibrium risk-free rate (a), market-wide
risk premium (b), market volatility of returns (c), and the sharpe ratio of the market
portfolio (d). The calibrated moments are compared to moments based on the model
without preference shocks (a = 0, black area). The values are based on 10,000 years
of simulated quarterly data of Yt.
The conditional moments implied by Model (1) are substantially affected by
the state variable Yt, see the black line from Figure 5.1. In the proposed Model
(1), all the reported moments that include the risk-free rate, market risk premium,
return volatility of the market and the sharpe ratio are positively related with the
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recession indicator. In the model without the presence of preference shocks (black
dotted line from Figure 5.1), the state variable has little effect on the reported
moments of asset prices. Moreover, there is no other potential source of time
variation in Model (2) and all the reported moments are thus too flat with a low
standard deviation, see the histogram of simulated moments from Figure 5.2. This
implies that preference shocks drive most of the variation of asset prices in Model
(2).
The model predictions based on simulations suggest that the proposed model
that considers preference shocks does surprisingly well in terms of fitting the ob-
served data, considering the simplistic form of the model. The proposed model
does not include external habits or long-run risks and is still able to yield and
match important features of asset prices.
The model proposed in this paper deviates from most existing theories by
assuming that investors experience preference shocks. In equilibrium, when the
recession indicator is at its mean level, the value of the gt function is one and
the preference shock is zero. Any deviation of the recession indicator from its
equilibrium long-term mean leads to a non-zero preference shock. For example,
if the recession indicator is above its long-term mean (in bad times), investors
experience a positive preference shock and become more sensitive to each unit
change in their utility.
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Expected Returns: Heterogeneous Cash-flow risk
Figure 5.3: The distribution of the simulated expected returns for assets with negative
cash-flow (CF) risk and positive CF risk: θjCF = −0.02 (grey area), and θjCF = 0.02 (blue
area). Simulations of 10,000-year quarterly time series of prices.
Individual Risky Assets
I consider two risky assets that differ only in their level of cash-flow risk. In par-
ticular, I consider a risky asset with negative cash-flow risk: θjCF = −0.02 and a
risky asset with positive cash-flow risk: θjCF = 0.02. I assume that all assets have
homogeneous long-term mean of the consumption share (s¯j = 0.05,∀j), homoge-
neous volatility of the consumption share (σj(st) = 0.05,∀j), and homogeneous
mean-reversion parameter of the consumption share (ψj = 0.05), see Panel A from
Table 5.1. This setup allows me to focus solely on the effects of heterogeneous
cash-flow risk on asset prices and the asymmetric return dependence. I use the
simulated time series of the state variable Yt that is based on 10,000 simulations
of quarterly data to get expected returns of the risky assets and the conditional
dependence measures.
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Equilibrium Conditional β
Figure 5.4: Conditional β described as a function of the recession indicator Yt. This
figure shows the equilibrium conditional β for two types of assets with negative cash-flow
(CF) risk (black dotted line) and positive CF risk (blue line).
The first and the second moment of the equilibrium distribution of expected
returns are positively affected by the asset-level heterogeneous cash-flow risk, see
Figure 5.3. I find that the high cash-flow risk asset has a higher mean expected
return and a higher volatility of expected returns. The effect of the heterogeneous
cash-flow risk is even stronger on the second moment, i.e. the volatility of expected
returns.
The main aim of this paper is to explore whether there is any link between
fundamental cash-flow risks of firms and the degree of asymmetric dependence
between stock and market returns. I first examine the effect of heterogeneous
cash-flow risk on the time variation of conditional βs. I find that cash-flow risk
positively affects the conditional level of dependence (conditional β), see Figure
5.4. The proposed model predicts that assets with a negative cash-flow risk, i.e.
θCF < 0, are expected to have relatively lower conditional CAPM βs, a significantly
lower time variation of CAPM β and a lower degree of asymmetric dependence.
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This can be seen from the value and the relatively flat slope of the equilibrium
level of the model-implied conditional β for the asset with a negative cash-flow
risk (black dotted line from Figure 5.4).
On the other hand, a high cash-flow risk asset with θCF > 0 exhibits a signifi-
cantly higher degree of asymmetric dependence, see the blue line from Figure 5.4.
The dependence between stock returns of a high cash-flow risk asset and market
returns is found to be particularly strong during market downturn periods when
the recession indicator value Yt is high.
Equilibrium Cash-flow (βCF ) and discount-rate β (βDISC)
(a)
Figure 5.5: Cash-flow and discount-rate β described as a function of the recession indi-
cator Yt. Panel (a) shows the equilibrium cash-flow β for two types of assets with negative
cash-flow (CF) risk (black dotted line) and positive CF risk (blue line). Panel (b) depicts the
conditional discount-rate β for two types of assets with negative cash-flow (CF) risk (black
dotted line) and positive CF risk (blue line).
I show in Figure 5.5 that heterogeneous cash flow risk affects both the cash-
flow and discount-rate β. This is because the firms’ covariance between cash-flow
growth and consumption growth affects both the price sensitivity to economic
115
5.4 Data
shocks (discount-rate channel) as well as the sensitivity of the asset price to shocks
in the asset’s cash-flows (cash-flow channel).
5.4 Data
Aggregate Consumption
The existing empirical evidence suggests that consumption asset-pricing models
fail to explain asset prices (Breeden et al., 1989; Kroencke, 2017; Savov, 2011).
There is a number of potential explanations why the available consumption data
performs poorly to measure consumption risk. First, consumption asset-pricing
models price assets with respect to changes in aggregate consumption between
two points in time (Breeden et al., 1989). The reported consumption is, however,
not consumed at the same time as reported and the aggregate consumption values
are thus affected by a “summation bias” (Breeden et al., 1989).
Second, consumption data is time-aggregated. Available data on consumption
provides total volumes of expenditures on goods and services over a period of time.
The published values of NIPA expenditures are flow estimates of consumption
collected during a certain period. Consumption models, on the other hand, require
point-in-time values of consumption. This leads to the “time-aggregation bias”.
Third, consumption measures based on National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPA) are subject to “measurement error” due to infrequent reporting of con-
sumption by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). NIPA consumption is esti-
mated based on monthly retail trade survey data. An insufficient sample size may
lead to sampling error. The annual data is based on a more comprehensive set of
survey, which may lower the overall effect of the sampling bias.
Fourth, econometricians filter NIPA consumption to mitigate the measurement
bias that arises due to the imperfections of available data. These imperfections
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may come from reporting errors or misclassification biases (Kroencke, 2017). If the
BEA, who publishes NIPA values, acknowledges these measurement errors, they
may decide to smooth the consumption time series, which may lower the stock
market covariances (Daniel and Marshall, 1997).
To mitigate the effects of the biases inherent in NIPA consumption data, I
use a number of proxies of consumption shocks, including the unfiltered NIPA
consumption Kroencke (2017) and alternative measures (indirect) proxies of the
business cycle.
Direct Measure of Consumption
NIPA consumption produced by BEA that is based on price indexes for personal
consumption for nondurable goods and services.1 The data is available on monthly,
quarterly and annual frequency. I choose the quarterly frequency because it is
based on a considerable larger retail trade survey compared to monthly data,
which yields a lower sampling bias.
Unfiltered Consumption
The annual NIPA consumption is filtered by BEA to account for errors inherent
in data described above. This filtering procedure may decrease the explanatory
power of any NIPA consumption-based variable to explain the variation in asset
prices. Kroencke (2017) applies an econometric procedure to reverse the filtering
contained in NIPA consumption and correct for the time-aggregation bias inher-
ent in consumption data. I collect the unfiltered consumption growth from Tim
Kroencke’s personal website.2 Figure 5.6 demonstrates the effect of the Kroencke
(2017)’s unfiltering procedure. The unfiltered consumption growth exhibits a sig-
1The consumption data was retrieved from the Federal Reserve Bank in St. Louis Economic
Data: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/ in July 2018.
2Downloaded from https://sites.google.com/site/kroencketim/data-programs in January
2018.
117
5.4 Data
Consumption Growth Proxies: Standardized
Figure 5.6: Consumption Growth Proxies (1960-2015): the filtered measure of NIPA
consumption growth (red line), the unfiltered NIPA consumption data (blue line) (Kroencke,
2017) and alternative measures (indirect) based on the inverse of the Lettau and Ludvigson
(2001)’s ‘cay’ variable (black dashed line) and the inverse of the Jurado et al. (2015)’s
economic uncertainty index (green dotted line).
nificantly larger amount of time variation relative to the original time series of
NIPA consumption growth. For further details about the unfiltering procedure,
see Kroencke (2017).
Indirect Measures of Consumption Shocks
I note that in the proposed model, the aggregate consumption dynamics dCt de-
scribed in (5.1) and the dynamics of the recession indicator dYt (5.3) are perfectly
negatively correlated. As a result, I choose to proxy for shocks in consumption us-
ing shocks to the recession indicator (with the opposite direction) when estimating
the industry-level cash-flow risk.
cov
(
dst
st
,
dCt
Ct
)
= −cov
(
dst
st
,
dYt
Yt
)
(5.37)
I use indirect measures of consumption shocks proxied using the Lettau and
Ludvigson (2001)’s ‘CAY’ variable and the Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015)’s
measure of economic uncertainty. These measures are based on a larger set of
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variables, have a substantially higher variation than NIPA consumption, and may,
therefore, suit better to explain highly volatile asset prices.
The (Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001) ‘CAY’ variable is the trend deviation term
of aggregate consumption regressed on asset holdings and aggregate wealth.1 The
‘economic uncertainty’ variable represents the Jurado et al. (2015)’s economic un-
certainty over one-month horizon.2 The negative values of the ‘CAY’ and ‘economic
uncertainty’ variables are reported in Figure 5.6 because both of these variables
are considered to be countercyclical (Jurado et al., 2015; Lettau and Ludvigson,
2001).
Firm Cash Flows
The estimation of the complex dynamic structure of the cash-flow processes of
risky assets defined in equation (5.16) requires firm-level cash-flow data with a
sufficiently high frequency of observations. The US firm fundamental data is only
available with annual or quarterly frequency. Dividends payments, the main source
of income to shareholders, are also paid out infrequently. The low frequency of
cash-flow data (typically quarterly) complicates the estimation of firm-level cash-
flow risk.
I collect security data on US listed firms from the WRDS CRSP-Compustat
Merged database from the beginning of the database in 1959 until 2017. I aggregate
the firm-level data into 49 Fama-French industries to assure that all assets have
a sufficiently long time series of data to estimate the cash-flow covariance risk.
I limit my attention to firms listed on NYSE (share code 1). I collect monthly
information about the firm identifier (‘permno’), total stock return (‘ret’), close
price (‘prc’) and number of shares outstanding (‘shrout’) from the WRDS CRSP
1Retrieved from https://sites.google.com/view/martinlettau/data on July 1, 2018
2Downloaded from https://www.sydneyludvigson.com/data-and-appendixes/ on July 1, 2018
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Table 5.2: Cash-Flow Items: Unconditional Values. Descriptive Statistics for cash-flow
items used to estimate net payout: dividends (Div) and net equity repurchases (Equity
Rep). The values are represented as a fraction of the total market value of assets. Net
payout growth (NP Growth) is the annual growth of the net payout (NP) to market value
of assets ratio. Fama French 49 Industries data is collected from 1960 until December 2015
FF49 Industry NP NP Growth Div Equity Rep
1 Agriculture 0.782 -0.149 0.662 0.120
2 Food Products 0.915 -0.020 1.283 -0.279
3 Candy & Soda 0.628 -0.364 1.498 -0.870
4 Beer & Liquor 0.050 0.033 1.074 -1.024
5 Tobacco Products 2.758 0.136 3.137 -0.378
6 Recreation 1.903 -0.173 0.840 1.073
7 Entertainment 1.872 -0.044 0.843 1.032
8 Printing and Publishing 0.794 0.035 1.459 -0.664
9 Consumer Goods 0.725 -0.006 1.277 -0.551
10 Apparel 0.747 -0.070 0.810 -0.063
11 Healthcare 1.571 -0.021 0.289 1.295
12 Medical Equipment 0.534 -0.060 0.517 0.020
13 Pharmaceutical Products 1.454 0.008 0.919 0.543
14 Chemicals 0.870 0.023 1.244 -0.368
15 Rubber and Plastic Products 0.854 -0.046 1.149 -0.294
16 Textiles 0.701 0.070 0.531 0.170
17 Construction Materials 1.040 -0.059 1.118 -0.076
18 Construction 0.855 -0.040 0.462 0.398
19 Steel Works Etc. 1.503 -0.092 1.022 0.487
20 Fabricated Products 1.338 0.075 0.950 0.389
21 Machinery 0.901 -0.026 0.963 -0.055
22 Electrical Equipment 1.140 -0.097 1.435 -0.293
23 Automobiles and Trucks 0.930 -0.016 1.072 -0.126
24 Aircraft 0.206 -0.052 0.711 -0.495
25 Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 1.012 0.131 1.449 -0.437
26 Defense 1.353 0.011 1.988 -0.635
27 Precious Metals 2.337 -0.049 0.545 1.796
28 Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining 2.432 0.012 1.429 1.009
29 Coal 3.322 -0.086 1.947 1.415
30 Petroleum and Natural Gas 2.828 -0.003 0.864 1.974
31 Utilities 2.744 0.001 2.106 0.650
32 Communication 1.449 -0.011 1.117 0.347
33 Personal Services 0.360 -0.027 0.593 -0.231
34 Business Services 0.906 -0.094 0.622 0.293
35 Computers 0.620 -0.021 0.437 0.186
36 Computer Software 1.602 -0.082 0.456 1.149
37 Electronic Equipment 0.948 -0.057 0.547 0.402
38 Measuring and Control Equipment 0.371 -0.049 0.716 -0.352
39 Business Supplies 1.059 -0.011 1.685 -0.615
40 Shipping Containers 0.812 0.091 1.168 -0.351
41 Transportation 1.410 0.029 0.815 0.599
42 Wholesale 1.152 -0.043 0.817 0.345
43 Retail 0.484 -0.033 0.751 -0.265
44 Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 0.468 -0.047 0.607 -0.124
45 Banking 2.362 -0.002 1.156 1.222
46 Insurance 0.509 -0.048 0.555 -0.041
47 Real Estate 2.080 -0.060 0.803 1.285
48 Trading 2.264 0.025 1.958 0.329
49 Other 1.786 -0.013 0.410 1.407
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Monthly Security File. I retrieve information on the monthly market return and
the risk-free rate from the WRDS Fama-French Database.
Cash-flow data comes from from the WRDS Compustat Fundamental Annual
File. I use the equity-holder definition of firm cash flows, and define the net payout
(NP ) as the sum of all dividends paid plus plus net equity repurchases.
NP = Div + Eq Rep (5.38)
where Div are Cash Dividends and Eq Rep are Purchases of Common and Pre-
ferred Stock, Table 5.2 provides a descriptive summary of the industry-level cash-
flow items. I aggregate the firm-level NP and MVA into industry levels. I limit
attention to firms that have at least five years of data and remove all observations
where the value of common equity (‘ceq’) is negative to remove any distressed
firms from my sample.
5.5 Empirical Tests
Estimation of Cash-flow Risk
I estimate the cash-flow risk (θjCF ) individually for all 49 Fama-French industries,
where the cash-flow risk of industry j is the covariance between cash-flow and
consumption growth (Menzly et al., 2004)
θjCF = covt
(
dsjt
sjt
,
dCt
Ct
)
, (5.39)
and sjt is the share of output that the risky security j produces and Ct is the
aggregate output at time t. I calculate the share of output for each industry using
the information about the industry-level net payout to aggregate consumption
ratio. At each year t, I use data from past 10 years to estimate the cash-flow risk
level θjCF (t)) for industry j. I estimate θ
j
CF (t) on a yearly-rolling window basis and
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Table 5.3: Cash-Flow Risk: Unconditional Values. CF risk estimated using the
filtered NIPA consumption data (θjCF (Filt.)), the Kroencke (2017)’s unfiltered NIPA
consumption data (θjCF (Unf.)), the Lettau and Ludvigson (2001)’s CAY variable
(θjCF (CAY)), and the Jurado et al. (2015)’s economic uncertainty variable (θ
j
CF
(Unc.)). Fama French 49 Industries data is collected from 1960 until December
2015.
FF49 Id Industry θjCF (Filt.) θ
j
CF (Unf.) θ
j
CF (CAY) θ
j
CF (Unc.)
1 Agriculture 0.160 0.306 0.230 0.407
2 Food Products -0.146 -0.135 0.084 0.112
3 Candy & Soda 0.222 0.055 -0.200 -0.169
4 Beer & Liquor 0.069 -0.043 -0.015 -0.515
5 Tobacco Products -0.298 -0.413 0.128 0.011
6 Recreation 0.020 -0.073 0.259 -0.051
7 Entertainment 0.249 0.279 -0.165 -0.040
8 Printing and Publishing 0.001 -0.037 0.118 -0.403
9 Consumer Goods -0.140 -0.184 -0.023 0.014
10 Apparel -0.164 -0.180 -0.093 -0.059
11 Healthcare 0.163 0.162 0.007 0.084
12 Medical Equipment -0.052 -0.206 -0.147 -0.046
13 Pharmaceutical Products -0.063 -0.092 -0.022 0.131
14 Chemicals -0.074 -0.008 0.031 0.227
15 Rubber and Plastic Products -0.107 -0.140 -0.110 -0.309
16 Textiles 0.128 0.115 0.062 -0.052
17 Construction Materials 0.059 0.001 -0.227 0.068
18 Construction -0.013 0.069 0.031 0.053
19 Steel Works Etc. -0.073 -0.072 0.009 0.096
20 Fabricated Products -0.055 -0.052 -0.008 0.062
21 Machinery -0.003 -0.029 0.107 0.140
22 Electrical Equipment -0.075 -0.162 -0.107 -0.191
23 Automobiles and Trucks 0.010 -0.092 -0.110 0.028
24 Aircraft 0.195 0.116 -0.010 0.464
25 Shipbuilding, Railroad Equip. -0.013 0.103 -0.036 -0.351
26 Defense -0.188 -0.493 -0.084 0.307
27 Precious Metals -0.219 -0.179 -0.087 -0.079
28 Non-Metal. and Ind. Metal Min. -0.001 -0.023 0.054 0.118
29 Coal -0.248 -0.063 -0.200 0.248
30 Petroleum and Natural Gas 0.011 0.062 -0.031 0.082
31 Utilities -0.001 -0.034 -0.022 -0.001
32 Communication -0.256 -0.318 -0.317 -0.364
33 Personal Services -0.033 -0.046 -0.134 -0.074
34 Business Services -0.003 0.058 -0.057 0.096
35 Computers -0.038 -0.175 -0.116 0.023
36 Computer Software -0.030 0.065 0.090 -0.009
37 Electronic Equipment 0.066 0.017 -0.013 -0.038
38 Measuring and Control Equip. 0.014 -0.028 -0.015 0.002
39 Business Supplies -0.117 -0.095 -0.109 0.075
40 Shipping Containers -0.288 -0.269 0.198 0.186
41 Transportation -0.228 -0.204 0.176 -0.261
42 Wholesale 0.106 0.078 0.083 -0.308
43 Retail -0.043 -0.034 0.057 0.259
44 Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 0.163 0.228 0.006 0.111
45 Banking -0.105 -0.157 -0.147 -0.100
46 Insurance 0.106 0.026 -0.149 -0.039
47 Real Estate -0.170 -0.328 0.022 0.154
48 Trading 0.069 0.085 -0.042 0.311
49 Other -0.136 -0.020 0.090 -0.141
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obtain a time-series of cash-flow risk levels for each industry. I also estimate the
unconditional level of cash-flow risk for each industry and report results in Table
5.3.
There are substantial differences in the unconditional industry levels of cash-
flow risk. I estimate four versions of the industry-level cash flow risk. Each year t,
I estimate cash-flow risk for industry j using the filtered NIPA consumption data
(θjCF (Dir. Filt.)), the Kroencke (2017)’s unfiltered NIPA consumption data (θ
j
CF
(Dir. Unfilt.)), the Lettau and Ludvigson (2001)’s CAY variable (θjCF (CAY)),
and the Jurado et al. (2015)’s economic uncertainty variable (θjCF (Unc.)).
I find that a relatively high proportion of industries have negative cash-flow
risk, that is a negative covariance between the aggregate consumption growth
and firm cash-flow growth. I focus on the firm heterogeneity in cash-flow risk to
examine whether cash-flow risk can account for the time variation in asymmetric
return dependence. The sign and the magnitude of cash-flow risk has important
implications for cash-flow dynamics and asset prices.
Consider a negative consumption shock. The sign of the asset-level cash-flow
risk, that is the covariance between consumption growth and cash-flow growth,
will determine whether an asset is a good or a bad hedge against bad economic
conditions. If the covariance is negative, θjCF < 0, then given a negative shock to
consumption, dCt
Ct
< 0, the asset j will constitute of a larger fraction of consumption
because
dsjt
sjt
will increase. This asset will thus serve as a hedge against bad times as
it will likely pay out higher cash-flows to shareholders when consumption decreases.
Cross-sectional Tests
I test the model predictions from Section 5.3 and examine whether there is any
link between the fundamental cash-flow risk of firms and the degree of asymmetric
dependence of asset returns.
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Conditional Dependence
I measure the conditional dependence of the 49 Fama-French industries using data
divided into quintiles sorted in terms of the size of the market risk premium.
Quintile 1 (Q1) refers to market upturn periods associated the largest market
risk premium and quintile 5 (Q5) then indicates the lowest market risk premium
levels, see Table 5.4. This approach helps to assess the state dependence of the
conditional moments. I also sort industries in terms of their cash-flow risk levels
to examine whether heterogeneous cash-flow risk affects conditional dependence
of asset returns. I report the conditional dependence levels for industries with
the highest unconditional level of cash-flow risk (Q1) and the lowest unconditional
level of cash-flow risk (Q5).
Table 5.4: Conditional Dependence: This table reports the conditional values of the
covariance and correlation between stock returns and market returns, the conditional CAPM
β and the conditional return variance for industries with the highest unconditional cash-
flow risk levels (from the highest quintile) and the lowest unconditional cash-flow risk levels
(from the lowest quintile). The unfiltered consumption growth (Kroencke, 2017) is used to
calculated cash-flow risk. All available US data between 1960 and 2015 is used.
Good State (Q1) Bad State (Q5) Diff (Q5 - Q1)
Panel A Conditional Covariance
High CF risk (Q1) 0.00035 0.0024 0.0021
Low CF risk (Q5) 0.00028 0.0006 0.0003
Conditional Return Correlation
High CF risk (Q1) 0.3639 0.6996 0.3357
Low CF risk (Q5) 0.2981 0.2450 -0.0531
Conditional CAPM beta
High CF risk (Q1) 0.9003 1.6669 0.7666
Low CF risk (Q5) 0.7256 0.4237 -0.3019
Conditional Return Variance
High CF risk (Q1) 0.0029 0.0053 0.0023
Low CF risk (Q5) 0.0025 0.0025 0.0000
Market 0.0004 0.0015 0.0011
I find that the conditional covariance between stock and market returns is
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significantly higher during bad market states, see Panel A from Table 5.4. The
difference between the conditional covariance in bad states versus good states is
three times larger in industries with high cash-flow risk as compared with industries
with low cash-flow risk. This finding confirms the model prediction that although
the return dependence of all risky assets is positively linked with the recession
indicator, high cash-flow risk assets are affected by market conditions relatively
more. As a result, high cash-flow risk stocks are found to exhibit a relatively
higher degree of risk that is related to the higher conditional dependence on market
conditions.
The conditional correlation between high cash-flow risk industry returns and
market returns is higher during market downturns than during market upturns,
see Panel B from Table 5.4. The observed return correlation is 0.6696 in bad states
versus 0.3639 in good states, which implies that assets with high fundamental cash-
flow risk become significantly more correlated with market performance during bad
times. Low cash-flow risk industries exhibit relatively symmetric correlations of
returns: 0.2981 in bad states compared with 0.2450 in good states.
I find that the relation between the conditional variance of market returns and
the market state is not monotonic. In fact, in both good market states associated
with the highest market risk premium (Q1) and bad market states related with the
lowest market risk premium (Q5), the market return variance is relatively high,
see Panel C from Table 5.4. This relation also affects conditional βs. Note that
in normal market states (Q3), the variance of market returns is extremely low
and the conditional βs are consequently high for both assets with high and low
cash-flow risk. The conditional βs are reported in Panel D from Table 5.4.
My findings confirm that there is a positive link between heterogeneous cash-
flow risk of firms and asymmetric dependence of returns, see Figure 5.7. The
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Conditional β and Cash-flow Risk
Figure 5.7: Conditional β in Good State (Q1) and Bad State (Q5) for industries with a
high and low cash-flow risk from Table 5.4.
last column from Table 5.4 shows that the asymmetric dependence (Q5-Q1) is
substantially higher for the high cash-flow risk industries relative to low cash-
flow risk industries. The proposed model, however, does not predict high return
volatility during periods of high market risk premia. Hence, it requires further
research to extend the model to explain the non-monotonic shape of the observed
relation between market volatility and market state.
Asymmetric Dependence between Stock and Market Returns
I formally measure the industry-level of asymmetric dependence using the Alcock
and Hatherley (2016) Adjusted-J statistic (JAdj). This statistic can distinguish
between the various degrees of asymmetric dependence. Unlike the downside and
upside β, the JAdj combines information from a set of exceedance regions to mea-
sure conditional return dependence. The Adjusted J-statistic (JAdj) adapts the
J statistic proposed by Hong et al. (2007) so that it is β and idiosyncratic risk
invariant, thereby improving its utility in empirical asset-pricing studies. The JAdj
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is defined by Alcock and Hatherley (2016) as
AD = JAdj =
[
sgn
([
ρ˜+ − ρ˜−]1)T (ρ˜+ − ρ˜−)′ Ωˆ−1(ρ˜+ − ρ˜−)] , (5.40)
where ρ˜+ = {ρ˜+(δ1), ρ˜+(δ2), ..., ρ˜+(δN)} and ρ˜− = {ρ˜−(δ1), ρ˜−(δ2), ..., ρ˜−(δN)},
1 is N × 1 vector of ones, Ωˆ is an estimate of the variance-covariance matrix,
(Hong et al., 2007). The conditional correlations are defined as follows, for δj ∈
{δ1, ..., δN},
ρ˜+(δj) = corr
(
R˜mt, R˜it|R˜mt > δj, R˜it > δj
)
(5.41)
ρ˜−(δj) = corr
(
R˜mt, R˜it|R˜mt < −δj, R˜it < −δj
)
. (5.42)
With symmetric dependence the value of JAdj will be close to zero. A significant
and non-zero value of JAdj provides evidence of an asymmetry between the lower
and upper-tail dependence.1 Moreover, I multiply the original JAdj by (-1) to
satisfy that a positive (negative) value of the JAdj refers to lower-tail (upper-
tail) asymmetric dependence, which is a situation when stock returns are more
correlated with market returns during market downturns (upturns) relative to
market upturns (downturns).
The mean industry level of asymmetric dependence positive, see Table 5.5.
This finding is consistent with existing empirical literature suggesting that the
dependence of listed equity returns is higher during downturn periods relative to
upturn periods, see, for example, Alcock and Hatherley (2016); Ang et al. (2006b);
1I replicate the procedure proposed by Alcock and Hatherley (2016) to estimate the Ad-
justed J-statistic (JAdj) for each industry individually. First, for each set {Rit, Rmt}Tt=1, I
get Rˆit = Rit − βRmt, where Rit and Rmt is the excess return on asset i and market, and
β = cov(Rit, Rmt)/σ
2
Rmt
. The first transformation implies that each data set has a zero CAPM
β, βRˆit,Rmt = 0. Second, I standardize the data to get identical standard deviation of the CAPM
regression residuals and get RSmt and Rˆ
S
it. Third and the final transformation step sets the βˆ to
1 by letting R˜mt = R
S
mt and R˜it = Rˆ
S
it + R
S
mt. After this transformation, all data sets have the
same β and standard deviation of model residuals.
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Chabi-Yo et al. (2017); Kelly and Jiang (2014); Weigert (2015).
Table 5.5: Descriptive Statistics for the variables used in the rolling-window regressions:
CF risk estimated using the filtered NIPA consumption data (θjCF (Dir. Filt.)), the Kroencke
(2017)’s unfiltered NIPA consumption data (θjCF (Dir. Unfilt.)), the Lettau and Ludvigson
(2001)’s CAY variable (θjCF (CAY)), and the Jurado et al. (2015)’s economic uncertainty
variable (θjCF (Unc.)), industry-level asymmetric dependence (AD
j) estimated using the
Alcock and Hatherley (2016)’s JAdj statistic, the industry-level annual excess return (rj),
book-to-market ratio and log(size). Data from 1960 - 2015 are considered.
Variable Mean Std Q1 Median Q3 Skewness Kurtosis
θjCF (Dir. Filt.) -0.026 0.234 -0.077 -0.009 0.036 0.073 7.032
θjCF (Dir. Unfilt.) -0.014 0.198 -0.052 -0.001 0.038 0.149 7.912
θjCF (CAY) -0.029 0.169 -0.088 -0.023 0.043 -0.833 4.742
θjCF (Unc.) -0.017 0.263 -0.096 -0.001 0.081 -0.017 6.623
ADj 4.631 4.773 2.364 4.331 6.795 0.100 3.786
rj 11.63% 16.35% 2.13% 9.67% 18.38% 1.429 5.033
BM 0.626 0.387 0.414 0.549 0.724 4.346 32.847
Log(size) 14.247 0.957 13.636 14.262 14.848 0.301 1.309
Cross-sectional Regressions
Industries with high levels of unconditional cash-flow risk tend to exhibit higher
degrees of asymmetric dependence, see Figure 5.8. I test this relation using rolling-
window regressions. The descriptive statistics of variables used in the regressions
are reported in Table 5.5.
Each year t, I regress the industry-level of asymmetric dependence (ADj), es-
timated using the Alcock and Hatherley (2016)’s JAdj statistic based on monthly
data from past 10 years, against industry-level cash-flow risk (θjCF ) estimated using
data available from past 10 years and industry-level excess return (rj) estimated
using monthly data from past 10 years. The following measures of CF risk are
considered: CF risk estimated using the filtered NIPA consumption data (θjCF
(Dir. Filt.)) in Model (1), the Kroencke (2017)’s unfiltered NIPA consumption
data (θjCF (Dir. Unfilt.)) in Model (2), the Lettau and Ludvigson (2001)’s CAY
variable (θjCF (CAY)) in Model (3), and the Jurado et al. (2015)’s economic un-
certainty variable (θjCF (Unc.)) in Model (4). I report the mean coefficients and
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t-statistics in Panel A from Table 5.6.
I find that the industry-degree of asymmetric dependence (ADj) is positively
related with the industry level of cash-flow risk (except for CF risk estimated using
the Lettau and Ludvigson (2001)’s CAY variable). The regression results confirm
the model predictions suggesting that high cash-flow risk assets exhibit higher
degrees of asymmetric dependence.
Asymmetric Dependence (AD) and Cash-flow Risk
Figure 5.8: The relation between industry-level AD measured using the Alcock and
Hatherley (2016)’s JAdj and industry level of CF risk. CF risk estimated using the fil-
tered NIPA consumption data (θjCF (Dir. Filt.)), the Kroencke (2017)’s unfiltered NIPA
consumption data (θjCF (Dir. Unfilt.)), the Lettau and Ludvigson (2001)’s CAY variable
(θjCF (CAY)), and the Jurado et al. (2015)’s economic uncertainty variable (θ
j
CF (Unc.)).
Fama French 12 Industries data is collected from 1960 until December 2015. The industry
id number is reported next to each scatter point.
Furthermore, I find empirical evidence confirming that fundamental cash-flow
risk positively affects levels of conditional CAPM βs, see Panel B from Table 5.6.
This finding is consistent with the model prediction from Figure 5.4. My findings
suggest that the US industry levels of cash-flow risk affect both the degree of
asymmetric dependence as well as the conditional level of dependence of equity
returns.
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Table 5.6: Rolling-window Regressions. Each year t, the industry-level of asymmetric
dependence (ADj) estimated using the Alcock and Hatherley (2016)’s JAdj statistic, the
industry-level excess return (rj) and CAPM β estimated using past ten years of monthly
data are regressed against industry-level CF risk (θjCF ) estimated using data available from
past ten years. The following measures of CF risk are considered: CF risk estimated us-
ing the filtered NIPA consumption data (θjCF (Dir. Filt.)) in Model (1), the Kroencke
(2017)’s unfiltered NIPA consumption data (θjCF (Dir. Unfilt.)) in Model (2), the Lettau
and Ludvigson (2001)’s CAY variable (θjCF (CAY)) in Model (3), and the Jurado et al.
(2015)’s economic uncertainty variable (θjCF (Unc.)) in Model (4). 49 Fama French indus-
tries are considered (1960-2015). This table presents mean regression coefficients and mean
t-statistics in parenthesis. The Newey-West adjustment for standard errors is used.
Panel A ADj
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
θjCF (Dir. Filt.) 1.214
[2.370]
θjCF (Dir. unfilt.) 1.758
[2.090]
θjCF (CAY) 0.547
[0.700]
θjCF (Unc.) 0.684
[2.080]
Intercept 4.704 4.701 4.679 4.622
[8.270] [8.250] [8.100] [8.240]
Panel B CAPM βj
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
θjCF (Dir. Filt.) 0.223
[2.770]
θjCF (Dir. Unfilt.) 0.178
[2.570]
θjCF (CAY) 0.166
[1.630]
θjCF (Unc.) 0.067
[0.720]
Intercept 0.910 0.911 0.901 0.903
[16.820] [16.560] [16.160] [16.420]
Panel C Excess return (rj)
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
θjCF (Dir. Filt.) -0.007
[0.280]
θjCF (Dir. Unfilt.) 0.025
[0.970]
θjCF (CAY) 0.056
[1.950]
θjCF (Unc.) 0.022
[2.730]
Intercept 0.167 0.169 0.169 0.171
[9.250] [10.540] [8.830] [9.010]
βj -0.060 -0.059 -0.060 -0.062
[4.330] [4.650] [4.140] [4.450]
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Log(size) and Cash-flow Risk
Figure 5.9: The relation between the industry log(size) and the industry level of CF
risk. CF risk estimated using the filtered NIPA consumption data (θjCF (Dir. Filt.)), the
Kroencke (2017)’s unfiltered NIPA consumption data (θjCF (Dir. Unfilt.)), the Lettau and
Ludvigson (2001)’s CAY variable (θjCF (CAY)), and the Jurado et al. (2015)’s economic
uncertainty variable (θjCF (Unc.)). Fama-French 12 industry data is collected from 1960
until December 2015. The industry id number is reported next to each scatter point.
I explore whether industries with high fundamental cash-flow risk have higher
excess returns in Panel C from Table 5.6. I regress the industry excess return (rj)
against the industry-level cash-flow risk (θjCF ) estimated using data from past ten
years. I find a significant evidence of a positive relation between industry-level
cash-flow risk and future excess returns (when the Lettau and Ludvigson (2001)’s
CAY or Jurado et al. (2015)’s economic uncertainty variable are used). These
results indicate that the cash-flow risk of industries represent a fundamental risk
that explains the cross section of excess returns.
Size Premium
I present evidence that industries with high levels of unconditional cash-flow risk
have generally low lower market value of equity, see Figure 5.9. This finding
indicates that fundamental cash-flow risk of firms may be useful in explaining
the value premia. I further test this relation conditionally using rolling-window
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regressions and report results in Table 5.7. I find that there is a significant negative
relation between size of firms and cash-flow risk (except when cash-flow risk is
measured using the Jurado et al. (2015)’s uncertainty variable), see Table 5.7.
My findings suggest that large firms have lower cash-flow risk values and can
thus serve as better natural hedges against negative consumption shocks. This
may explain why larger firms are perceived as less risky by market participants
and exhibit lower excess returns.
Table 5.7: Rolling-window Regressions. Each year t, the industry-level book-to-market
ratio and the log value of size estimated using the monthly data from past 10 years is re-
gressed against industry-level CF risk (θjCF ) estimated using data available from past 10
years. The following measures of CF risk are considered: CF risk estimated using the
filtered NIPA consumption data (θjCF (Dir. Filt.)) in Model (1), the Kroencke (2017)’s un-
filtered NIPA consumption data (θjCF (Dir. Unfilt.)) in Model (2), the Lettau and Ludvigson
(2001)’s CAY variable (θjCF (CAY)) in Model (3), and the Jurado et al. (2015)’s economic
uncertainty variable (θjCF (Unc.)) in Model (4). 49 Fama-French industries are consid-
ered (1960-2015). This table presents mean regression coefficients and mean t-statistics in
parenthesis. The Newey-West adjustment for standard errors is used.
Log(size)
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
θjCF (Dir. Filt.) -0.345
[2.010]
θjCF (Dir. Unfilt.) -0.294
[1.870]
θjCF (CAY) -0.263
[2.440]
θjCF (Unc.) 0.025
[0.180]
Intercept 14.225 14.222 14.245 14.234
[85.270] [82.760] [87.570] [88.750]
5.6 Conclusion
I examine the effect of fundamental cash-flow risk of firms on the asymmetric
dependence between stock and market returns. Particularly, I explore why diver-
sification benefits of certain assets disappear during market downturns. I find that
portfolios with high fundamemtal cash-flow risk are likely to perform the worst
during bad economic conditions because they exhibit a relatively high degree of
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asymmetric dependence.
I develop a consumption-based general equilibrium model with investors ex-
periencing preference shocks that are exposed to heterogeneous cash-flow risks
of assets. The model predicts that during periods associated with negative con-
sumption shocks, assets with a low cash-flow risk will perform relatively better.
In contrast, high cash-flow risk stocks are shown to exhibit a higher degree of
asymmetric dependence.
The existence of preference shocks is important in explaining the conditional
return dependence of assets. The effect of the preference shock makes investors
value even more each additional unit of consumption, because their marginal utility
depends positively on preference shocks. Furthermore, the presence of preference
shocks can explain a rich spectrum of return risk premia. I find that the interaction
between heterogeneous cash-flow risks of firms and preference shocks is crucial to
explain the cross section of asset prices and the degree of asymmetric dependence.
These findings provide helpful insights on the sources of time variation in the
cross section of conditional return dependence. This paper contributes to the
existing literature by showing that high cash-flow risk stocks experience relatively
higher return dependence on market conditions during bad times as compared to
good times. I show that the fundamental cash-flow risk of firms affects both the
cash-flow β as well as the discount-rate β of risky assets.
The model predictions are confirmed by US data. The paper uses a variety
of measures of consumption that account for time-aggregation, measurement and
sample bias inherent in the publicly available consumption data. The empirical evi-
dence from US industries shows that the industry-level of asymmetric dependence
is positively related with the industry level of cash-flow risk. The fundamental
cash-flow risk also positively affects industry excess returns and CAPM β, which
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suggests that heterogeneous cash-flow risk is an important risk driver. Moreover,
my results may help us understand why large firms exhibit lower excess returns. I
show that firms with large market capitalization tend to have negative cash-flow
risk and can thus serve as natural hedges against negative shocks to the aggregate
economy.
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5.7 Appendix
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The first order condition of the social planner’s problem described in equa-
tion (5.7) yields the Lagrange multiplier of the resource constraint, where Cit =
ψiCt.
uC(Ct, Yt) = e
−ρtC−1t gt(Yt) = e
−ρtC−1t (a(Yt − Y¯ ) + 1) = Mt. (5.43)
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The conditional expected value and variance of the geometric Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process of Yτ are Et(Yτ |Yt) = Y¯ + (Yt − Y¯ )e−k(τ−t) and vart(Yτ |Yt) =
σ2C(Yt)Y
2
t
2k
(1− e−2k(τ−t)), respectively. The investor marginal utility is given by
Mt = e
−ρtC−1t (a(Yt − Y¯ ) + 1) (5.44)
and the price of the claim on aggregate consumption is
(5.45)
Pt = Et
[∫ ∞
t
Mτ
Mt
Cτdτ
]
= Ctg
−1
t Et
[∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(τ−t)gτdτ
]
= Ctg
−1
t
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(τ−t)
[
a
(
Y¯ + (Yt − Y¯ )e−k(τ−t)
)
+ 1− aY¯ ] dτ
= Ctg
−1
t
[
a(Yt − Y¯ )
ρ+ k
+
1
ρ
]
.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The dynamics of the stochastic discount process are described as
dMt
Mt
= −rtdt− σM,tdZ1t , (5.46)
where Mt is the investor marginal utility from Proposition 1:
Mt = e
−ρtC−1t gt. (5.47)
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Applying Itoˆ’s lemma to Mt leads to
(5.48)
dMt
Mt
= −
[
ρ+ µC + +ak
Yt
gt
(1− Y¯ /Yt) +
(
1 + av
Yt
gt
)
σ2C(Yt)
]
dt
−
[(
1 + av
Yt
gt
)
σC(Yt)
]
dZ1t
To satisfy the local martingale property of the stochastic discount factor (Mt),
the risk-free rate must be the negative value of drift term from the dMt/Mt dy-
namics
rt = ρ+ µC + +ak
Yt
gt
(1− Y¯ /Yt) +
(
1 + av
Yt
gt
)
σ2C(Yt) (5.49)
and the market price of risk (σM) is the negative value of the diffusion term
σM =
(
1 + av
Yt
gt
)
σC(Yt). (5.50)
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. I apply Itoˆ’s lemma to the aggregate market price from equation 5.10 to
derive the price dynamics of the aggregate portfolio. The equilibrium volatility
(σP (Yt)) is the diffusion term of the price dynamics process. The equilibrium price
of the market portfolio is a function of the aggregate consumption Ct and the state
variable Yt (with scalars a, Y¯ , ρ and k).
Pt =
Ct
a(Yt − Y¯ ) + 1
[
a(Yt − Y¯ )
ρ+ k
+
1
ρ
]
= f(Ct, Yt) (5.51)
The dynamics are
(5.52)
dPt = Pt (µCdt+ σC(Yt)dZt) +
Ct
ρ+ k
ak
ρg2t
(
k(Y¯ − Yt)dt− vσC(Yt)YtdZt
)
− Ct
ρ+ k
a2k
ρg3t
v2σ2C(Yt)Y
2
t dt−
1
ρ+ k
ak
ρg2t
vYtσ
2
C(Yt)dt,
The equilibrium volatility of returns on the market portfolio is the diffusion term
from the dPt/Pt dynamics.
σR(Ct, Yt) = σC(Yt)
(
1 +
akv
gt(aρ(Yt − Y¯ ) + ρ+ k)Yt
)
(5.53)
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Proof of Proposition 5 and 8
Proof. The local martingale property of the stochastic discount factor (Mt) imply
that the drift of the dMt
Mt
must cancel the drift term of the risk-less asset, rdt.
Consider a risky asset with price Xt: Xt = MtYt and dynamics
dXt
Xt
=
dMt
Mt
+
dYt
Yt
+
dMt
Mt
dYt
Yt
. (5.54)
For Xt to be a local martingale, it must satisfy the following condition.
(µt − rt)dt = σM,tσY,tdt, (5.55)
where µt is the drift term of the Yt dynamics.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. The price of the risky asset j is given by
(5.56)P jt = Ctg
−1
t
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(τ−t) Et
(
qjτ
)
dτ.
In order to find a closed-form solution to the price of the risky asset j from equation
(5.20), I need to solve the integral
∫∞
t
e−ρ(τ−t) Et (qjτ ). I follow the method used
by Menzly et al. (2004) to find the solution to the stochastic SDE that drives qjt .
I denote Xt = (Yt, q
j
t , s
j
t)
′. The dynamics of this vector are given by dXt = A0 =
A1Xtdt+ Σ(Yt, s
j
t)dZ
N
t , where
A0 = (kY¯ , 0, ψ
j s¯j)′ andA1 =
 −k 0 0aφj s¯j −a(k + ψj + vθjCF ) akY¯ − aY¯ φj − φj
0 0 −φj
.
There are three eigenvalues of the matrix A1: λ1 = −k, λ2 = −a(k+ψj+vθjCF ),
λ3 = −φj. The expected value of Xt+τ is then given as
Et(Xt+τ ) = Φ(τ)Xt +
∫ τ
t
Φ(τ − s)A0ds, (5.57)
where Φ(τ) = U exp(∆τ)U−1, and U is the matrix of eigenvectors and exp(∆τ) is
the diagonal matrix with diagonal elements equal to exp(∆τ)ii = e
λiτ . It follows
that
Et
[∫ ∞
t
eρ(τ−t)qjτdτ
]
=
∫ ∞
0
e−ρτe2Φ(τ)Xtdτ +
∫ ∞
0
e−ρτ
∫ τ
0
e2Φ(τ − s)A0dsdτ
(5.58)
Solving the integrals from equation (5.58) leads to
Et
[∫ ∞
t
eρ(τ−t)qjτdτ
]
= ζj0 + ζ
j
1s
j
t + ζ
j
2s
j
tYt + ζ
j
3Yt, (5.59)
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where
(5.60)
ζj0 =
aφj s¯jY¯ k
α0
[
1
φj
− 1
k
+
1
φj(φj + ρ)
− 1
k(k + ρ)
]
+
φj s¯j
ρ
[
−α0
α1
+
α1
α0α3
− α1
φj(φj + ρ)α0
1
ρ2
+
α1
α3α0(−(ρ+ α3)) +
1
ρ2
]
ζj1 =
α1
α0
(
1
ρ+ φj
− 1
ρ
(
α1
α0
− 1
))
− 1
α3
α1
α0
+
2
ρ
(5.61)
ζj2 =
1
ρ+ φj
− 1
ρ
(
α1
α0
− 1
)
(5.62)
ζj3 =
aφj s¯jY¯ k
α0
(
1
ρ+ φj
− 1
ρ+ k
)
(5.63)
and
α0 = ak − k + aφj + avθjCF (5.64)
α1 = φ
j − akY¯ + aλvθjCF + aφj s¯jY¯ (5.65)
α2 = a(k + φ
j + vθjCF ). (5.66)
The closed-form solution for price of the risky asset j is then given by
P jt (Yt, s
j
t) = Ctg
−1
t (ζ
j
0 + ζ
j
1s
j
t + ζ
j
2s
j
tYt + ζ
j
3Yt). (5.67)
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. Itoˆ’s lemma to the equilibrium price equation of the risky asset j from
Proposition 6 yields
(5.68)
dP jt
P jt
=
∂P jt
∂Ct
dCt + +
∂P jt
∂sjt
dsjt +
∂P jt
∂Yt
dYt +
1
2
∂2P jt
∂Y 2t
(dYt)
2
+
∂2P jt
∂CtYt
dCtdYt +
∂2P jt
∂Cts
j
t
dCtds
j
t +
∂2P jt
∂sjtYt
dsjtdYt.
I collect all the diffusion terms to get
σjR(Yt, s
j
t) = σC(Yt)− (γj1 −
a
gt
)σC(Yt)Yt + γ
j
2σ
j(st)s
j
t . (5.69)
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Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. The conditional βj is defined as
βj(Yt, s
j
t) =
covt(r
j
t , r
m
t )
vart(rmt )
=
σjR(Yt, s
j
t)σR(Yt)
′
σR(Yt)σR(Yt)′
(5.70)
Combining the information from Proposition 4 and 7 leads to
(5.71)βj(Yt, s
j
t) =
σC(Yt)−
(
γj1(θ
j
CF )− agt
)
vσC(Yt)Yt + γ
j
2(θ
j
CF )σ
j(st)s
j
t(
1 + aYt
gt
kv
(ρa(Yt−Y¯ )+ρ+k)
)
σC(Yt)
.
Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. It follows from the definitions of σjR(Yt, s
j
t) and σR(Yt) that
σjR(Yt, s
j
t)σR(Yt)
′ =
(
1 +
∂P jt
∂Yt
Yt
P jt
(−vσC(Yt)) + ∂P
j
t
∂sjt
sjt
P jt
σj(st)
)
σC(Yt) (5.72)
and
σR(Yt)σR(Yt)
′ =
(
1 +
∂Pt
∂Yt
Yt
Pt
(−vσC(Yt))
)2
σC(Yt)σC(Yt)
′ (5.73)
The conditional βj from Proposition 9 can now be decomposed into two com-
ponents.
(5.74)βj(sjt , Yt) =
∂P jt
∂sjt
sjt
P jt
σj(st)
1 + ∂Pt
∂Yt
Yt
Pt
(−vσC(Yt))︸ ︷︷ ︸
βjCF
+
1 +
∂P jt
∂Yt
Yt
P jt
(−vσC(Yt))
1 + ∂Pt
∂Yt
Yt
Pt
(−vσC(Yt))︸ ︷︷ ︸
βjDISC
,
where the first component refers to the sensitivity of return covariance to shocks
in the consumption share (sjt) and the second component describes the sensitivity
of return covariance to changes in the state variable (Yt). I derive the equilibrium
cash-flow beta and the discount-rate beta to be
(5.75)βjCF (s
j
t , Yt) =
γj2(θ
j
CF )s
j
tσ
j(st)
σC(Yt) + akv
σC(Yt)Yt
gt(ρa(Yt−Y¯ )+ρ+k)
.
and
(5.76)βjDISC(s
j
t , Yt) =
σC(Yt)−
(
γj1(θ
j
CF )− agt
)
vσC(Yt)Yt
σC + akv
σC(Yt)Yt
gt(ρa(Yt−Y¯ )+ρ+k)
.
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6Conclusion
This thesis contributes to widen the understanding of the cross-sectional asymmet-
ric dependence between equity returns and market returns. It compares the cross
section of stock returns across the worlds 38 largest stock exchanges with particular
emphasis on the importance of asymmetric dependence for international investors.
In this thesis, I find that asymmetric dependence is consistently priced in inter-
national equity returns. Indeed, asymmetric dependence is the only factor that is
priced in all the in-sample regressions and the vast majority of my out-of-sample
regressions.
I provide evidence that changes in AD are related to the growth of financial
markets relative to GDP and the conditions necessary for the establishment of
a business enterprise. In particular, the degree of asymmetric dependence rises
in countries with increasing market capitalization to GDP. This suggests that
the growth in size and importance of financial markets have negative effects that
may influence the stability of these markets, as well as the economy as a whole.
Moreover, investors become more sensitive to asymmetric dependence and require a
higher additional return premium to bear asymmetric dependence risk in countries
with a high change in market capitalization to GDP.
I also study the existence of asymmetric dependence among US Real-Estate
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Investment Trusts (REITs). REITs are generally considered to have a low correla-
tion with the market, which provides desirable diversification qualities. I provide
new evidence that shows that these diversification benefits are diminished for most
of US REITs because of existence of the lower-tail asymmetric dependence. I also
quantify investor sensitivity to this asymmetric dependence in the US REITs mar-
ket. I find a strong empirical evidence that AD in US REIT returns are related
with a significant price.
Last but not least, I examine how fundamental cash-flow risk of firms affects
the cross-sectional asymmetric dependence between stock and market returns. I
find that portfolios with high fundamental cash-flow risk are likely to perform the
worst during bad economic conditions because they exhibit a relatively high degree
of asymmetric dependence.
I develop a consumption-based general equilibrium model with investors ex-
periencing preference shocks that are exposed to heterogeneous cash-flow risks
of assets. The model predicts that during periods associated with negative con-
sumption shocks, assets with a low cash-flow risk will perform relatively better.
In contrast, high cash-flow risk stocks are shown to exhibit a higher degree of
asymmetric dependence.
This thesis has important implications for the understanding of the time-
varying risk profile of firms and their cost-of-capital estimation. I show that
firms with a high level of fundamental cash-flow risk are likely to have largely
volatile CAPM β, which complicates the capital allocation process that is based
on assessing future risk profiles of investments. It is important to be particularly
careful when making investment decisions in firms with a high covariance of cash-
flow growth and aggregate consumption growth because these firms are shown
to exhibit a relatively higher degree of asymmetric dependence and are likely to
141
substantially underperform relative to other assets during market downturns.
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